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Abstract 
The US presidential election of 2008 was considered a milestone for blacks and race 
in the USA. However, despite the considerable attention given to the election, it has 
not been placed in historical and political context. In particular, contemporary 
assumptions about the importance of the symbolism of a black president and about 
how the election tested the racial outlook of whites pervade the literature. Prior 
vigorously contested ideas such as equality, discrimination and integration were 
largely unconsidered during the election and with the Obama victory. This research 
attempts to bring out why race, considered predominantly through representation 
and identity, raised considerable energies among the electorate, examining the 
themes of “hope” and “change”, and the online campaign. To establish exactly what 
the election was reacting to, the thesis attempts a historical reconstruction of race: 
first, by working through a critique of realignment theory as the predominant 
academic view of electoral processes, then through an examination of how 
whiteness figured as a means to resolve class and related conflicts from the late-
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, and finally examining how 
whiteness was consolidated through post-war suburbanisation. This reconstruction 
moves past the idea of race as psychological phenomenon or as a legacy of slavery 
and Jim Crow. The thesis then analyses the turnaround on race and why race was 
posed without reference to equality in 2008 through looking at both the idea of white 
racial bases and of identity politics. We conclude that the meaning of race in its post-
war sense is largely absent in the contemporary USA suggesting that a politics of 
suburban interests better explains post-civil rights developments than race. We show 
how the politics of identity, so evident in the election, has been unable to raise issues 
of equality to address the enormous racial divisions in the USA today. 
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Introduction 
The 2008 US presidential election was seen by many as historic in marking the 
distance that the USA had moved from its previous racial politics. For the veteran 
Civil Rights commentator, Manning Marable, to elevate a black American as its chief 
executive was a stunning reversal of history.”1 In examining this election, the aim of 
the thesis overall is to understand how this had come about. The main question this 
thesis sets out to answer is “what role was played by race in the 2008 US 
presidential election?”. 
For some authors Obama’s victory seemed to speak for itself: if the nation as a 
whole could support black leadership then this alone was sufficient to show there 
was a substantial change to previous racial politics.2 Others stressed that Obama 
had to gather a huge number of white votes for victory. This led to several 
commentaries that came with the Obama victory which argued that the USA had 
moved beyond race, i.e. had become “post-racial”. In this argument, the question 
being asked in the election was not whether voters supported Obama or McCain for 
president, but rather were white people ready to accept a black man as political 
leader: were whites able to cast aside their backward prejudices? Some stressed 
that Obama, despite his victory, had not received the majority of white votes and that 
this demonstrated the continuing divisions based on race. Of white voters, 55 per 
cent cast their ballot for McCain (almost 60 per cent of white men and 53 per cent of 
white women).  However, the more nuanced reading was that Obama was not alone 
in Democrat candidates failing to gain a majority of white votes. Since 1968 
                                            
1
 Manning Marable, Beyond Black and White, (London: Verso, 2009, 2nd ed.), 297 
2
 The assumption that Obama’s election was, in itself, momentous seemed to be shared with the 
Nobel Prize Committee who precipitously gave Obama the Nobel Peace prize in November 2009 – 
the nominations closed just 11 days after Obama took office. 
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Republicans have won the majority of the white vote. Of the last ten presidential 
cycles Obama had been more successful than any of the white Democratic 
candidates – other than Bill Clinton. Clinton, like Obama, gained 43 per cent of the 
white vote.3  
Many took it that race had been so important in the USA that, in its symbolism, the 
vote for Obama in effect acted as a plebiscite on racial attitudes and that other 
factors could be ignored. However, the reasons for voting for a candidate are by no 
means exhausted in an analysis of the racial composition of the vote. Indeed in 
Chapter 8 this thesis develops the argument that voting choice might be better 
understood in relation to politics connected to the locations where voters live rather 
than voters’ racial background and views. In exit polls “Only 9 per cent said that race 
was an important factor in making their voting decision (and of these voters, 53 
percent supported Obama!)”4 Even if voters were “shy” about saying their vote was 
made because of their views on race, the numbers of votes does not explain what 
meaning race had come to have.  
Ultimately the thesis aimed to see the shifting meaning of race in the political culture 
of the USA and connected with change in US history rather than attempt to divine 
meaning from the changing voting patterns as seen, for example, in the 2008 
election. A historical-political analysis allows us to do three things which cannot be 
done through adding up the decisions of voters and ascribing a racial approach – or 
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 The last Democrat candidate to do better than Obama was Carter with 47 per cent of the white vote 
in 1976. See Dianne M. Pinderhughes, “Race, the Presidency, and Obama’s First year” in Charles P. 
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 John Kenneth White “” in “A Transforming Election: How Barack Obama Changed American 
Politics”, in Crotty, William J. ed. Winning the Presidency 2008. (Boulder, Co., Paradigm, 2009), 191 
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otherwise – to these decisions. First, it enables us to establish origins, i.e. where the 
ideas behind race and the impetus to establish or to dismantle racial ways of thinking 
comes from. Second it enables an understanding of change. It is not clear why 
people might change their views on race based on internal motivations or that 
somehow these changes are shared, i.e. are made en masse. Rather than assume 
mass change in racial outlook as a given we can attempt to connect with changed 
circumstances and political approaches over time i.e. we can engage with the 
political and historical factors and the contestation that brings change about. Third, 
we can also point enquiries as to what race meant in given circumstances. Rather 
than consider the understanding of race as fixed we can look at how the meaning 
connected with the concept of race changes. 
Obamamania 
The starting point for our historical-political engagement is to examine the politics 
and the discussion in the 2008 election itself. This is done in the first three chapters, 
in the first part “Examining the 2008 Election”. By analysing the campaign and the 
arguments put forward there, we can see the particular ways in which race was 
discussed and understood. In the initial chapters there is an examination of the 
election overall, an attempt to explain the themes of “hope” and “change”, and an 
analysis of the online campaign which seemed to be the location of much of the 
dynamism that the election exhibited. Here the thesis looks specifically at the 
election for clues as to how a black man became president and what this said about 
the changing meaning of race in US political culture in a society where blacks have 
little political power and where a myriad of social statistics showed blacks all too 
often positioned as second-class citizens.  
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In particular, in this thesis we want to understand how race had changed such that 
Obama’s racial background brought with it not just some hostility but also a great 
deal of support. A secondary question to address is “how do we account for the 
enthusiasm that came with the Obama campaign?”. The election produced 
excitement and enthusiasm beyond that of the elections of recent years, both during 
the campaign and with the Obama victory. This was often described as 
“Obamamania” which captured the exuberance often exhibited. As one academic 
noted of his New York neighbours, “I can name many of my well-to-do white friends 
who took to the highways and byways to campaign for Obama in the strong 
conviction that he would present a public face for the United States that would allow 
us to regain the affection and respect of people all around the globe.”5 The 
enthusiasm in the campaign seemed directly linked to the candidate’s race. The 
sense from the campaign was that much of the enthusiasm was a consequence of a 
white polity which was hostile to racial politics and was excited at being able to 
distance itself from those politics – even if this was expressed on occasion in chants 
by Obama supporters that “race doesn’t matter!”  
Despite the celebratory declarations about race that came with Obama’s victory the 
actual discussion of race during the election had been muted and limited in key 
ways. Both the Democrats and the Republicans had little to say explicitly on the 
subject of race. There were secondary discussions that related to the person of the 
candidate. For example there was the discussion about how black Obama was. 
There was also the discussion about the symbolism of a black candidate being 
elected president. However, given the racial divisions in the USA, there was no 
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 Richard A. Epstein, “The Good News on Race Relations”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Vol. 157, No. 210, 2009, 216 
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substantive discussion in the election about what might be done about these 
divisions. Indeed on occasion Obama expressed the view that race had acted as a 
“diversion” from the problems facing the nation. Despite the limited discussion both 
Democrats and Republicans were closely scrutinised for anything they said about 
race.6 From the Republican perspective there was sensitivity towards raising the 
race of the candidate or appearing to “play the race card” in any way which followed 
at least in part from its mea culpa on racial campaigning in 2005.7 
Post-racial  
A key idea that the thesis engages with and that emerged in the election campaign is 
the idea of “post-racial”. This term is relatively new and in some ways is confusing. A 
common way of understanding the claim that with Obama’s victory that the USA was 
post-racial was that there was no longer any discrimination. For example the Oxford 
Dictionary of English8 defines post-racial as “Denoting or relating to a period or 
society in which racial prejudice and discrimination no longer exist”.9 However, 
studied in context, post-racial was seldom if ever used to make the strong claim that 
there was no longer racial prejudice or discrimination in the USA. As the thesis 
discusses in Chapter 1, the post in post-racial was not used in the sense of post as 
in post-war i.e. simply as following, as after. The argument was not being made that 
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 James W. Ceaser, Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney, Jr., Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and 
American Politics (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 28 
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 Head of the Republican National Committee Ken Mehlman, in a 2005 NAACP speech said “Some 
Republicans gave up on winning the African-American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit 
politically from racial polarization. I am here today as the Republican chairman to tell you we were 
wrong” cited in Anne E. Kornblut, “Bush and Party Chief Court Black Voters at 2 Forums”, New York 
Times, 15 July 2005, accessed 14 April 2015,  
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8
 The Oxford Dictionary of English differs most significantly from its cousin the Oxford English 
Dictionary in that it attempts to bring new words more quickly into the dictionary. 
9
 Oxford Dictionary of English, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/post-racial 
accessed 1 August 2016 
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racism no longer existed. Rather the post in post-racial was used in the sense of 
post as in post-modern. Post-modern should be understood, paraphrasing Lyotard 
the French philosopher, as an “incredulity towards [the] meta-narratives”10 that came 
with modernity. Or in other words a rejection of “big ideas” or major theories that 
attempted to explain society as a whole. So, in the same spirit, post-racial describes 
an incredulity towards the particular meta-narrative or overarching explanation that 
race provides. There was a questioning of whether the category was any longer a 
credible basis upon which to conduct public life. Racism might well still exist among 
individuals, for example, but it was no longer a basis for public policy or a major 
factor in political motivation. In other words, race had no purchase in a political 
sense. This meant that matters concerning race might be reintegrated into US life as 
behaviours requiring regulation or else as aspects of other problems such as poverty 
or law and order, rather than as previously the pursuit of different policies directed by 
the conflicting interests of different groups. 
Post-racial as understood here becomes a double-edged sword. The idea of using 
race becomes less important as a means to engage with the world both in appealing 
to those who are racially prejudiced but also as a motivation in opposing and 
overcoming racial inequality and divisions as a matter of public policy. Consequently 
the idea is that there has been a diffusing of race as a powerful political issue. There 
is little sense of race as a motivator for those who want to oppress, but also no 
aspect of race as a call to arms for those arguing for equality. The implication is that 
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 Jean-François Lyotard cited in Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1989) 
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in a post-racial society, race no longer matters – as one author has it “[t]he postracial 
is the political horizon of racism’s depoliticization”.11  
The double edged character of post-racial can be seen in the candidacy of Obama, 
Obama was considered a post-racial candidate in that he made little play of racial 
divisions. There were to be no policy implications as a result of the different life-
chances afforded to blacks as against whites. Obama gained significant support on 
race not through his attempts to overcome the racial divide – there were no such 
attempts. Rather where Obama received support on the basis of race this should be 
understood as because of his function of a signifier that the USA had moved past 
these divisions in being able to elect a black man as president.  
Hope and change 
The thesis develops its engagement with the idea of post-racial through drawing out 
its connection with the idea of hope. Hope was one of the main ways in which the 
enthusiasm for Obama was expressed. Obama’s presentation of hope can be 
understood as an attempt to redefine the American Dream. It took the struggles of 
individuals and groups to improve their circumstances, such as the struggle against 
slavery, and re-presented these as part of the American story and ultimately as 
fulfilling the American Dream. As we discuss in Chapter 1 and 2, in the re-telling of 
hope the qualities of these individuals and groups were remade into the qualities of 
the nation’s political system that they had to struggle against.12 In laying claim to 
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 Babnor Hesse, “Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: The Postracial Horizon”. The South Atlantic Quarterly. 110: 
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 James T. Petre, makes a similar point: what is new is that Obama “interprets ‘America’s true 
genius; as a capacity for reform”. “Barack Obama’s American Exceptionalism”, James T Petre, 
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Multidisciplinary Renderings of the 2008 Campaign, (New York: Suny Press, 2010), 23 
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these individual stories, the re-telling of hope also changed the emphasis, from there 
being the American Dream to there being many American Dreams. Obama’s main 
exposition on hope made his own life story one of many narratives. His life story of 
being black and yet in contention for the presidency becomes one American Dream 
among many. Obama’s hope sought to diffuse or deconstruct the meta-narrative or 
grand theory of the American Dream into many narratives, many American Dreams. 
In this new version, race might be seen merely as part of the weave made by so 
many individual stories. 
In attempting to explain the enthusiasm for and the popularity of Obama’s campaign, 
the thesis also examines two other themes. The first is that of “change” which, 
alongside hope, seemed to capture the enthusiasm of the election. The second is 
the online campaign which itself was at times credited as being a source of the 
enthusiasm on display and at the least was able to give outlet to the energies of 
large numbers of ordinary people.  
In examining “change” we look at what several commentators have called a content-
less slogan. For many Americans, it may be that change simply became a way in 
which Obama might be contrasted to the unpopular Bush presidency. However, the 
meaning of change as a political intervention took shape and became clear in the 
course of its application in the campaigns both for the Democratic nomination and in 
the general election. In the context of the election discussions and debates it 
becomes clear – as we discuss in Chapter 2 – that the idea is being applied in a 
pointed way and speaks to a cynicism about contemporary US political life. In using 
the idea that Obama represented “change we can believe in”, there was the 
signalling that Obama’s campaign should be contrasted with others who were 
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compromised by their connection with the corruption of Washington politics. 
Obama’s inexperience in this telling was an asset. 
In using “change” what at first examination seems to be a call for a positive outlook 
(backed by its connection to hope) in its application in the campaign debates strongly 
signals a negative outlook, i.e. the disbelief that others might represent change that 
the electorate might believe in. Connected with the idea of change was the success 
of the online campaign. Through the raising of billions of dollars in campaign support 
from ordinary people and the engagement of millions in campaigning, the online 
campaign acted to distance the Obama campaign from Washington insiders and 
from money provided by lobbyists or super-rich donors. The activities of millions in 
the online campaign stood in contrast to the corrupt big money politics of the 
Washington elite. This itself was an argument that Obama represented a rejection of 
previous Washington-centred politics.  
Race disconnected from equality 
A vital point about the discussion of race that came with the election – which is partly 
linked to the idea of post-racial – needs to be raised here. This is the way in which 
race as discussed during the election was shorn of its connection with equality. In 
the discussion race was linked with the symbolism of Obama’s skin colour. However, 
any discussion of race in connection with the idea of equality was notable by its 
absence.  
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The following table summarises how race was discussed in the Obama election: 
Considered central Seldom if at all considered 
Symbolism Legal equality 
Representation Material inequality 
Consciousness (of whites and blacks) Political divisions 
Identity Social and economic structures 
 
When race was discussed in the 2008 election the factors shown in the left hand 
column continuously featured. However, ideas previously strongly connected with 
race – shown in the right hand column – were seldom raised. Race in 2008 was 
considered through the racial identity of voters, the symbolism of voting for a black 
man, and in the importance given to one’s political representative having a particular 
racial background. While these have been longstanding themes in the discussion of 
race, it is notable that other, previously central, ways of seeing race were largely 
absent. Previously, at least as much weight had been given to equality when 
discussing race. Several ideas were not substantially taken up: the idea of equality 
before the law, the material difficulties facing blacks, and the political divisions where 
it might be seen that problems facing blacks or that were experienced in the inner 
cities were left unaddressed. 
The way race was presented in the 2008 election itself needs to be interrogated. 
Race in 2008 has come to be seen in particular ways and understood through 
particular ideas that point to an altered content and meaning from the campaigning 
of the Civil Rights movement. Race is not a monolithic idea. This becomes apparent 
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in the major change of  emphasis in how race was considered in 2008 compared to 
the past.  
The coverage of race in this way was not challenged in the discussion during the 
election. Obama did reference this point by arguing that race in the past had been a 
distraction and that the problems facing blacks should be seen, rather, as part of the 
problems of poverty, resources etc. faced more generally. However, because this 
view was not substantially questioned or debated, in effect this meaning of race 
became the one assumed. One of the questions the thesis needs to answer to 
understand race in the election was “why was race largely discussed without 
reference to equality in 2008?”. 
We return to this point later in the introduction in a discussion on identity politics. 
Moving beyond the election 
As an important result of a close examination of the election, it becomes apparent 
that neither the discussions nor the events of the election are an adequate resource 
for explaining why race was understood in the way that it was. Both the media 
discussion and the online debates, for example, show limited reflection about race. 
The politics of the election campaign – and the post-racial discussion afterwards – 
did not so much deal with race but anticipate or respond to changes in racial 
viewpoints among whites considered to have been established independently of 
politics. The question raised in the limited “horse race” media coverage of the 
election was how much had white views on race changed and had those views 
changed sufficiently for a black man to win. Demographic factors, generational 
differences and supposedly changed cultural values – where the electorate had 
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become for some reason more “liberal” on race – stood in for any attempt to 
understand political change.  
As originally conceived, the thesis was to steadfastly retain a focus on the 2008 
election itself. When I first came to research the role race played in 2008 my 
consideration was that through closely examining the 2008 election I would be able 
to draw out how race factored into political considerations and was a motivation both 
for Obama’s supporters and opponents. Coming from a media studies background I 
undertook to examine, for example, the media discussion and the online aspects of 
the campaign and show how race surfaced both explicitly and implicitly in the 
discussions around the election.  
However, increasingly it became evident that to develop an explanation of how 
Obama won and what that meant required a broader investigation of how race 
factored into US politics and meant working outside the confines of the election. 
There was a need to move beyond the election and examine history over a longer 
period in an attempt to explain both why race had been so important in the USA, 
what had evidently changed to make the rejection of race so important for so many, 
and why race was understood predominantly as a matter of a president with a darker 
skin tone rather than through the significant material and political divisions between 
blacks and others. The attempt to address the broader questions of race through a 
historical/political reconstruction of race in its main twentieth century manifestation is 
done in the second part of the thesis, “Understanding Race Historically”, in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6. 
To restate the difficulty the thesis has to navigate in a slightly different way, we 
wanted to challenge the assumptions made about race in the 2008 election. To do 
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this, however, necessarily entailed the challenge of capturing the historically specific 
logic with which the race question is posed and posed again, but differently, at 
successive moments in American development. Despite the limited timeframe of the 
conjuncture of the election only the extended timeframe allowed for a logical 
reconstruction of the historical paradigm required for a solid questioning of these 
assumptions. 
Political theory 
In beginning to address broader questions about race and US political culture, the 
investigation looked to political analysis and US political theory. In doing this, 
however, what came to light was that the limited contact with race found in the 
discussions of the 2008 election was also a feature of mainstream US political 
analysis. In critical realignment, the default interpretation of elections in political 
theory, there is only a tenuous connection between race and the political 
developments expressed in US elections. In Chapter 4, “Theories of Electoral 
Change”, the thesis examines how political science, at least in its main approach, 
has not significantly integrated a discussion of race into change over time. The 
dominant approach towards elections based around partisan/critical realignment has 
by and large assumed racial outlooks as one aspect of political identification or as 
connected with other issues that motivated voters, such as crime or welfare. Race in 
these readings is generally seen as external to electoral and political processes.  
It seemed that the main way in which race was understood in political theory, i.e. 
through psychology, was to largely render it logically prior to political events and 
consequently an understanding of the dynamics of race lay outside the remit of 
political investigation. Race was seen as a consequence of group prejudices and/or 
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as a legacy of particular periods of history – of the racial organising of slavery or of 
Jim Crow. While from this standpoint politics might interact with and connect with 
race, for example through appeals to latent white racism perhaps, race in this model 
was not of politics. In Chapter 4 the thesis examines the idea of electoral realignment 
as something of a case study of the limits of US political theory in how it deals with 
race and as something of a more general critique of the way in which there is the 
assumption of static categories, i.e. ideas such as race are not seen as changing 
over time. 
Historical Reconstruction of Race 
The problem with most of the discussion of race in relation to the 2008 election is 
that it was based on unquestioned racial assumptions – on the constant background 
of white racism since the Civil War – rather than seeing racial prejudice as nuanced, 
changing idea that had more or less force in US politics according various historical 
and political factors. The thesis must, therefore, embark upon a reconsideration of 
the meaning of race in United States politics and history. Altogether a more 
ambitious undertaking was required than that originally envisaged: a historical 
investigation of the complex relationship that the USA has had with race and 
subsequently how this finds political expression. To answer the original enquiry 
required consulting historical sources across a much greater span of time and 
subsequently the dissertation moved in a different direction from that originally 
envisioned.  
Our approach was to ascertain the reasons why racial thinking as it appeared in the 
twentieth century was developed and then to explore how this form of race declined. 
For the bulk of the twentieth century, race was a powerful force in US politics. 
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However, in recent years this force had changed significantly. Race in its main 
twentieth century form i.e. the denial of equality has become less important. 
However, at the same time vestiges of race as previously understood, matters of 
identity, significantly increased in importance. With the 2008 Obama victory the 
discussion was that race no longer acted as a barrier to achievement by blacks and 
racism was almost universally decried in public life. It seems appropriate to describe 
this situation as a “turnaround” on race. If we could establish the reason that race 
was important this might also lead in to establishing why and how race changed. To 
understand the role that race played in 2008 then also required answering the 
related question of “how did racial factors and racial thinking change during the 
twentieth century?”  
It seemed to us that an explanation of race that applied for most of the twentieth 
century would require certain characteristics. First, it would have to account for the 
strength of feeling involved over an extended period of time. Second, it would have 
to explain how race became important not simply in the South, but also on a national 
basis. Third, our model would have to connect with the way in which race took on a 
universal character. It would have to explain how whiteness became connected with 
being American. Fourth, it would have to account for the form that race took in the 
physical separation of whites and blacks that, again, applied on a national basis. 
Finally, it would have to make some account for why race in this twentieth century 
manifestation would, at the least, lose momentum as the century progressed. 
In our historical construction of race we attempt to identify the particular ways in 
which race functions in the USA. Rather than attempt a reconstruction based on 
theories of race we attempt to link to particular twists and turns of how race featured 
in political development. There are a host of theories of race, of attempts to define 
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race and its development in general. However, by instead presenting a historically 
oriented investigation we can see the interactions of race with other political factors 
such as class and nationality, and vitally the changes in the idea of what race means 
as it plays out in its specific historical context within the United States. Rather than, 
for example, place the idea of race in inverted commas and show how it falsely 
describes reality, the thesis considers the way that ideas and meaning – and 
practices – change over time in a way that abstract theories fail to capture.  
In developing our historical model of race in the USA, the thesis also engaged in a 
critique of other historical approaches. The contention in this thesis is that the limited 
main ways in which historical explanations have been applied are problematic and 
do not amount to convincing historical explanations. These explanations often leave 
important gaps which are filled by explanations based on the consciousness of the 
population. Where historical explanations are inadequate, automatically the fall-back 
explanation for race applies: that whites are racist i.e. racism becomes the 
(inadequate and circular) explanation for racial politics.  
Perhaps the most pervasive way that race is linked to history is through the legacy of 
slavery. In a simple sense the poverty and degradation that was the consequence of 
slavery has a demeaning legacy on the black population. Even with the end of 
slavery there was poverty, ignorance and at least in parts a destructive cultural 
legacy. While slavery was in place there was also undoubtedly a demoralising effect 
on the black population not directly under its sway. Nor are there a great number of 
generations separating the population of 2008 from the Emancipation Proclamation 
of 1863. Even with the abolition of slavery the view that blacks were fitted to this role 
did not vanish overnight. The ignominious end to Radical Reconstruction was also 
understood in such a way that it was used to bring into question the abilities of 
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blacks to be able to govern (although by the 1960s revisionist historians had to a 
large degree undermined this standpoint).13 
Nonetheless, race as a legacy of slavery does not amount to a substantial historical 
explanation for race over time. Essentially, as a legacy, the impact of slavery on 
ideas of race is passive. A legacy is unable to account for new developments. 
Additionally slavery was a form of social organisation, what might be better termed a 
mode of accumulation within capitalism in the USA, only of Southern states and 
consequently, is limited in what it tells us about the situation nationally. So, for 
example, one important way that race functioned in the USA in the twentieth century 
was through the spatial division of the population where whites moved out of the 
cities to all-white suburbs whereas blacks became concentrated in poor inner-city 
areas.14 The legacy of slavery has little to tell us about why this started to happen 
from the 1890s and about how this developed on a national basis. Nor can the 
legacy of slavery tell us anything about how this process began to reverse from the 
1970s (as is discussed in Chapter 8). The point here is that the novelty and renewed 
dynamic of race as the twentieth century developed cannot be accounted for by an 
institution that has ended. Indeed, while slavery was organised around a close 
division of labour between blacks and whites, race in its main twentieth century 
manifestation was marked by the way in which blacks were excluded from access to 
the new dynamic suburban labour markets. 
In a similar way to slavery, race in the twentieth century has been linked to Jim Crow 
and the legacy of Jim Crow. A related difficulty in understanding the historical 
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development of race through Jim Crow is that it is a Southern institution. It is unclear 
how “peculiar” southern institutions might be said to have a national impact on race. 
Rather than similarities, the differences between race on a national basis and race 
as applied in Jim Crow are what are notable. While the segregation in Jim Crow was 
enforced by law and reached directly into all areas of public life, the racial 
segregation of suburbia was not legally mandated. Rather, the boundaries of white 
suburbia were policed by residents voting with their feet or employing informal tactics 
to stop property sales across the colour line. Understanding the national divisions of 
race through Jim Crow is not possible. Further, as we argue later in the thesis in 
Chapter 6, the successes of the Civil Rights movement in the South and the 
continued emphasis on these successes acted to divert attention from the informal 
racial politics of the rest of the USA. Notably it was opposition to moves to end 
housing and educational segregation in the North in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that was one of the most significant factors in putting paid to the civil rights 
movement. 
A third way in which there has been an attempt to link race to political developments 
is in the post-civil rights era has been described as the “Southern Strategy” (this is 
used as a case study on racial appeals in Chapter 8). In this view the Republicans 
apply a Southern model of appeals to racism as a view held by white bases of 
support outside the South. This has been perhaps the major explanation of the 
application of racial politics since the civil rights era. From this standpoint the 
Republicans appealed to the racial prejudices of Northern whites in an attempt to 
undermine the New Deal coalition in a continuation of the way that they had 
appealed to Southern whites. This understanding relies on the supposition that there 
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is latent racism among Northern whites.15 It does not explain this racism but rather 
assumes that it is present. Further it interprets the New Deal as an attempt to 
overcome racial divisions where rather the New Deal was one of the main 
mechanisms to establish the physical divisions between blacks and whites in its 
federal backing for whites-only suburbia.16  
As we discuss in Chapter 7, rather than there being the use of Southern racial 
organising techniques in the North it might be argued that in some ways the flow of 
racial organising has gone the other way. The development of racially segregated 
Southern suburbs has followed the Northern model. The least segregated areas 
remain in the South, but the pattern has been to apply what were in the main 
Northern practices more systematically to areas in the South. 
The last historical model the thesis engages with is the idea of whiteness. This is 
covered in some detail in Chapter 9. Especially in its historical investigations, the 
thesis has employs the methodology of whiteness i.e. that race is formed by 
exclusion and inclusion in relation to the major group rather than by an unchanging 
negative attitude towards skin-colour or any other specific attribute. However, we 
take issue with the use of whiteness as used in much of contemporary whiteness 
studies literature which treats whiteness as an ahistoric structure of “white privilege”. 
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At this stage it is worth asserting that the idea of whiteness amounts to the 
assumption that there are a series of flexible institutions which proffer advantages for 
whites as against blacks. In works on whiteness in recent years these have been 
understood as informal networks of privilege where whites gain simply by wont of 
being white. There is the outward appearance of formal equality. However, behind 
this façade is a series of preferences made in favour of whites. The limitations of this 
model are that whiteness seems to stand on its own. Essentially through their lived 
racial identity, which seems to be largely unchanging over time, whites are 
supposedly able to draw advantage from the racial setup. As such this is a 
description of white racism that floats above historical developments. This is, we will 
contend, only the appearance of a historical approach.  
This model has it that there is a system of whiteness which in some readings has 
been in place for several hundred years. We note here that despite the idea of an 
undifferentiated whiteness the supposed benefits of being white seem to be 
unevenly shared in practice, for example over the last 40 years or so. We also note 
that the idea that there has been a hostility in many quarters towards ideas of 
whiteness as part of the “culture wars” in recent years but in this reading this does 
not seem to have affected whiteness. Chapter 9 attempts to link whiteness with the 
politics of identity as a way of understanding how whiteness has significantly 
changed over time and the meaning of the contemporary hostility to whiteness.  
Outlining our historical political model of race 
Our thesis begins an attempt at explaining the default racial organisation of the 
twentieth century through looking the physical separation of the races throughout the 
USA that in large part was enacted through deliberate mass whites-only 
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suburbanisation. As discussed in Chapter 6, the systematic spatial division of the 
USA into areas that were white only and the ghettoization of large parts of the inner 
cities where only black residents lived was only widely recognised in the 1980s and 
the 1990s with the idea that an “American Apartheid” had been created and the 
interrogation of how the suburban expansion operated along racial lines.17 
Through our model we want to explain why the systematic separation of blacks and 
whites happened. The federal backing for whites-only suburbanisation in the New 
Deal and the decades after the Second World War that underwrote these divisions, it 
seems to us, was not just a result of racially based federal policy. Rather, until the 
late 1960s, this approach had been largely uncontested and so support, it should be 
assumed, was much wider than the predilections of the federal bureaucracy. There 
was little in the literature to explain this. Without an alternative explanation we are 
left, by default, with the racial outlooks of whites as an explanation in itself. 
In working back through history to try to explain how this division gained support, our 
research leads us to examine the waves of race-based campaigning that washed 
over the USA from the 1870s through to the 1940s. The thesis, starting in Chapter 
five, “Negotiating Whiteness”, attempts to set out how a politics emerged that 
accepted, indeed expected or demanded, the separation of blacks and whites and 
could do so with little contestation. This racial politics, we argue, became the way in 
which the USA sought to deal with the divisions based around class, ethnicity, 
nationalism and religion that there were between different groups of whites. We 
attempt to show how, in particular, the conflicts connected with assimilating large 
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numbers of European migrants and blunting the potential conflicts of class came to 
be handled through the prism of race.  
The thesis relies on several superb examinations of the past as a guide. For 
example, the thesis uses material from working class history that attempts to 
understand the travails of the early trade union movement in the West, scholarship 
on the nativist movement that outlines the roiling patterns of reaction from the 1880s 
into the 1920s, and whiteness studies that seeks to explain important ways in which 
waves of immigrants bought into or were sold a white outlook. Chapter five, 
“Negotiating whiteness” attempts to bring these developments together. By bringing 
together movements and events from the turbulent period from the 1870s until the 
1940s, the thesis shows how the negotiations of class and of nationality in large part 
took on a racial form and ultimately influenced the development of white bases of 
support. This is a complex picture made of several strands but bringing these 
strands together shows how racial thinking and organisation went to the heart of 
political change even though this took several forms and had varying degrees of 
intensity. There are seemingly contradictory factors at work here that make this by 
no means a straightforward story. Thus, for example, although there is a New Deal 
coalition that includes blacks and provides material support to blacks, there is at the 
same time the establishment of whites only towns and suburbs through New Deal 
support and sometimes directly as New Deal policy.18 The divide between blacks 
and whites is hardened in this period, but the impetus is far from simply being white 
hostility to blacks. Indeed rather than a settled whiteness in opposition to blackness, 
this period contains part of a long movement towards the creation of a combined 
white outlook. 
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The early part of this period is instructive. This is partly because it took on a relatively 
clear form through the campaigning efforts of nativists and partly in how this period 
came to a conclusion points to how problems were to be negotiated. For the early 
part of this period from about the 1880s to the 1920s the racial campaigning often 
took the form of the idea of nativism. Nativism was a reaction to the waves of large-
scale immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe that began in the 1880s and 
accelerated in the 1890s. Nativism acted as a constant reaction to an alien presence 
in the body politic. The conflict was centred on the divisions between large numbers 
of white immigrants who had arrived to fill the needs of burgeoning industry and the 
existing white native population. These newcomers – what John Higham called 
“Strangers in the Land”19 – were more likely to be unskilled labourers than the 
existing “native” workers, had different national origins from those of the existing 
population (and a much more recent connection to the extent that this might signal 
divided loyalties), were Catholic rather than Protestant, and, because they did not 
have a stake in existing property relations, might well be attracted to anarchist or 
socialist politics that sought to redistribute wealth.  
As we discuss in Chapter 5, the constant agitation of nativism was finally 
undermined and came to an end with the immigration legislation of 1924 which set 
quotas for immigration. The new immigration law, while still favouring Protestant 
immigrants from Northern Europe, set out clear lines linking citizenship to race. In 
essence 1924 legislation set out immigration controls which had it that whites of all 
ethnicities might become citizens, but barred those from non-white countries from 
applying to become American. It should be noted that there were small exceptions. 
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For example for blacks the 1870 Naturalization Act had set out the special status of 
“aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent”20 for naturalisation. The 
Republican dominated congress of the time did this to underpin the status of blacks 
as “a matter of justice” which had only just been won at such cost.21 However, with 
the 1924 act the annual quota for those from all African countries totalled 1,200 – 
this might be compared, for example, to the number from Germany which was 
51,000 or from the UK which was 34,000. Overall 2.3 per cent of the total 
immigration quota was for countries outside of Europe.22 The legislation acted to 
signal that all whites should be considered in common as against non-whites 
although with an implicit ranking among whites in that the quotas involved favoured 
the home countries of the native population. In essence the new law linked the 
question of being American directly to the question of being white. 
The setting up of immigration laws establishing the difference between whites and 
others was a key starting point to overcoming the divisions among whites. 
Subsequently the waves of nativism that had been seen since the 1890s came to an 
end. However, it should be understood that the position of being white in this divided 
land was not straightforward. There was what might be called the pressure of racial 
ordering. Overall, the situation pointed to an unsettled whiteness where divisions 
remained. The central way of establishing the credentials of being white, of fitting 
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into mainstream, white culture, was in joining with other whites in the hostility 
towards the black population. The key form this took was to attempt by ethnic whites 
to distance themselves from blacks attempting to move into their ethnic enclaves in 
the city. The response to those blacks attempting to breach the colour line was often 
violent, through for example firebombing houses.  
In Chapter 6, “Racial Separation”, the thesis covers how the racial outlook we have 
described that emerged in the late nineteenth century took on material form and was 
extended well into the twentieth century until at least the 1970s. This is the story of 
how blacks became literally a race apart in a wave of expulsions and exclusions of 
blacks across small-town America from the 1890s until the 1940s23 combined with 
the mass internal migrations of whites-only suburbanisation until the 1970s. In this 
exposition we try to draw out the peculiar form in which this happened such that the 
divisions were seemingly the product of individual choice. We attempt to show how 
market mechanisms, though seeded and enabled by federal policy, were such that 
the market acted to discipline against racial integration through movements in house 
prices. In this period, the American Dream of white picket fences in a suburban 
setting was overwhelmingly for Americans of various European ancestries coming 
together as white. We develop the argument that the default narrative of successful 
civil rights campaigning in the South comes to obscure the divisions between whites 
and blacks that emerge on a national basis largely through this suburban migration.  
The spatial separation of blacks and whites was enacted in the main through the 
expansion of the suburbs. In effect the white insecurity seen in the cities through the 
desire to literally distance themselves from blacks became more systematic with the 
development of mass suburbanisation which began at the turn of the twentieth 
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century. Blacks were blocked from moving to the growing suburban locations. There 
were informal colour bars put in place by property developers. Additionally there 
were informal measures by realtors to block sales. Federal support for mortgages 
funded the enormous migration to all-white suburbs which broke down the white 
ethnic enclaves that had been a feature of the central cities. The overall process was 
supported by federal intervention in mortgage provision which made it extremely 
difficult for blacks to raise the financing to move to the growing white suburbs – 
should the hostility they would encounter or the informal bans not prove to be 
sufficient disincentive. In these all-white areas backed by federal monies, the market 
also acted to discipline against integration. House prices went down with any black 
inhabitants thus spurring those involved to block any sales to blacks. Consequently 
the most dynamic parts of the economy around the new suburban developments 
were no-go areas for blacks. Essentially the form that racial divisions took was that 
blacks were unable to take part in the expansion of the economy linked to the new 
suburban growth. 
As the thesis discusses in Chapter 6, the suburbs should not merely be seen as new 
places to live. The development of the suburbs was essentially a political 
phenomenon in that they took the form of new self-governing locales. Increasingly 
from the 1910s the suburbs began to break away from the cities. The suburbs were 
the site of new structures of governance. In their independence they broke the 
political ties of ethnic whites with Tammany hall-style ethnically based voting blocs 
and reorganised interests around a vast host of smaller suburban enclaves. The 
politics involved were about distancing these new grouping from the material 
problems and perceived moral problems of the cities. In this process blacks who 
were associated with these problems were firmly excluded. This was influenced by 
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federal support but there was a strong and spontaneous grassroots movement 
dedicated to keeping blacks out. The politics of being white were played out in the 
divisions between the black ghettos of the cities and the all-white suburbs. The 
politics of race at the time were such that this process was not questioned.  
Following the Second World War, the federal measures that sought to bring whites 
together and further distanced whites from blacks continued. State support for 
education provision through the GI Bill following the Second World War was 
overwhelmingly for whites and provided the means for new immigrant populations to 
play their part as much as “native” whites in the expansion of the economy in the 
post war boom. Notably during the war, as we discuss in Chapter 5, blacks were 
excluded from front line military service and employed in the war industries but 
denied access to unsegregated housing. 
What becomes the most important institution to understand race in the USA in the 
twentieth century then was not the peculiar institution of Jim Crow, but rather the 
peculiar institution of an American Apartheid seemingly created not by legal 
mechanisms but through “discrimination”, the term used here in the sense of choice, 
i.e. whites spontaneously choosing to live separately from blacks. The caveat to this 
choice, of course, is the enormous backing this it received through the federal 
monies of the New Deal and measures that came with the end of the Second World 
War. 
Race in this manifestation was primarily about bringing whites together such that 
previous divisions were overcome. The distancing from blacks, both physically and 
politically, acted to cohere whites by negative example, but was not its primary aim. 
What had been fractious politics of variegated white ethnicities and differing class 
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outlooks were turned into a combined whiteness. Blacks in this picture were a 
negative cultural point of reference. The hostility to blacks who seemingly did not fit 
the aspirational model of white America acted as a test of fitting-in with cultural 
norms. In previous years white ethnicities gained coherence as groupings or 
communities around which strategies for survival and advancement could be 
organised in the burgeoning cities. However, through the interventions that 
subsidised combined white living in the suburbs – where it was cheaper to buy than 
it had previously been to rent – this survival strategy was replaced by taking part in 
the expansion into the new all-white suburbs. Notably this is not the whiteness 
discussed in whiteness studies. It was not whiteness in general already established, 
but rather an attempt at establishing whiteness in common connected to the material 
success of an expanding economy. 
A white race completed: the turnaround on race 
In our historical-political model of race it becomes clear that as the twentieth century 
progressed the drive behind race as a means for white ethnics to be fully American, 
to create a combined whiteness, runs its course. It is in Chapters 7,8 and 9, the third 
part of the thesis “The Shifting Meaning of Race” that we look at the turnaround in 
race and its consequences, building on the analysis of race in its mainstream 
twentieth century form that we developed in the second part of the thesis. 
Ethnic whites by the 1970s had become virtually indistinguishable white neighbours 
most often in all-white suburbs across the USA. Here the thesis makes the case that 
the dynamic behind these racial politics comes to an end because the goal it had 
been striving for had been reached. The point of race was as a means to overcome 
the problems of class, national background, ethnicity etc. which was the main 
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difficulty the US polity faced as the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth 
century progressed. These problems had been negotiated through the creation of a 
whiteness that allowed belonging and allowed for the evincing of differences in what 
might be called a racial ordering and which became a central part of the USA’s 
political organisation. However, whites of all hues had by the 1970s became secure 
in their position as whites and became indistinguishable from one another by means 
of these previous ties, i.e. previous ethnic links played little or no political role. While 
being American and fitting into the white model had been very much a live issue for 
those moving to the new suburban locations, the new generations raised in suburbia 
felt none of these pressures. There was longer the pressing need to distance 
themselves from blacks as part of becoming fully American, i.e. white American, as 
had been the case with their parents and grandparents.  
By the 1970s there was no longer momentum for the old racial politics: the insecurity 
of a position in the racial order based on the original difficulties of the late nineteenth 
century at least was no longer at issue. The pressure of the racial order so keenly 
felt in the earlier part of the century became increasingly irrelevant. The generational 
difference was important because the new generation had a very different 
experience to that of previous generations and no experience of the importance of 
race that their parents and grandparents had grown up with. Indeed once a light had 
been shone on these politics in the early 1970s – as civil rights questioned these 
arrangements – then new generations increasingly saw such racial politics as 
morally indefensible. 
As illustration that the racial politics of the twentieth century were petering out, the 
thesis examines in Chapter 7 how the racial separation that underpinned the politics 
of race for most of the twentieth century is rapidly dismantled. From the 1970s on, 
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each decade saw a significant decrease in measures of segregation. About a third of 
this decrease can be accounted for by internal migration away from the heavily 
segregated North to less segregated Southern states. However, two thirds of the 
decrease was because levels of segregation throughout the USA decreased. This 
was possible because the absolute barriers to movement to the suburbs by blacks 
based on racial animus were removed. This was a major turnaround: although levels 
of segregation increased from the 1890s to the 1960s, by 2000 levels of segregation 
had decreased to numbers last seen in 1910.24 Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
as of 2000, on average 59.1 per cent of a population would have to move out of 
individual census wards to match the overall racial proportions in the metropolitan 
regions those wards were in.25 In other words, despite significant progress since 
1970, the USA remains highly segregated, most significantly in North Eastern cities. 
From race to place 
The thesis has a model of race that shows why there was a turnaround in race from 
the 1970s. However, there have been factors that mean that this change has not 
been especially clear. There are two main factors covered at the end of Chapter 7 
that disguise and to an extent mitigate this change.  
The first is the conservative organisation of the main parties which has acted to 
shore up the idea of white constituencies. This was done by focusing policy on the 
needs of whites and by sidelining the problems of the inner cities and blacks. We use 
a model of party competition developed by Paul Frymer to explore how the idea that 
there were white bases of support as understood by the main political parties acted 
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to bolster the connection between race and politics. In a conservative approach the 
parties acted to minimise any support for measures that might help blacks on the 
basis that this might be seen to undermine white support as they understood it. 
Frymer’s analysis shows how the two main parties have worked to diminish the 
needs of blacks on the basis that winning votes from blacks reduces votes from 
whites. This is facilitated by the way in which black votes are, what Frymer calls, 
“captured”. Capturing happens for blacks who are invested in the Democratic Party 
which then has little incentive to offer policy initiatives to gain their support. Nor do 
the Republicans offer incentives for blacks to switch. The Republican Party has little 
chance of gaining black support and are themselves invested in policies considered 
to be aimed at whites. This lack of competition is based on the assumption the 
parties made of white bases of support which are strongly if not implacably hostile to 
policies that might attempt to deal with the problems of the inner cities and 
consequently creates a conservative orientation towards policy. By their policy 
orientation the main parties have effectively extended and given shape to the racial 
divide.  
The second and more important factor is the political setup that the American 
Apartheid left in its wake. The thesis examines how there is a politics of space that 
remains as the politics of race has diminished. The thousands of self-governing 
suburban municipalities are often hostile to raising taxes which are not spent within 
their often small boundaries. In effect they are oriented towards maintaining the 
existing social composition of their existing populations. Increasingly this is not a 
matter of race but rather of insularity. The objection is not to residents of other races 
but rather to spending on services on non-residents or for extra spending because 
new residents do not fit the existing patterns of income and social need. Despite the 
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withering away of racial animosity that stopped black movement, in effect the 
suburban governments are wary of taxation that might go outside the suburban 
boundaries to people of different backgrounds. The coming to a close of the politics 
of race is hidden in that it leaves in its wake a politics of space. The unintended 
consequence of the spatial separation that came with race was huge numbers of 
self-governing suburban locales which are often strongly oriented towards limiting 
spending on services that might not immediately benefit the local population and on 
enforcing zoning rules that limit changes to the type and cost of housing in a bid to 
maintaining their existing social composition.  
In an important distinction, however, there is not a simple transition from suburban 
spaces that exclude blacks to suburban spaces that exclude any from outside those 
outside their successful middle class social strata. The politics of race have not 
simply been replaced by a politics of space. This is because unlike the uniform 
success of the post-war boom, in the uneven economic development of the USA 
since the major slowdown of the early 1970s, some areas have prospered while 
others have seen repeated recessions that have failed to fully heal. The lack of a 
uniform economic and social experience has been a suburban landscape which in 
many ways has become more varied than urban spaces.26  
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One axis of variation that seems to have political consequences is the connection 
between suburban spaces and the urban cores they are connected to. The thesis 
looks at attempts by demographers to link types of suburban space to votes which 
show a political pattern which in part reflects the relationship of suburban spaces to 
their urban cores. Overall there are politics where, rather than race, the relationships 
between urban and suburban spaces seem to create a set of political criteria which 
is reflected in voting patterns: put crudely a stronger connection to the urban core is 
positively correlated to Democratic support.27 This analysis points to a set of political 
orientations not connected to race where voters see their interests in the context of 
the politics of space that comes out of the increasingly variegated suburban political 
landscape. The thesis develops the case that the political calculations of the USA’s 
suburbs are better described as linked to the politics of suburbia rather than the 
politics of race. The assumption has been that white Americans are making 
decisions based on a racial outlook, despite their protestations to the contrary. 
Rather, the analysis we develop here suggests that the varied and changing 
economic and social relationships of the suburbs are richer and firmer ground from 
which to understand political motivations today than the uniform racial politics of the 
twentieth century.  
Identity politics 
The thesis attempts to explain why race in the 2008 election was disconnected from 
the idea of equality. It does this through an examination of the concept and practices 
of identity politics in Chapter 8 and 9. Essentially identity politics is the use of group 
membership as political criteria. The sociologist Daniel Bell writing in 1973 described 
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this as a “new principle of rights”.28 When it comes to race, this means that 
individuals are judged by their racial background rather than strictly on individual 
merit. The thesis examines how this approach was used as a means to manage race 
or ameliorate racial divisions in the form of affirmative action when large-scale 
attempts at using federal resources to bridge the racial gap were seen to fail in the 
1960s. Since that time identity politics as a way of seeing race has expanded. The 
way in which in 2008 race was overwhelmingly understood through matters of 
identity bears this out. By using the model of identity politics we can see the 
importance ascribed to Obama’s blackness in the election. We attempt to show how 
the recognition and representation of racial group identities has become the main 
way in which race is understood and dealt with today. 
Identity politics can be understood as an approach arising out of the impasse that 
liberal politics faced by the late 1960s. With Civil Rights success in the South, for a 
short time the racial divisions in the North were highlighted. President Johnson 
attempted to tackle these divisions as part of a series of “Great Society” 
programmes.29 When it came to dealing with the problems of the inner cities, 
however, Johnson’s efforts were largely unsuccessful. The political will and the 
forces arrayed against Johnson were such that there was little ability to resolve the 
entrenched problems of poverty facing blacks in the inner cities. This is not to say 
that some of Johnson’s interventions did not have lasting benefits. The transfer 
payments established in this period helped to significantly reduce levels of poverty 
for some groups, for example. However, the separation of black life in the ghettoes 
of the inner cities and the relative dynamism of mainstream US life seen, for 
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example, in the white suburbs, remained. Johnson’s attempts failed largely because 
the resources applied to the problem were insufficient. Such was the scale of the 
problems in the inner cities that the measures applied could not bring the inner cities 
into the American mainstream of development. Additionally, the resources applied 
were often captured by existing political players such that they do not go to the 
intended recipients. White mayors often captured policy initiatives for their own white 
constituencies meaning little headway was made.  
Although affirmative action is, today, associated with the left, President Nixon was 
the author of the first significant affirmative action programmes.30 Nixon was 
attempting to stabilise the situation in the inner cities following a number of years that 
saw rioting in the Northern cities. While, as we have seen, there had been huge 
initiatives to overcome the differences between whites in the past, no such political 
capital was available for blacks. Nixon did not campaign for equality or for the 
passing of new legislation. Rather by using executive orders, by means of 
presidential decree, Nixon set measures whereby federal employment had quotas 
for black employment. Further, Nixon linked federal grants to the states to affirmative 
action measures. Nixon used the division of powers in the USA to bypass democratic 
accountability. There was to be no winning of support for solidarity for the difficulties 
of the poor of the inner cities. Rather the federal bureaucracy and the opening up of 
means for litigation based on these measures allowed Nixon to implement support 
for middle class blacks in employment and in education. We make the case that 
accommodations with group differences shown in affirmative action were attempts to 
manage race with little confidence available in being able to overcome racial 
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divisions. Identity politics in the form of affirmative action were the means through 
which Nixon attempted to deal with the inability to put through substantive measures 
that would deal with the problems of the inner cities and the divisions between white 
and black America. Essentially this was giving up on the idea that there could be 
significant material intervention that would improve the lot of those in the inner city as 
a means to overcome racial difference. There was an abandonment of the Great 
Society-style initiatives that sought to bring equality. These were seen as being too 
ambitious and could not raise the support for overcoming the gap between poor 
urban areas and the white advancement in the suburbs, i.e. for reversing several 
decades of policy. 
Implementing affirmative action was no minor point: in effect it meant overturning 
previous ideas of equality and subverting legal norms. Where previously there was 
equality based on merit, this was replaced by benefits given on the basis of 
membership of racial groups. In effect precepts such as equality before the law were 
undermined on the basis that this might make amends for past injustices. Through 
affirmative action Nixon was, in his own words, “helping the strong”. Nixon’s 
approach helped give opportunities to a black middle class by providing employment 
opportunities in the federal and state workforces and by creating diffuse criteria for 
equal employment by major corporations who were bidding for government 
contracts. Affirmative action hiring was taken up by large corporations in that it 
created a barrier to entry for smaller competitors. New employment and educational 
openings helped solidify a black middle class that could take advantage of these 
opportunities.31 
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Affirmative action attempted to manage race. There was no programme that 
attempted to overcome the divisions of race. Rather there was the idea that using 
the ascribed group characteristics of race it would be possible to help some blacks. 
The goal was not equality. There was no sense that race was to be overcome. There 
was the abandonment of large scale intervention that might seek to overcome 
problems of employment, education, housing etc. among blacks or in the inner cities.  
In the past campaigners had attempted to have a state that made no decisions 
based on race as a means to overcoming discrimination and as a means to equality. 
In accepting this “new principle of rights”, however, race was to feature in decision 
making by the state. Previously campaigners had attempted to get public support, for 
solidarity, to overcome racial divisions. With the state now attached to opportunities 
for blacks, these campaigners were now engaged in negotiations as to the size of 
quotas for black advancement. Consequently campaigners often became 
supplicants to the state rather than look outward to their fellow citizens. Though 
ostensibly as a means to address inequality, in effect the use of racial categories 
entrenched these categories. While some on the left initially challenged affirmative 
action in the courts and through campaigning such campaigners were side-lined by 
the Democratic Party which supported affirmative action. This acceptance by the 
Democrats signalled that they too considered it was not plausible to overcome racial 
divisions through major programmes of intervention, or to campaign for support for 
such measures. Without major initiatives the idea of overcoming the racial divide and 
establishing equality had, in effect, been abandoned. The idea of removing racism 
had been replaced by the allocation of resources based on racial membership as a 
means to ameliorate the effects of racial divisions, in effect to manage these racial 
divisions. 
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Rather than the idea being that blacks could be judged by their character, by their 
achievements, there was a move towards providing employment because 
prospective employees were black. The presentation of the idea was that through 
government intervention the past disadvantages of blacks would be overcome given 
time. It is the contention here that through identity politics the connection between 
race and equality has been severely undermined. In accepting group, racial 
designations, the idea of overthrowing racial divisions becomes diminished. The 
recognition of identity, along with the racial designation, as a means to some 
advancement became a goal in itself. The goal of overcoming, of destroying racial 
categorisation, has been lost.  
The thesis also considers how the use of racial criteria in managing resources has 
changed to further weak its tenuous link with historical equality. The thesis uses 
Skrentny, a leading commentator on affirmative action, to update the picture of how 
identity politics is connected with how race is seen today. Identity politics has 
increasingly taken the form of what Skrentny calls “racial realism”.32 Partly because 
of legal attacks which see affirmative action as discriminatory, increasingly the 
justification for identity politics has moved away from a link to past injustices. Today 
racial realism has become an important justification for taking account of race. Racial 
realism is said to describe the benefits to organisations of using racial criteria. This 
takes the form of marking use of racial characteristics in organisational effectiveness 
or in racial signalling. In organisational effectiveness, the argument is that an 
organisation can benefit from workers who understand racial markets or can even 
take advantage of racial characteristics in working practices. In signalling, the idea is 
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that an organisation can show it is modern and progressive through diversity in 
appointments. This change takes identity politics even further from a connection with 
matters of equality. 
Major perspectives on race and the 2008 election 
This introduction has gone through the major models, theories and ideas with which 
the thesis engages. As part of this it has outlined the political historical approach it 
uses and presented an outline of it. We now turn to situate the thesis among other 
attempts to understand the Obama election. Here we identify major perspectives 
when it comes to race and the 2008 election. It is against these views that this thesis 
is competing to explain the meaning of race in the election. Different elements of 
these perspectives are often merged and can overlap. Indeed there is inevitably 
some overlap in the major perspectives presented here and in the points made in the 
thesis. While we have arranged these perspectives in a particular way for clarity, it 
would be possible, however, to re-present these ideas by combining their elements 
in different ways. However, roughly speaking each perspective shown here also 
roughly corresponds to distinct takes on the meaning of race as emerged from the 
election.  
There are four major views that we identify here: 1) race is not now a defining issue 
in US politics: it is one factor among many; 2) with Obama comes the development 
of post-racial politics which opens up new political possibilities; 3) Obama as a 
minority candidate symbolically heralds the future where whites as a minority within 
the electorate which may also mean an emerging Democratic majority; 4) Obama’s 
victory further disguises white privilege which remains the contemporary form of 
racial domination. We now outline each of these perspectives in turn. 
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1) Race is not now a defining issue in US politics 
One major perspective when it comes to race and the 2008 election is that the 
election can be analysed like any other election. There are several mainstream 
academic works that in covering the election barely raise the issue of race.33 In this 
approach race is just one of the factors to take into account when adding up the 
effects on the electorate and the election result. And this effect might be relatively 
minor. For example, one work makes the case that race had little effect on white 
voters and this was shown in surveys where “By the time voters balloted, the 
majority had concluded that McCain’s age was more worrisome than Obama’s 
background, however defined.”34 And although blacks voted overwhelmingly for 
Obama this was not seen to have wider ramifications. Rather it was issues such as 
an unpopular Republican president and a faltering economy that were important. 
In this view, race does not play a special role in the election. Racial background 
becomes one among several ways of categorising the electorate, e.g. race, age, 
education, gender. Race in these readings is simply one of a number of factors in the 
election. For example, in one work, race was number 5 among 6 “keys” that helped 
Obama achieve victory. Race, expressed as “Barack Obama is an African-
American”, helped Obama with support among the Democratic base.35 The other 
keys were “change” and “post-partisanship”; Obama being a compelling individual; 
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strong and innovative campaign organisation; the capacity to raise money; and, 
positive media coverage.36  
This standpoint is far from new though it is perhaps striking when seen in the context 
of the election of the first black president. It might be connected with the strong 
empirical current within US political analysis. Notably, the discussion of race was 
absent from US political science until the 1960s when the civil rights movement 
made race a live political issue and where it seemed that the electoral arithmetic 
might mean the racial outlooks of voters could lead to different electoral outcomes.37 
As we examine in Chapter 4, there has been a strong current within US political 
theory that understands race as outside of politics proper: race belongs, rather, in 
the field of psychology or group prejudice.38 Racial prejudice is understood in this 
view as the private, irrational baggage that voters bring to the public, rational world of 
politics. With a downplaying of race in political discussion in 2008, one of the major 
perspectives seems to be a return to race playing a minor role in the mainstream 
academic analysis of US elections. An aspect of this may because of the way that 
academia works: academic specialisation means that the discussion of race has its 
own expansive specialised literature often couched in terms of being about the black 
experience or black leadership. Similarly the discussion on realignment, for example, 
generally does not connect with works outside its sub-discipline. With the Obama 
election there is an attempt to “de-racialise” politics and policy and to the extent that 
this is successful there should be the expectation that this was reflected in the 
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tendency to de-racialise academic theories of elections including the 2008 election 
itself. 
2) Post-Racial politics 
The second approach to race in 2008 is that the Obama election is post-racial and 
that this opens up political possibilities for promoting and formulating universal 
colour-blind policies whereas in the past policies that even as a secondary effect 
might help blacks faced hostility based on race. Manning Marable, for example, the 
late civil rights scholar largely adopts this approach to understanding the meaning of 
the Obama election (Marable is used here extensively as a clear, representative and 
thorough source).  
While Obama got the most publicity for his post-racial campaign, post-racial 
campaigns have increasingly been adopted, often successfully, by black politicians 
from the late 1980s. In constituencies with a large proportion of the electorate white, 
black politicians seemed to be faced with a “race ceiling” when it came to election to 
major offices, such as governor or mayor. In this approach candidates “refused to be 
identified as ‘black politicians’” or made it that they “happened to be black” but that 
this was unimportant.39  Marable argues that “the Obama pre-campaign group 
recognized that most white Americans would never vote for a black presidential 
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candidate. However, they were convinced that most whites would embrace, and vote 
for, a remarkable qualified presidential candidate who happened to be black”.40  
While this strategy seemed to work in that it got black representatives (who are more 
likely to address racial divisions) there were other factors behind these victories that 
suggested there may be support for policies that tackle social problems without race-
based hostility. Marable argues that there were two factors that made “inevitable rise 
and breakout of a leader of African descent like a Barack Obama”.41 The first was a 
larger non-white electorate (we discuss this in the next perspective). The second, 
and just as important, “there was a major liberalization of white racial attitudes 
towards black culture and leadership, in which the historic animus and resistance 
many whites displayed toward blacks was significantly reduced”42 The amount of 
white support and, in particular, young white support lays behind the new 
possibilities: “Above all, [Obama’s] political attractiveness to a substantial minority of 
white voters is unprecedented and momentous, with the support of young white 
voters at times especially impressive.”43 
Consequently there is the opening up of policies that can be discussed in a race-
neutral way. With the accommodation with racial politics comes the idea that there 
might be the application of race-neutral measures to tackle problems with poverty, in 
housing, employment and other social democratic style measures. This is based on 
the idea that racial motivations have been overcome which allows for a discussion of 
policy without hostility based on racial prejudice. There is the possibility of 
developing and implementing a non-racial set of policies to be applied based on 
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need. This perhaps represents an opening up of the polity to taking black interests 
more seriously (as part of broader social problems) and connecting black interests 
with white interests.  
This connected with Obama’s argument that the best approach to dealing with racial 
matters was indirect. Rather than race-based solutions, it would be general attempts 
to tackle the material problems that faced the USA in general that could tackle race 
relations. Caught off-guard, in a rare moment, Obama discussed this approach 
explicitly:  
“I’m not somebody who believes that constantly talking about race somehow 
solves racial tensions. I think what solves racial tensions is fixing the economy, 
putting people to work, making sure that people have health care, ensuring that 
every kid is learning out there. I think if we do that, then we’ll probably have 
more fruitful conversations.”44 
In many ways this might be understood as a rhetorical point. It was one of the race 
occasions where Obama discussed the material problems affecting blacks. The point 
seems moot because there were few initiatives by Obama race neutral or otherwise 
that could make a dent in US racial divisions. Even Obama’s signature policy, his 
healthcare plans, made little difference to the relative position of blacks, suggesting 
that only a more systematic intervention, for example based around revitalising the 
cities, could really affect relative the poverty of many blacks. 
For some, racially based opposition to programs that might tackle social problems 
remains. For Tim Wise, such is the coded racism that in the USA simply the mention 
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of the word welfare and immediately there are connection made to the black inner 
cities: “There is a “racialization of social policy…the public, and particularly the white 
public, already views government spending on behalf of the have-nots or have-
lessers, in racialised terms.” When Obama says he is “advocating colorblind 
universal programs to help all in need,… most white Americans hear something else 
altogether…racial redistribution”. Indeed part of the hostility to welfare according to 
Wise is that politicians are attempting to mislead the public about the recipients of 
the policy. Wise argues that politicians would get more support if they argued 
explicitly for help for poor inner city blacks on the basis that this was a call for 
fairness.45 
As well as opening up politics, the emphasis on post-racial politics can also be seen 
as closing down some options. Writing in with 1994 with Leith Mullins, Marable called 
what we might now identify as early examples of a post-racial strategy by new black 
leaders as what he called “post-black”. This was, in effect, the closing down of old 
civil-rights style campaigning – at least at the level of mayors and governors.46 As 
Marable argues, with Obama’s adoption of  a post-racial approach: “Obama does not 
represent the triumph of an advancing anti-racist movement but rather the necessity, 
at the highly refracted level of electoral politics, of abandoning old agendas, largely 
by not mentioning them.”47 
3) Obama’s victory signals whites becoming the minority 
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The third perspective is that race and the Obama victory were connected through the 
symbolism of a non-white president signalling a new era where whites were to be the 
minority in the USA. Obama, in this view, can be seen as representing the 
demographic decline of whites and the increasing importance of minority voters. This 
was a point that has constantly been stressed in coverage of the elections. As Henry 
has it, Obama’s racial background is particularly apposite to the USA’s anticipated 
demographic changes:  
“Obama’s personal family history has raised the recognition of the mixed or 
hybrid character of American history to a new level. In less than forty years the 
United States will be roughly equally divided between Whites and people of 
color.”48 
Obama as a minority candidate represents the demographic shift away from a white 
dominated politics. Further, his bi-racial background connects with the idea that there 
will be an inter-mixing taking place that will lessen the importance of the black-white 
binary in US racial politics today. Connected as it is with immigration of a number of 
third world or developing countries, this demographic change is often described as 
the “browning of America”49. 
We discuss this change at more length in Chapter 9. However, at this stage it is 
worth making some points for clarity. We can note that the time where whites are in 
a minority seems to be some time away (although some expect whites to be a 
minority as early as 204250, however in terms of a nation’s meaning the changes 
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might be described as happening now. This is a change that is greeted with hostility 
by some and with pleasure by others. Further although the idea that whites are in a 
minority might seem straightforward demographic fact, this is not the case because 
of the character of whiteness. In central ways whiteness should be understood as 
political rather than biological. This becomes clear when discussing Latinos. It is 
uncertain whether Latinos (or the children of whites and Latinos) might be, in the 
future, considered white or not. This is ultimately a political question. One need think 
of Latino politicians who have stood for the Republican candidate for the presidency 
such as Ted Cruz who seem to be for all intents and purposes white.  
4) Colour-blind racism 
The fourth perspective is that Obama’s victory does not tackle the source of racism 
in the USA which is seen as being white privilege. Rather by seeming to make 
colour-blind fairness the norm, this strengthens white domination. This standpoint is 
connected with whiteness studies scholarship which we discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 9.  
The Obama approach is seen as problematic because it stresses a colour-blind 
approach to race. For the whiteness studies school and associated writers51, this is 
there is norm of whiteness, of unearned advantages, that are simply assumed by 
whites. This is done in employment, housing, culture etc.  This is done prior to 
politics as “cultural background”  such that it is seen as simply “how it is” or natural. 
A colour-blind approach does not test or question these norms and so white privilege 
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goes unquestioned. In other words, systematic white privilege is unaffected by formal 
equality because it is done through cultural assumptions made by networks of whites 
and white-dominated institutions. As Jeffries argues: 
“Even if individuals no longer affirm racist beliefs, the institutions that order our 
social lives, such as banks, schools, and the criminal justice complex, utilize 
practices and policies that maintain and strengthen white dominance.”52 
Jeffries follows the general thrust of several authors generally associated with the 
whiteness studies school who make the case that despite the Obama victory which 
might well seem to be a “massive blow to white privilege and the existing racial 
order” that “drastic racial and ethnic inequalities, prejudice and stereotyping, and the 
marginalization of nonwhite people from positions of power persist today”53 In effect, 
the lack of whites espousing racial ideas and the connected symbolism of Obama’s 
victory do not alter the mechanisms of discrimination that continue in the USA today. 
If anything given there is an assumption that the USA is a colour-blind society white 
privilege is strengthened having supposedly passed the test of fairness. 
Through these mechanisms whiteness remained as a system of privileges, and 
blacks (and other minorities) retain their second class status. The argument behind 
this view of race is that whiteness itself needs to be tackled. There needs to be a 
race conscious approach to targeting white privilege (which is “a collective, implicit 
acceptance of whiteness as virtuous, normal, unremarkable, and expected.”)54 There 
is a combination of whites who argue they are not racist and have a colour-blind 
approach yet at the same time there are massive divisions between blacks and 
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whites. In other words, “the institutional foundation for racism remains intact despite 
a reduction in attitudinal antipathy towards racial others.”55 As we argue in chapter 9, 
the idea of whiteness has become a commonly cited, if not default, theory explaining 
racial divisions in the USA today because it purports to explain racial divisions when 
whites themselves seem not to be racist.  
This thesis 
This thesis attempts to understand the role of race in the 2008 election. Its argument 
is that this can be done through its connection to the dissolution of the patterns of 
race established in the twentieth century. The Obama election has brought some of 
that change to a head and has highlighted and strengthened other aspects of racial 
politics. 
Through a historical political analysis, the thesis links race in its twentieth century 
form with the attempt to create a combined whiteness as a way of overcoming the 
divisions between different groups of whites in class, religion, national background 
and ethnicity. Its contention is that this process is complete by the 1970s and as a 
consequence the impetus behind racial organising lessens. This provides space for 
removing race from the political agenda. With the job of uniting whites complete, 
race in its twentieth century form especially as connected to equality had come to be 
on balance experienced as a destabilising and unproductive, even destructive, force 
rather than a useful one. In other words, it created more conflict and divisions than it 
resolved through creating a cross class alliance and unifying whites (a task, anyway, 
in the main complete). Consequently there is an incentive for moving past race 
understood in connection with equality at least. For the Democrats, racial politicking 
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raised demands for equality that it had to deal with from the left or else seemed to 
bring gains to the Republicans who could use racial animus to attack Democrat 
programmes associated with black or ethnic minority interests (although it could be 
argued that Republicans were deploying suburban insularity to attack spending on 
the urban poor). Either way, one might agree that from Obama’s perspective that 
having to manage difficulties associated with race and equality, for the Democrats 
had acted as a distraction for many years. For the Republicans race animated a 
disruptive section of its base including populist elements which made it difficult to win 
votes from ethnic minorities, which would increasingly become a problem, or appeal 
to the centre. Especially for a technocratic approach race and the opposition to race 
made government more difficult. 
Through the leadership of a minority candidate, a post-racial politics could be put 
forward by the Democrats. This could be done through the use of identity politics as 
with a black presidential candidate such as Obama there was sufficient cachet and 
moral weight to make the case for a post-racial approach in the election campaign. 
Essentially a post-racial strategy would attempt a deconstruction of race through the 
idea that we are simply individuals with individual identities following our interests i.e. 
rather than the American Dream there are many American Dreams. Further, the 
involvement of millions of whites in the campaigning signalled that individual whites 
no longer connected with the mass racial politics of the past. Indeed with this 
approach the victory of the candidate itself would count as part of the post-racial 
argument.  
It should be noted that in addition to the space provided by twentieth century racial 
politics coming to a conclusion, the weakness on the left and in the remnants of the 
civil rights movement (shown, for example, in their “post-black” approach) also 
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helped in that not only did such forces provide no opposition they ended up rallying 
behind the Obama cause. 
As well as bringing the post-racial change to a head, the election also acted to 
highlight and strengthen other trends: these were identity politics and the culture 
wars especially in regard to the questioning and even attacks on whiteness. 
At the same time as the post-racial campaign the thesis makes the case that there is 
a parallel action of identity politics. Identity politics has long been the way in which 
racial politics has been managed. The way this acted was that demands for 
recognition based on ascriptive racial group membership acted as an alternative to 
and undermined demands for equality. The campaign strengthened trends in support 
of identity politics through Obama’s success, i.e. the power and weight of symbolism, 
representation and identity became clear in the election.  
Obama’s victory does not bring colour-blind/race neutral measures to deal with race. 
Rather it relies on racially conscious identity politics in the form of therapeutic 
interventions such as regulation of behaviour through for, example, codes of 
behaviour in the workplace on the one hand and the minimised support for 
arguments for equality on the other. 
Obama’s victory also highlighted the demographic shift towards a minority white 
electorate. Although because whiteness is a political rather than a natural construct, 
in actual fact it is far from clear how racial identifications will be made in the future, 
this is not how it is seen or presented. There is a sense of support for a move 
towards minority oriented identity politics (what might be called a post-white change) 
partly because is seen to represent something of a fait accompli.  
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Far from there being the continuity of a system of white privilege, there are currently 
quite broad attacks on white culture which might be seen as part of the culture wars. 
Indeed the idea of subconscious system of white privilege found in whiteness studies 
forms part of that attack. The politicisation of culture has seen hostility towards 
whiteness as backward, irrational, racist etc. While these arguments rarely featured 
in the Obama election directly, they are general trends with which the Obama 
election connected.  
Arguments that attempt to explain racial divisions based on whiteness have gained 
quite broad traction nowadays. With the longstanding rejection of racial politics by 
whites, attempts to explain the broad racial divisions there are today either through 
the sub consciousness of whites or else through institutional practice have become 
default explanations. However, it is possible to make the case that blacks remain in a 
subordinate position because there have been no measures that attempt to 
transform material circumstances i.e. programmes of investment and development in 
the cities. Indeed there has been little in the way of campaigns for equality and there 
have been no campaigns that have elicited the support of whites across the colour-
line in support of such a goal. Essentially, without any political pressure for 
substantial material change the black poor by and large remain particularly poor. The 
slow growth and lack of social mobility mean that individual solutions to problems, 
i.e. individual success stories, do not tend to have an overall transformative effect.  
Main questions in the thesis 
The main question the thesis engages with is “what role was played by race in the 
200 8 US presidential election?” In doing this we also attempt to answer particular 
questions that are raised with the election. We attempt to answer “how do we 
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account for the enthusiasm that came with the Obama campaign?” and “why was 
race largely discussed without reference to equality in 2008?” In attempting to 
understand the phenomenon that underpinned Obama’s victory we also attempt to 
answer ““how did racial factors and racial thinking change during the twentieth 
century?” as part of an attempt to create a political-historical view of race as it was 
constituted in the twentieth century. 
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Part I 
Examining the 2008 election 
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Chapter 1. An Exceptional Election 
One of the main purposes of the chapter is to provide an overview of the election 
and of the discussions of race that takes place around the election for subsequent 
chapters. By providing an overview in Chapter 1 this allows the following chapters to 
be read in the context of the 2008 election discussions and of the idea of race raised 
in the election. The chapter uses several books that attempt to assess the meaning 
of the election.1 Overall, as per one of the main critiques of the thesis, they are 
limited because they understand the election either in terms of the significance of the 
racial background of Obama or in terms of the racial views of whites.  
Another of the main purposes of the chapter is to assess the meaning of post-racial. 
This is done using a detailed analysis of the main speeches made by Obama and by 
drawing on Obama’s two biographies.2 It is in speeches where Obama discusses 
hope or race where post-racial ideas emerge. The chapter also uses works from the 
remnants of the civil rights tradition. These do not directly take up post-racial ideas in 
their arguments and were limited to criticisms of Obama as not paying sufficient 
attention to particular civil rights campaigns or else as not being sufficiently black, in 
the sense of having a black immigrant’s experience rather than the more typical 
                                            
1
 Manning Marable and Kristen Clarke (eds.), Barack Obama and African American Empowerment: 
The Rise of Black America’s New Leadership (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Ricky L. Jones, 
What’s Wrong with Obamamania?: Black America, Black Leadership, and the Death of Political 
Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008); Jeffries, Michael P. Paint the White 
House Black: Barack Obama and the Meaning of Race in America. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013.; Joeseph, Peniel E. Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama. New 
York , BasicCivitas, 2010; Henry, Charles P., Robert L. Allen and Robert Chrisman, eds. The Obama 
Phenomenon: Toward a Multiracial Democracy. Urbana, Chicago and Springfield: University of Illinois 
Press, 2011.; Kenski, Kate, Bruce W. Hardy, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. The Obama Victory: How 
Media, Money, and Message Shaped the 2008 Election. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.; 
Ledwidge, Mark, Kevern Verney, and Inderjeet Parmar. Barack Obama and the Myth of a Post-Racial 
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experience of being brought up black in the inner city. The chapter also uses detailed 
journalistic accounts of the campaign to flesh out the overall picture of the campaign 
where necessary.3  
The 2008 election was seen as being of historic significance by many, largely 
because of the election of a black president. Polls shortly after the election reflected 
the public view that this was a historic moment for blacks and by extension for race 
in the USA. A USA Today/Gallup poll on 5 November 2008, the day after the 
election, showed 33 per cent thought Obama’s success “the most important advance 
for blacks in the last one hundred years”. A further 38 per cent considered it “one of 
the most” important advances in the last 100 years. Only one in ten considered it as 
“not that important”.4 The slogans of “yes we can”, “hope” and “change” had rubbed 
off onto the mood of the same respondents: 67 per cent described themselves as 
optimistic, 67 per cent as proud and 59 per cent as excited. Historians surveyed in 
2014 – although an eye-blink of time from which to judge – thought that the Obama 
victory in 2008 would stand the test of time as a notable historic moment. Asked to 
assess the legacy of Barack Obama for New York magazine, 53 responded and 
“Almost every respondent wrote that the fact of [Obama] being the first black 
president will loom large in the historical narrative”. Most saw this as being because 
of “the symbolism of a nonwhite First Family”.5  
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 Richard Wolffe. Codename: Renegade: The Inside Account of How Obama Won the Biggest Prize in 
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 Others reasons given for why 2008 would be remembered were because of the “antagonism 
Obama’s blackness provoked” or “the way [Obama’s] racial self-consciousness constrained him”. 
Both of these reasons seem questionable. While there was something of an antagonistic attitude to 
the presidency by Republicans under Obama, which was certainly not improved by racial 
considerations, hostility to the president has increasingly become a feature of recent years; the 
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At least while it lasted the 2008 presidential election reinvigorated and renewed US 
politics. The Iowa caucuses, first stop on the road to prospective presidential 
nominations, saw a record estimated 334,000 pack public venues across the state – 
up from 212,000 in 2004 – and Democrat turnout almost doubled.6 The historian 
Simon Schama, present in the state capital Des Moines that night, described it as 
the moment that US democracy “came back from the dead”.7 Obama’s official online 
campaign, Organizing for America at “my.barakobama.com”, allowed the candidate 
to spurn public campaign funds, raising over half a billion dollars from three million 
people,8 even creating problems of what to do with the money. On victory night, 
“spontaneous crowds of joyful celebrants rushed into streets, parks, and public 
establishments in thousands of venues across the country” and people in Harlem 
were “crying in disbelief”.9 As one commentator observed, the staid election victories 
of recent decades were replaced with something akin to the public celebrations of 
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the nineteenth century and, at least for a short while, political cynicism 
disappeared.10  
Rather than a particular set of policies or programme, more visceral factors seemed 
to drive public involvement. An examination of Obama’s political outlook and 
previous record reveal a mainstream, if relatively liberal, figure, that cannot account 
for the outpouring of expectation and desire unleashed among supporters.11 A 
collapse in support for President Bush had meant that his record was not strongly 
defended by Republicans and there was approaching a cross-party consensus on 
the major issues of the day, both on the need to withdraw from Iraq and to bail out 
the banks. There was no policy or grouping of policies that might explain public 
enthusiasm. Rather it seemed that the theme of “hope” and the possibility of 
transcending race that came with a black President which seemed to enervate the 
electorate. 
Obama’s message of “hope” had captured the public imagination. Much of this was 
based on his own “compelling life story”12 set out in the autobiographical works, 
Dreams of My Father (1995) and The Audacity of Hope (2006). These best-selling, 
critically acclaimed mediations on the American dream, of both making and re-
making it, ensured the candidate’s story was almost universally known. Sarah Palin, 
in her acceptance speech as Republican Vice Presidential candidate, mocked 
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Obama as having “authored two memoirs but not a single major law or even a 
reform, not even in the State Senate”.13 As state senator, many of his bills – whether 
major or not – had been enacted,14 but Palin, highlighting Obama’s political 
inexperience to contrast McCain’s seniority, was missing the point. The narrative of 
distance from and not being of Washington was a vital part of Obama’s appeal. In 
contrast, the lack of an effective story for the Republican candidate led the McCain 
team to try and then discard six competing narratives of their own during the 
campaign.15  
But what was it that the electorate were to “hope” for exactly? It seemed that in the 
absence of a clear programme,16 more often than not the electorate were able to 
invest their own individual hopes in the person of the candidate. Already in 2006, in 
an interview with Obama when US Senator, one journalist noted that Obama took on 
“the quality of a blank screen on which people can project whatever they like” – and 
that, as a consummate politician, “he hasn’t discouraged this”.17 It was no accident 
that Obama’s online campaign was at “my” barakobama.com: it was possible to 
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construct your own. Even with the intensity of the election, seemingly formless 
slogans such as “hope” and “yes, we can” remained largely unchallenged. One 
reason, perhaps, was because calls for “change” equally devoid of content had 
featured so consistently across the political spectrum in recent decades. Another 
was that Obama’s version of Democrat policy was not, at the time at least, 
considered sufficiently contentious or newsworthy.18 
The other force propelling the campaign was race, or rather the attempt to transcend 
the issue of race. This, as we discuss in more depth in the next chapter, was 
perhaps linked to “hope” figuring as the aspiration to finally move past racial division. 
And Obama was the quintessential “post-racial” candidate. It was a speech to the 
Democratic National Convention in 2004 which brought him to national prominence, 
where he argued, “There’s not a black America and white America and Latino 
America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America”.19 Undoubtedly as 
only the third black person elected to the US Senate since Reconstruction ended in 
1877 and as a veteran of community organising in the racially segregated wards of 
Chicago, these words carried weight.20 In The Audacity of Hope, Obama “offers a 
word of caution” to those interpreting this speech as meaning that “we have arrived 
at a ‘post racial politics’ or that we already live in a color-blind society”, both racial 
inequality and racism still matter.21 But here he fails, perhaps, to acknowledge the 
novelty of what post-racial means and how he contributes to it.  
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There has been a working assumption by many using the term that post-racial simply 
means moving past racial views in politics, that the “post” in “post-racial” plays a 
similar role to the “post” in “post-war”. However, post-racial might better be 
understood in a different way, where the “post” takes on the meaning ascribed to it in 
“post-modern”. Postmodern was itself an incongruous semi-philosophical term that 
entered into mainstream vocabulary without necessarily a clear understanding of the 
abstruse viewpoint or writings behind it.22 Likewise, post-racial’s entry into the 
political lexicon reflects something new and undigested. The appearance and novelty 
of the term post-racial should be noted. It derives from an individualised, post-
modern outlook, rather than from a collective, structural or policy based approach. A 
post-racial politics is not simply an argument that racism no longer exists nor 
matters. Rather the implication of post-racial is, following postmodernism, that what 
was the meta-narrative of race can dissolve into the many narratives of individual 
lives.23 Previously race evoked such a response that it resisted deconstruction24 – in 
the USA it was often considered as a fundamental divide in the polity, as an 
unhealed schism running through society and even as an organising principle that 
the state and parties wrestled with. Now it might instead be better seen as part of the 
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many individual stories that made up the many individual American Dreams, or 
indeed the many individual “hopes”. A post-racial politics would not deny racial 
inequality in the face of myriad statistics of racial disadvantage. Rather there is a 
reclassification of the scope of race as a problem. For one author this is seen as 
being made possible through “mental gymnastics” on the part of post-racial 
supporters taken together with a population eager to mark out that they had moved 
on from discrimination and support for inequality through the attribution of “post”.25 
With a declaration of the USA as “post-racial” problems of race might be safely and 
now publicly reintegrated into the mainstream of consumer and individual choice and 
behaviour, and therefore of regulation and policy of an already “colour-blind” state. 26 
Race might then become an inter-personal issue rather than a schism in the body 
politic. 
Obama’s personal narratives – bringing race into the contemporary American dream 
– are a redefinition of the racial problem/question, a viewpoint strengthened and 
validated by the symbolism of election to presidential office. Throughout the 
campaign, the Obama camp downplayed race as public issue while leaving the 
embodied form of the candidate to speak for itself. The Republicans made little 
mention of race at all. This reached such a point that an interviewer noted that the 
Republicans and Democrats had barely even commented Obama’s candidacy was 
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such a milestone for black people in the USA. Obama quipped that people had 
probably noticed.27  
When the issue of race forced itself to the surface through Obama’s relationship to 
former pastor Reverend Jeremiah Wright whose radical sermons had circulated on 
the internet, this gave Obama a chance to rehearse the post-racial message in its 
American form as outlined above, using the plain-spoken “story” rather than 
narrative:  
I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we 
solve them together – unless we perfect our union by understanding that we 
may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look 
the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to 
move in the same direction – towards a better future for our children and our 
grandchildren. This belief comes from my unyielding faith in the decency and 
generosity of the American people. But it also comes from my own American 
story.28  
Here “hope” is brought in to address a lowest common denominator of a better future 
– and even then for the children.29 Later in the speech he reinterprets race as the 
narratives of different American dreams: “It requires all Americans to realize that 
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your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my dreams”.30 The Obama 
campaign sought to stand above race as an issue – as Obama argued in his speech, 
race had played the role of a “distraction”31 for many cycles in US politics. It could be 
raised here cathartically to acknowledge it and then to argue for a response that 
addressed concerns in general, reintegrating racial division into the polity as just one 
aspect of social policy/regulation. Then race could for all intents and purposes be 
ignored: this was, after all, “the” Obama speech on race.  
The Democrat’s reticence on race is influenced by the role race has played in the 
ideological battles of the post-civil rights period – from the late 1960s. Although overt 
racism has become electoral suicide in US politics, other factors have long seemed 
to act as stand-ins for direct racial politics. Debates on “welfare mothers”, the 
“underclass”, the absent black father, hip hop culture and even negative 
comparisons with “model minorities” have refocused concerns about the position of 
blacks to their own cultural predilections and brought into question liberal policy 
responses. Even the standard issues of tax and crime have often seemed to act as 
vehicles for a discussion on race. For the past thirty years liberals have been on the 
defensive with these race-related issues. The liberal agenda is portrayed as soft on 
crime, wasting taxpayers’ money on undeserving poor blacks, or being reverse racist 
in affirmative action – issues that have resonated with sections of the white 
electorate.32 Conservatives have been able to undermine the liberal post-war 
outlook, at least in part, through race, by arguing that government welfare 
programmes in the inner cities have created dependency and demoralisation by 
undermining self-reliance and have tilted the balance against hard working and often 
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hard pressed whites.33 In particular through the “Southern Strategy”, the Republicans 
have been understood as pursuing an electoral strategy which attempted to attract 
support on the basis of racial signalling – initially in the South then then more widely 
– using race-related issues, such as opposition to welfare or in calls for law and 
order crackdowns, as “wedge” issues to divide Democrat support.  
Obama’s post-racial politics cede a great deal of ground to conservative attacks 
which can be seen as following a long trend of Democrats accommodation to cultural 
criticisms of black lifestyles and culture.34 Although not wishing to make race an 
issue, the candidate, nonetheless, repeatedly signalled his concern with the moral 
problems of black families and culture.35 And it could be argued that that such post-
racial politics, in a similar way to postmodernism, are profoundly conservative in that 
they dismiss broad policy approaches as “meta-narratives”.36 However, in the 
context of the election a post-racial approach can be seen as an attempt to both 
remove the sting from Republican attacks and undermine a perceived bloc of white 
support. As one commentator noted, post-racial is at the same time post-white.37 
White support might be seen to have been undermined, but one response intimated 
that the type of politics that is associated by many with whiteness was not completely 
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exhausted. To try to distance his campaign from the unpopular Bush presidency, 
attempt to harness a populist dynamic and ensure the turnout of more right-wing 
Republicans, McCain looked to the Alaskan Senator, Sarah Palin. This eleventh hour 
appointment was to provide a focus and legitimacy for a predominantly white 
disenchantment with America’s problems later taking shape as the Tea Party. This 
response was vigorous, but, at the same time, narrow. Beyond taking up demands to 
reduce government and taxes there was little consensus and little ability to gain 
wider support.38  
However, not all Democrats were comfortable with the Obama strategy; many 
leading civil rights figures were initially sceptical. Democrat grandee Jesse Jackson 
was critical of Obama’s avoidance of the “Jena 6” civil rights campaign, Reverend Al 
Sharpton questioned his ability to represent blacks, and the eminent academic 
Cornel West called for more to be made on racial issues.39 More generally polls in 
late 2007 showed only half of African Americans thought Obama “shared their 
values”.40 Even Michelle Obama in April 2007 from within the campaign, frustrated at 
poll showings, was reportedly worried that its post-racial direction took them away 
from their initial political concerns.41 The discussion about Obama within civil rights 
circles tended to be about how black he was. This was understandable as, while he 
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was an African American, his experience as a second generation immigrant was 
very different to that of the black communities in America’s inner cities42 – this was 
not just a matter of background but of political outlook and trust. However, with no 
alternative candidate on the horizon, support for Obama’s campaign increased and 
as time went on the list of those giving a positive endorsement grew, often based on 
the symbolism of a black man in the White House. There was some desperation at 
work here. Despite the success of the civil rights movement in removing formal legal 
discrimination, subsequently the accomplishments of civil rights campaigners have 
been limited and the inferior position of blacks remains. Programmes that might step 
into the realms of social democracy to address black problems – or perhaps, as 
some have argued, to dismantle entrenched white networks43 – have failed to find 
favour and affirmative action measures have been rolled back. The limits of formal 
equality have become clear, but so too the difficulty in going beyond this.44 Further, 
the fracturing of the black community with a black middle class out of touch with the 
concerns of others has undermined black leadership and the role it previously played 
                                            
42
 Clarence Page has brought to attention the “model minority” status of recent African immigrants, at 
least when it comes to education, and their relationship to Ivy League affirmative action programmes. 
Obama as a second generation immigrant partly fits this model. Clarence Page, “Black Immigrants, 
An Invisible ‘Model Minority’”, realclearpolitics.com, 19 March 2007, accessed 29 March 2011, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/03/black_immigrants_an_invisible.html  
43
 Scholars in the early whiteness school such as David Roediger contend that to end racism the 
“wages of whiteness” – i.e. benefits white workers receive both materially and psychologically – must 
be tackled. David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American 
Working Class (London: Verso, 1999). 
44
 The present author discusses this further in Mark Beachill, “The Private Public”, Proof Set 2, 
Politics, Postmodern Journalism, and the Public (London: Proof-Reading.org, September 2010), 
accessed 29 March 2015, http://www.proof-reading.org/the-private-public  
72 
in liberal/left politics.45 As the election drew closer civil rights activists gave the 
Obama ticket positive support, with isolated exceptions.46  
Outside of the issues raised in the campaign, the ability to organise online played an 
important role in creating a newly dynamic public arena. This was seen by many 
commentators as at least in part an explanation in itself of the vitality of the 
campaign. Online campaigning harnessed spontaneous support and provided an 
inexpensive direct channel to voters. The Obama campaign sent a billion emails and 
recruited 1.5 million volunteers with varying levels of involvement as well as raising a 
huge amount of money. David Plouffe, the campaign manager, described the 13 
million email addresses they accumulated as the equivalent of having their own TV 
station.47 Obama’s online activities were noted as being particularly sophisticated 
and learnt and borrowed from the pioneering 2004 campaign of the unsuccessful 
Democratic candidate Howard Dean. The Obama campaign’s focus on the Iowa 
caucus and early voting built up momentum and was at least partly facilitated by 
appeals to those sympathetic to the campaign online. Online support for Obama took 
on a life of its own – some of this was deliberate – the online systems encouraged 
informal contact to be recorded (called n2n or neighbour to neighbour campaigning) 
and let people setup local events to attend. However, outside of the official online 
campaign, spontaneous support could gather; for example, user generated content 
on YouTube generated 1,800 campaign-related videos and 14 million hours of 
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viewing.48 Such online support meant that traditional Democratic campaigning and 
mobilisation was often side-stepped. The amount of money and volunteers 
generated caught both Obama and his opponents by surprise.  
An important rationale for this research is how an understanding of race might help 
us account for the re-energizing of the public sphere. This was an election that 
deviated from those of the last few decades in its engagement with young people 
and ability to draw wider public involvement. There has been a tendency to assume 
as given the exuberance of public response, or “Obama-mania”, without attempting 
to explain or else situate it and draw out its meaning. The influential Right Nation 
thesis, that the USA is essentially a conservative nation,49 has been brought into 
question through the campaign especially for younger cohorts of the electorate. The 
“silent majority” given voice by Nixon to support establishment politics and morphing 
into the white blue-collar base of the Reagan years seems to have been 
undermined, yet it is unclear whether seeing this as a liberal triumph is appropriate. 
The powerful appeal of post-racial politics suggests the conservative-liberal 
dichotomy may not be the best framework to understand what happened. 
There remain very real racial divisions in the USA. It is worth noting just how great 
the divisions are between black and white America. This is a necessary reminder as 
the discussion about race does not address these divisions to the extent that it might 
seem they no longer exist. One author, Brooks, usefully brings together and 
catalogues many of these divisions as they existed as of 2005 and how little they 
have changed since the beginning of the post-civil rights/affirmative action era in the 
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substantial appendix to his book. The appendix looks at figures since 1973 until 
2005. As Brooks notes “Demographics in the appendix regarding housing, high 
school dropout rates, business ownership, and other areas of American life all show 
significant racial disparities in resources for the entire post-civil rights period despite 
scores of black success stories during this time.”50 To give a flavour of these 
divisions as of 2005: 21 per cent of black families were living below the poverty line 
as against 6 per cent of non-Hispanic white families. The median family income of 
whites was $63,000. That of blacks was $37,000. The average earnings for young 
black males with an undergraduate degree was $45,000 in comparison to $65,000 
for whites.51 Young black men were seven times more likely to go to prison than 
young white men. Young black men were only half as likely to earn a bachelor’s 
degree as young white men.52 In earnings, access to resources, assets, educational 
achievement and in dealings with the law there clearly remains a huge gap between 
black and white America. Notably looking at the numbers from 1973 there has been 
little or no relative improvement. Several measures indicate that the disparities have 
grown. Another source worth referencing is from the Urban League, an organisation 
for black advancement. It publishes an annual report on the “State of Black 
America”. In the 2008 edition on unemployment, it notes that the unemployment rate 
for blacks was 12 per cent as compared to 5.8 per cent for whites. It also notes, for 
example, “The median net worth of White households in the study grew to $265,000 
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over the 25-year period [up to 2008] compared with just $28,500 for the Black 
households.”53  
And yet despite these divisions the Obama victory seemed to allow race as an issue 
to be excised from national politics: the Wall Street Journal felt comfortable in 
arguing the USA was now in a position to “put to rest the myth of racism as a barrier 
to achievement in this splendid country” and likewise dismiss “European 
condescension about ‘racist’ America”.54 The hope, expressed succinctly by Obama 
volunteers was “Race Doesn’t Matter!”,55 yet paradoxically in the 2008 election the 
desire to transcend race did. 
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Chapter 2. A New Hope? 
This chapter predominantly works through an analysis of primary material in the form 
of the transcripts of the televised debates for both the Democratic nomination and 
the general election. It was the through these debates and in the heat of argument 
that the discussion of change, in particular, took on its clearest form. It also uses 
journalistic coverage of the use of change and hope which was supplemented by 
detailed journalistic accounts of the campaign in book form. These came out shortly 
after the election and were written by journalists who followed the campaign trail and 
who were given near insider access to the personalities of the campaign. 1 The 
chapter also used some of the discussion of “post”, e.g. post-modern and post-
feminist in journal articles where authors attempted to understand why this 
designation had become popular. 
One academic analysis called change “the theme that defined the 2008 race”.2 This 
chapter looks at the ideas of change and of hope that seemed to play such an 
important part in the election. The slogans of “change” and of “hope” seemed to 
capture the public imagination and even took on a life of their own outside the 
campaign with iconic posters, t-shirts and memorabilia stamped with alternately one 
or the other. 
In 2010, Sarah Palin speaking at the first ever Tea Party National Convention 
rhetorically asked Obama supporters “How’s that hopey, changey stuff working 
out?”3 Palin was raising the lack of transparency of the Obama administration in 
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comparison with its professed idealism. However, the “hopey changey stuff” has 
caught on as summing up the lack of content behind Obama’s campaign. Veteran 
anarchist and campaigner Noam Chomsky, asked in 2012 to reflect on the Obama 
administration, picked up on Palin’s meme: “when she was making fun of this 
‘hopey-changey’ stuff – she was right. There was nothing there… [I]t’s no great 
secret that the U.S. electoral system is mainly public relations extravaganzas. They 
keep away from issues. It’s sort of a marketing affair”.4 Chomsky may be something 
of a political outlier, but the question of how ideas such as hope or change became 
seemingly so powerful has to be answered. A close reading of the ideas, especially 
in the context of the election campaign, shows that there was something there. As 
we will argue, voters were not simply mesmerized by empty marketing glitz. 
It should be noted that calls for “change” have scant novelty in presidential elections. 
In a simple sense any challenger to the incumbent president, even those from the 
same party, is calling for change of some description. However, it is not given that 
the calls for change should be take the shape of this lowest common denominator 
(“we need change”) rather than becoming a call for more specific proposals such as 
a “war on poverty”, “a chicken in every pot”, “supporting the middle class” etc. 
Nonetheless calling for change has become common in the post-war period. Among 
many recent examples of the use of change as an important appeal in presidential 
elections are: Thomas Dewey, the Republican challenger to President Harry S. 
Truman in 1948 using the slogan “America needs a change”; Jimmy Carter in 1976 
used “A leader, for a change”; Walter Mondale’s 1984 campaign used “Time for a 
Change”. In 1992, one of Bill Clinton’s key slogans was “It’s Time to Change 
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America”. Even George W. Bush running as an incumbent in 2004 gave a nod 
towards the idea by appealing to “Steady leadership in times of change” – not 
unreasonably suggesting that change today is a given. Indeed using change in a 
contemporary campaign is made difficult by having to finding a relatively original 
formulation. “Change” is a well-worn cliché in elections; the idea that the success of 
Obama’s appeal resides merely in appealing to “change” can be discounted. 
The specific form the Obama campaign used “change” was as the slogan “change 
you can believe in”. This was used consistently for 19 months from the primaries 
until late in the general election. “Change you can believe in” on its own can be 
interpreted in several ways. However, the slogan should be understood by 
considering the problems faced by the Obama camp and the strategy to tackle these 
problems. The initial difficulty was how to deal with the relative inexperience of the 
candidate in comparison with Obama’s competitors for the Democratic nomination 
and later to potentially take on a veteran Republican candidate. The discussion of 
the need to have an experienced leader has been a staple of recent presidential 
contests and inexperience would be seen to be a liability. Further, a specific problem 
identified for the electability of black candidates was that it had been possible for 
white voters to dismiss them on the basis that they lacked experience or were 
otherwise deficient in leadership skills and so the charge of inexperience allowed 
perhaps an expression of coded racism or at minimum of racial distrust.5  
The Obama camp’s strategy was to try to use the fact that its opponents were 
politically experienced heavyweights to their own advantage. In a judo-like approach, 
the attempt would be made to try to use their opponents’ own weight against them 
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and so bring them down. The argument was made that political gravitas tied up with 
Washington meant at the very least that their opponents were not best placed to 
bring change or at worst incapable of bringing change. The Obama camp’s message 
was that the change people wanted could not come from a political insider. The 
stress was that political experience could easily be a problematic rather than a useful 
resource. The experience of working in the nation’s capital was recast as part of the 
problem, with the idea of Beltway insiders divorced from the concerns on Main Street 
and the middle class, and more attendant to lobbyists and special interests. The 
proving ground for “change you can believe in” was in the Democratic primaries. To 
win Obama had to be able to take on the favourite Hillary Clinton, a politician with a 
long track record and linked to the previous Democrat victory of her husband. 
Although not without detractors, Clinton’s initial polling support in early 2007 for the 
Democrat nomination stood at 40% as against Obama’s 21% reflecting Clinton’s 
strong reputation.6 But, as one Obama strategist was wont to say, Clinton would be 
made to “pay” for her experience.7 
The idea of “change you can believe in” takes on a particular cast when applied in 
the context of the Obama camp’s strategy. The suggestion is not being made that 
the particular policies being put forward by the candidate are especially believable, 
rather the emphasis here is very much that it is not possible to believe in change as 
espoused by political opponents because of their insider status. The positive 
statement, when seen in context, represents a negative view of opponents. If an 
attack on experience earned in Washington politics had been the sole province of 
the Obama campaign then it might easily have been dismissed as a self-serving 
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attempt to distract from the candidate’s own lack of experience. However, the refrain 
that there was something fundamentally wrong – even dysfunctional – with US 
federal government and that congressmen and congresswomen were putting 
“special interests” before the nation was a constant political refrain from all sides. A 
series of terms – gridlock, pork barrel politics, slush money, lobbying, corruption – 
had joined the lexicon in on-going refrains about the US political setup. Such is 
public disaffection that one famous early 2013 poll of registered voters showed them 
more favourably disposed towards cockroaches than to Congress.8 
In the Democratic nomination campaign the argument that only an outsider could 
bring change became insistent. In the face of poor polling figures in October 2007, 
the Obama team’s approach became to oppose the idea that the Clinton camp might 
itself legitimately use change. David Axelrod, Obama’s chief strategist presented a 
memo to re-focus the troops: Clinton was to be painted as part of the Washington 
status quo, as the epitome of what the US public detested about federal politics.9 
Despite this taking of stock, it was not Obama that most strongly claimed Clinton was 
in the pockets of the lobbyists but another candidate, John Edwards. Edwards was 
long considered as one of the potential victors alongside Clinton and Obama. His 
strategy was similar to Obama’s, that is to target Clinton as having links with special 
interests. The strength of Edwards’ attacks on Clinton gave the sense of how 
strongly his anti-Hillary position was held and at one stage he even had overtures 
made to the Obama team – which were rejected – of a mutual pact against Clinton. 
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The first Democratic debate on 30 October 2007 saw Edwards launch scalding 
attacks on Clinton:  
I think it is crucial for Democratic voters and caucus-goers to determine who 
they can trust, who’s honest, who is sincere, who has integrity. And I think it’s 
fair in that regard to look at what people have said. Senator Clinton says that 
she believes she can be the candidate for change, but she defends a broken 
system that’s corrupt in Washington, D.C. 
One participant considered Edwards to have made “pretty close to personal 
attacks”.10 Edwards, for his part, seemed not to understand why Obama had not 
backed up his strategy; according to one account during the first interval he “pulled 
Obama aside and stared him in the eyes. ‘Barack, you need to focus!’ Edwards 
implored. ‘Focus! Focus! Focus!’”.11 Obama then joined the attack. He argued that 
Clinton’s lack of transparency over conversations with her husband when president 
meant that she would not be able to renew trust in government and that her 
experience was tied up with a system dominated by special interests, pork barrel 
spending and “bungling money” that had alienated the US public. Further, he argued 
Republicans were fixated on Clinton because they were familiar with and so “very 
comfortable” with the partisan “bickering” that had brought legislative gridlock for 
much of the past eight years. Following Obama, Edwards then argued that Clinton 
had raised more money from lobbyists, big business and the defence industry than 
any candidate, Democrat or Republican, and so was just not going to break their 
grip: “Will she be the person who brings about the change in this country? You know, 
I believe in Santa Claus. I believe in the tooth fairy. But I don’t think that’s going to 
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happen. I really don’t.” The attacks by Edwards and the follow-up by Obama seemed 
to set the tone for the debate; the six male candidates spent much of their time 
attacking Clinton. All would have to, at some stage, state their case against the 
leading contender. It seemed the green light had been given. As a result Clinton 
seemed on the defensive and did not help her cause by seeming to give conflicting 
answers on the question of driving licenses for illegal immigrants. The Clinton camp 
reacted that their candidate had been picked on. They released a YouTube video 
called “The Politics of Pile-on”. The media took this as being a complaint that six 
men had been picking on a single woman. Whether the Clinton camp chose to let 
this interpretation go and see where it led is unclear, but nonetheless the result was 
seen to be another Clinton gaffe of trying to avoid the cut and thrust of debate and so 
draw attention away from her mistake.  
The pattern was set where Obama relied on Edwards’ strong attacks on Clinton that 
fit with his own campaign’s strategy. Obama could then make points less stridently 
than otherwise necessary and could avoid either seeming overly aggressive or often 
even being seen as explicitly negative towards Clinton. In effect Edwards played the 
role of a “stalking horse” for the Obama campaign. The 5 January 2008 Democratic 
nomination debate showed just how powerful the charge of being part of the existing 
system had become. Edwards, still in the race, argued that Clinton was part of “the 
forces of status quo” and in hock to a system dominated by “entrenched special 
interests”. Even after 20 Democratic debates Clinton seemed on the defensive even 
taken aback by the attacks. Her argument was that she too wanted change after the 
Bush presidency. She responded – although not directly to the argument – that 
“making change is not about what you believe. It’s not about a speech you make. It 
is about working hard”. Acknowledging that Clinton had said she would tackle special 
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interests, in a more subtle attack than that of Edwards, Obama noted that he was 
pleased that Hillary was finally talking about the subject, the sarcasm implied, but 
that he had long been involved in creating legislation to bring lobbying into the open. 
Still in contention (just) and so formally in the debate albeit playing little active role, 
the 14-year veteran of Congress, Bill Richardson was moved to ask, “Is experience 
kind of a leper?”12 The answer clearly, it was. And although there was the occasional 
rhetorical concession that experience is necessary and part of the on-going 
discussion of candidates was about their track-record and the relevant qualities of 
leadership, the terms of the debate had been set by the argument that exposure to 
Washington was toxic.  
The Obama campaign, then, benefited from and played up to a cynicism about 
politics as was. The charges being forcefully aired were of corruption or rottenness in 
the system or at least by participants in it. It was not a simple disagreement over 
policy. These concerns were not the sole province of the Obama campaign. Other 
Democrats played to the same negative perceptions about politics. However, the 
Obama team were the main beneficiaries in effectively turning inexperience into an 
asset. The charge of having Washington experience and being “old politics” and thus 
being incapable of bringing change became an effective stick to beat the Clinton 
campaign. As the nomination contest developed the idea that Clinton could bring 
change was dismissed. It seemed to be that Obama and his team came to believe 
that change was their exclusive commodity: the change they could believe in. 
Increasingly Obama’s support from volunteers and the millions he was able to raise 
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from small donations online gave support to the idea that he was at a distance from 
the old politics. In effect a virtuous circle had been established where the argument 
that he might move past corrupt Washington politics was bolstered by the number of 
donations and volunteers; these donations and volunteers themselves validated the 
argument and encouraged more of the same.  
Throughout the campaign the Clinton camp tried to use the theme of change itself 
but with little sustained success. Despite the array of political talent associated with 
the campaign it initially used the stilted formulation, “Working for change. Working for 
you.” Subsequently the slogans were changed several times: “the strength and 
experience to make change happen”, “ready for change, ready to lead” and “the 
change we need”. The attempted use and rapid disposal of these ideas indicated the 
difficulty the campaign had identifying a message that worked.13 The Obama 
campaign’s increasing ownership of change made it difficult for the Clinton campaign 
to even use the term. One Clinton strategist, in retrospect, rued the decision not to 
raise money via small donations online that might have linked Clinton to grassroots 
support. It was apparently rejected because it seemed like too little money and 
otherwise trying to make something of the gender issue.14 
We have stressed the specific use of change against political experience, but the 
objection could be made that change as taken up and adopted by the public seemed 
a somewhat loftier affair. The sense was that Obama had a rhetorical flair that 
promised change – as something of a higher purpose. Clinton in the January 2008 
debate was sufficiently worried by Obama’s mastery of change in his speeches to 
object twice that he had change only as “words”. Clinton felt better taking a swipe at 
                                            
13
 Ben Smith, “Undecided: Hillary Keeps Shifting Slogans”, Politico, 3 January 2008, accessed 8 
December 2014, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0108/7685.html  
14
 David Remnick, The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama (London: Picador, 2010), 515. 
85 
the excessive rhetorical talent that seemed to promise perhaps too much rather than 
attempting to explain her problematic Washington credentials. The expansive sense 
of change taken up so positively by the public might seem at first incongruous with 
the political tactics discussed above. However, it is best not to see the two as merely 
co-existent but as complimentary. The soaring rhetoric of Obama invoking the best 
traditions of the US polity worked by contrast with the sordid money/vote grubbing 
attached to contemporary congress. Leith’s analysis of the Obama’s rhetorical skills 
shows how Obama evokes the glories of the past through his links with the rhetoric 
of both Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. In key passages Obama re-
works and re-uses important historical speeches that would be familiar to his US 
audience. Rather than simply understanding such rhetoric as being about the 
political points being put forward, the high blown speeches are about “positioning 
him at the confluence of two great oratorical traditions in American public life”.15 The 
attack on Washington-as-is complimented the rhetoric that harked back to 
Washington-as-was. By being able to connect with the past, some of the past glories 
could rub-off on Obama and might even be seen as qualities that are latent within 
the nation. At the same time the giants of history could be set against the pygmies 
inhabiting the capitol today. Change as seen in the rolling power of US history, as 
high minded and idealist, served to negatively highlight contemporary Washington, 
as small minded and calculating.  
It is here that we can consider the use of “hope” in the election in how it connects 
with the idea of change. “Hope” like change is an idea that has been used before in 
US politics, but with a much smaller pedigree. Famously, in 1992, Bill Clinton used 
                                            
15
 Sam Leith, You Talkin’ to Me?: Rhetoric from Aristotle to Obama (London, Profile Books: 2012), 
218.  
86 
hope allegorically in a speech at the Democrat National Conference about hope for 
the future, even as hope for racial equality, through referencing the name of his 
home town, Hope, Arkansas.16 However, hope used as a political theme by Obama 
was largely his own creation, though inspired by a sermon “The Audacity to Hope” 
given by his pastor Jeremiah Wright in 1990.17 Obama used the title “The Audacity of 
Hope” for the 2004 DNC speech that shot him to fame and later for his second 
autobiography. In his 2004 speech, Obama argues that the Democrats are putting 
forward a “politics of hope” rather than a “politics of cynicism”. This hope, “God’s 
greatest gift to us, the bedrock of this nation; the belief in things not seen; the belief 
that there are better days ahead”:  
It’s the hope of slaves sitting around a fire singing freedom songs; the hope of 
immigrants setting out for distant shores; the hope of a young naval lieutenant 
bravely patrolling the Mekong Delta; the hope of a millworker’s son who dares 
to defy the odds; the hope of a skinny kid with a funny name who believes that 
America has a place for him, too.18 
Here, Obama uses “hope” as a way to rhetorically connect the multiple experiences 
of the US across time. It uses the idea of a faith that one’s situation can be altered. 
This is makes for a heady blend in its association with the aspirations of the 
American dream, with the struggle against slavery that rent the nation, even giving a 
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nod to the youthful idealism sacrificed in Vietnam, all couched in language that sits 
easily within a strong tradition of religiosity. Further, the stress is that the speaker 
shares a personal and contemporary connection to this universal theme/tradition. 
Obama notes that this hope is not idealistic i.e. it is not merely being “hopeful” and 
so requires work. The link between “hope” and a political programme, though, is 
difficult to imagine because the idea is so general and amorphous. It is more an 
attempt to rework national mythology than any clear aspiration. The main implication 
that might be drawn is to remain true to the nation which had seen the meeting of 
aspirations over such a long time. Although from another perspective it might equally 
be said that many of the individuals he alluded to were struggling against the US 
political setup. In other words, the “can do” spirit is continuously needed to tackle 
systemic problems in institutions that intimate and say outright: “you can’t”. There is 
a deft recasting of national deficiencies as national justification or of translating the 
qualities of individuals into qualities of the nation. The uplifting power of hope, as 
with change, is the link to the political capital of the past. With hope Obama restated 
the American dream in a slightly more religious form and connects it to a broader 
range of struggles than those of impoverished immigrants arriving at Ellis Island. 
This is quite an achievement – although perhaps it is also not perhaps so easily used 
by others linked in part as it is to the colour of the candidate’s skin. 
Another part of Obama’s approach where the high value of US politics in the abstract 
or historical sense was contrasted with a low value given to US politics today was in 
relationship to the partisan divisions in US politics. One of Obama’s most celebrated 
speeches made at the 2004 DNC and which launched him to national prominence 
serves to illustrate that there is a sense of looking down on today’s politics. 
Famously Obama argued there were not red states or blue states but only the United 
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States. While raising the US polity in the abstract, this is also in a sense a decrying 
of the political disagreements there are today. There is an overture to the politically 
disconnected electorate, frustrated by foolish political disagreements, by the 
legislative logjam and that just wants problems to be solved. Thus strongly held 
convictions competing in the public square are, as previously noted, called 
“bickering” by Obama. Rather than explain where his party stands on these 
disagreements Obama chose to be dismissive. And with no explanation of the 
divisions, then supposedly such politics – aka partisanship – could only be venal and 
self-serving.  
Indeed Obama’s position above politics made it difficult for Clinton. Attacks by her 
did not seem to stick, whereas attacks by Obama on Clinton seemed to be believed. 
The explanation doing the rounds at one point was that Obama had charisma, was 
very likeable, and Clinton was as Obama put it, “likeable enough”.19 However, it 
might be better to consider that even at an early stage many Democrats had 
invested themselves in Obama’s saint-like position.  
Many took from the powerful rhetoric that Obama brought to the race that the change 
being discussed was surely akin to that being discussed by Martin Luther King, Jr.20 
However, the complimentary point which gave such links with the past their salience 
owed as much to Ross Perot, the billionaire who ran as an independent for president 
in 1992 and 1996 on a ticket of going to Washington to “clean out the barn”.  
If targeting political experience as being problematic worked with Clinton, the 
approach could plausibly be extended to McCain. “Change you can believe in” was 
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carried over into the general election contest. Again Obama’s ownership of “change” 
limited the scope of the McCain team to manoeuvre. In the face of this McCain’s 
team struggled with a coherent presentation moving from the idea of being a 
seasoned political operator to being a political maverick – in Washington but not of 
Washington. The way in which the Obama team had laid claim to important ideas in 
the campaign and its symbolic dominance became clear in early June 2008 when 
the troubled McCain campaign sought to appropriate some of the Obama 
campaign’s “brand capital”. The slogan “A leader you can believe in” made its 
appearance at a McCain Louisiana rally playing on the Obama slogan and 
attempting to stress McCain’s leadership credentials. The slogan tried to co-opt part 
of the Obama message and so too did the McCain website, to the extent that, 
incredibly, it was rebranded in the colours of the Obama campaign and with a 
strikingly similar logo – the slogan “A leader we can believe in” now prominently 
displayed.21  
It was, however, insufficient for McCain to co-opt merely the second half of the 
“change you can believe in” slogan. On 4 September 2008 while accepting the 
party’s nomination the McCain/Palin ticket signalled that it sought to challenge where 
Obama was seen to dominate and its claim to the idea of change itself.22 With the 
economy collapsing a campaign strategy projecting more of the same was 
increasingly unrealistic and so McCain adopted the slogan “Change is coming” and 
avoided mentioning the incumbent Republican president. In his 13 September radio 
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address McCain went further by claiming co-ownership of the Obama campaign’s 
slogan and that he could firm up its promise of change: “We offer not only change 
you can believe in, but change you can verify.”23  
McCain’s declaration that he could offer “change you can believe in” was not merely 
bluster or assertion however. Sara Palin’s addition to the Republican ticket on 4 
September 2008 allowed him to co-opt this “change”. The Obama campaign could 
no longer rely on the argument that only they could bring change based on being not 
of Washington. Sara Palin’s lack of experience and location out in Alaska could allow 
her to argue that she too, like Obama, was a Washington outsider. The Obama 
campaign had relied on emphasising that their candidate’s inexperience was an 
asset because it set him outside the Washington machine. A great deal of Obama’s 
formal claim to be an “agent of change” had relied solely on the anti-political 
sentiment that an “outsider” untainted by deep association with the status quo might 
reconfigure a dysfunctional politics. Palin was even able to effectively criticise 
Obama’s running mate Joe Biden as a creature of Washington and thus bring into 
question Obama’s change credentials.24 In particular Palin could employ some of the 
homeliness of President Bush Jr. by way of contrast with Obama’s east coast liberal 
intellectualism (though by way of Hawaii). The challenge set by the McCain/Palin 
pairing was via the adoption of the arguments on change rather than opposition to 
the points being put forward by the Obama campaign.  
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In passing, it should be noted that the Tea Party, which was given such impetuous 
by the Palin nomination, has in some ways a similar orientation to politics and history 
as that of the Obama campaign. Likewise, the Tea Party combines hostility towards 
the political system today with a reverence to political tradition. And, while Tea Party 
groupings were given legitimacy by Palin’s nomination, reciprocally their support of 
Palin as grass roots anti-Washington activists only enhanced her “change” 
credentials in the sense that change came to be used here. “Change” becomes 
something abstracted from political policies, even of political views. There seems to 
be a cynicism at the heart of this idealism; at least an idealism about the past – and 
perhaps the future – growing around a core of cynicism about the present. 
The ability of the McCain/Palin ticket to take up the theme of change seemed to 
confuse the Obama campaign. “Simply saying the word does not make you the 
agent of change,” complained Axelrod.25 Obama opined incoherently, “We can’t be 
fooled because John McCain – I’ve been talking about change since we started this 
campaign – some of you were involved. I talked about change when we were up, I 
talked about change when were down.”26 The reporter for Esquire argued that the 
questioning of the ownership of change threw Obama:  
Truth be told, Obama himself seems to have lost his clarity, lost his hold on 
change. Blindsided by McCain and Palin and their absurd claims of Change is 
Coming and Change You Can Verify, Obama wears the slightly 
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uncomprehending look of someone who’s just discovered that his wallet has 
been lifted at a Fourth of July picnic.27 
McCain seemed to have a much better grasp of change, “For Governor Palin and 
me, change is more than a slogan, and it’s not about party. It’s about changing the 
way business is done, and it’s the reason we entered politics to begin with.” In the 
first presidential debate McCain, while in bi-partisan agreement with Obama on the 
financial recovery plan, smoothly introduced the idea that “ear-marked”, pork-barrel 
spending was the “gateway drug” to political corruption that he had in particular 
fought and that Obama had been complicit with this in his state until he declared his 
presidential candidacy.28 How convincing McCain’s “change” conversion might be 
and how it might lie alongside the inspirational side of change employed by Obama 
proved a different matter. But even there, in the second debate, McCain bizarrely 
started to encroach on Obama’s territory: “My mother basically raised my family… I 
know what it’s like in dark times… I know what it’s like to have to fight to keep one’s 
hope going in tough times”.29 
The co-option of change felt like a slight to the Obama campaign and its carefully 
constructed moral superiority. Obama was rankled that the ownership of the term 
change was being challenged, that McCain’s strategy was as the New York Times 
put it to “seize the mantle of change”30. “Let’s be absolutely clear about what change 
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means – change isn’t just a word”, argued an exasperated Obama. And while Palin 
had jokingly described herself as a pitbull with lipstick a rattled Obama made the 
unstatesmanlike suggestion that the new challenger was rather a pig with lipstick.31 
A New York Times reporter connected this to Obama’s previous haughty reaction to 
Clinton’s attempt to suggest that she might deliver change.32 Obama’s call for civility 
and compromise in politics when tested seemed wanting.  
Events, then, had overtaken “Change we can believe in”. From September the 
campaign adopted “Change we need”. The idea being that Obama will bring change 
that not only should you believe in, but it’s “the change Americans need because of 
the state of their lives over the last 8 years under a Bush presidency”.33 The attempt 
was, in part at least, to recast “change” as new, changed policies. Obama’s 
economic plan became the centrepiece of this re-justification. However, as Thomas 
Friedman, the New York Times commentator, argued, in this process Obama had 
managed to go from “cool to cold” and needed to be able to summon up some 
enthusiasm for his own policies34 which were not particularly radical or ambitious.35 It 
seemed that the “the hope monger had gone” at least in his all-out form, although a 
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vestige remained in that the new economic ads eschewed negativity even though 
they might seem anaemic.36 
The way that the “mantle of change” had so easily transferred from Democrat to 
Republican in this way – this instability – seems to show how insubstantial and 
shallow was the initial basis for the claim. There had been no substantial proposals 
put forward on removing “entrenched special interests” through political reform. 
Perhaps a programme of measures tied to a constitutional amendment might have 
been put forward in such a campaign. The policies put forward were either 
piecemeal and inadequate for the problems that were said to exist or else vague and 
diffuse. This seems to confirm Clinton’s point that holier-than-thou posturing was 
going on: 
None of the problems we face will be easily solved. Now, I could stand up here 
and say let’s just get everybody together, let’s get unified….the sky will open, 
the light will come down celestial choirs will be singing, and everyone will know 
that we should do the right thing and the world will be perfect. Maybe I’m just 
lived a little long but I have no illusions about how hard this will be. You are not 
going to wave a magic wand and make the special interests disappear.37 
Although we have identified “change” as hostility to perceived political graft, perhaps 
there is something to be said the idea of change in a more general optimistic way. 
“Change” as a rallying cry can bring a simple, straightforward identification with the 
need to change without the electorate having to agree with exactly what the 
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candidate had in mind. Perhaps for a country as large and diverse as the USA using 
the idea of change might be considered as important as part of reaching out and 
attempting to include as many sections of the electorate as possible. However, 
change in and of itself has little content and its use in political campaigning indicates 
difficulties in crafting a more substantial approach. In other areas of life, for example 
in business or sport, someone suggesting change would immediately be asked what 
changes were being proposed. It seems that the call for change has become so 
much part of the political furniture that its use is little commented on. The sharp 
minds engaged in political jousting find it difficult to call out the lack of content in the 
idea of change because their candidates or parties have adopted it at one stage or 
another.  
In this case, the use of change was particularly problematic because of its several 
meanings – as opposition to graft, as the aspiration for a better world and as at least 
moderately different policies – obscured rather than clarified. Confusion reigned and 
both the media and the parties were guilty of playing to a dumbed-down narrative 
such as the abstract, often meaningless, discussion of leadership vs. change. The 
satirical animated series South Park sensing the emperor had no clothes and playing 
on the euphoria of the Obama campaign aired an episode the day after the election, 
“About Last Night…”, where with victory Democrat supporters milled around 
mindlessly shouting “Change!”38 
Despite the long campaign there was little or no testing of the main aspect of the 
idea of “change you can believe in”. Opponents of Obama were either defensive, 
accepting the points but trying to side-step them, as with Clinton, or else in 
agreement as with Edwards, McCain and Palin. It seemed that there was little 
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willingness to mount some sort of defence of politics in Washington in the face of 
public hostility. Perhaps it might have been argued that special interests had a 
legitimate interest in policy because policies were aimed at them and that they might 
bring expertise and a novel perspective to bear on the formation of policy. Likewise it 
might be argued that state money was required to attract large corporations which 
might otherwise decamp to foreign shores. And while the partisan rancour might 
sometimes be seen as being about petty differences, issues of principle were often 
at play. Admonishing the participants to play nicely and bridge differences seems to 
be dismissive of the debate, the dialogue, that is needed and so, in the end, 
reinforces cynicism rather than showing a way forward. With no defence of today’s 
politics being made available, those still interested in the subject are often reduced to 
retreating into a wonk-ish fascination with the details of policy. 
The upsurge of enthusiasm and even idealism shown in the 2008 election was 
intoxicating for many. However, its reliance on the narratives of the past was 
disturbing and ultimately self-limiting. While there might be inspiration to be had from 
the giants of US history, change to be meaningful must come from attempting to 
meet the needs of the present ultimately through new ideas and approaches.  
There was no attempt to build political capital by defending contemporary political 
practice or by developing new practices – other than the candidates narrowly 
defending their own records in contrast with that seen around them. In the absence 
of a defence of contemporary political capital, the past was plundered. Obama’s 
sophistication was that this was not merely by the appropriation of the stars and 
stripes but a clever re-working of national themes which proved inspiring to millions. 
However, the public in adopting such general ideas of change and hope so 
enthusiastically suggests a suspension of disbelief by the electorate itself and we 
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must allow for other factors such as race to have played to people’s aspirations. The 
turbo charged version of “change” – energised by the rhetorical link to a golden age 
of politics on the one hand and tied to the distrust of contemporary politics on the 
other – retains the amorphous appeal that allows the audience to project (other) 
desires onto it. The quality of debate was insufficient to interrogate the idea of 
change or the anti-political sentiment attached to it.  
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Chapter 3. Online Activism and the Revival of Politics  
The thesis has attempted to draw out how the 2008 election was connected to race. 
It seems clear that much of the novelty of the public response in the 2008 election 
was connected to racial issues and to the symbolism of electing black man to the 
White House. However, there has been another, partially competing, factor used to 
try to explain the relative dynamism and excitement of the campaign: online activism. 
During the 2008 presidential election, online campaigning was seen as reaching 
maturity and having had a substantial effect. This chapter examines the claims made 
for online campaigning and attempts to situate such campaigning within the context 
of changes to campaign strategy and to the politics of the Democratic Party in 
particular. 
This chapter benefitted from the academic tendency to explore new phenomena – on 
the basis that results of such investigations will automatically bring new, i.e. original 
results. There is a wealth of investigations into the numbers of the online campaign 
in a number of academic journals and in several book length studies. The Obama 
online campaign was understood from an early stage to have followed on from the 
previous Howard Dean online campaign. This meant that there was already a large 
amount of attention in journal articles, journalistic interviews and several book length 
treatments that sought to develop the idea of the “netroots” that the thesis could 
make use of. The sheer volume and variety of online discussion made these the best 
sources to tackle this subject. A detailed study of the way in which online politics was 
conducted in the 2008 election was considered outside of the scope of the study, i.e. 
it would amount to a study in and of itself. 
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Primary sources were also used during research as a check on the assessments of 
secondary material. This involved looking through a number of online forums to 
assess whether the academic material captured what was happening online. In 
particular checks were made to ensure that there was no novel discussion of race 
taking place in such online forums. There was indeed no distinct online discussion of 
race found in these forums. In general the pattern of online forum discussion was a 
discussion which combined a strong “wonkish” element of attention to legislation with 
a locally/state oriented discussion of political characters and of the connections 
made with these characters and the main political candidates. 
The majority view has been Obama’s ability to use the internet in his campaign 
enabled victory. One academic noted, “Most observers of the 2008 campaign agree 
that the Obama campaign’s use of the Internet was key to his success.”1 And as staff 
writers on the Pitt Political Review argued: 
The Internet has transformed from being almost insubstantial in political 
campaigns to being essential in only 10 years. The elections of 2008 and 2010 
revolutionised the way that campaigns reach out to voters, with the new 
benchmark set by President Barack Obama and his campaign team in 2008.2 
Howard Dean, whose online support while running for the 2004 Democratic 
presidential nomination had made many take notice, by 2007 came to see internet 
campaigning not simply as an important part of political campaigning but as a 
transformational phenomenon – as the way to return power to the people:  
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The Internet is the most important tool for redemocratizing the world since 
Gutenberg invented the printing press. There’s no way you could exaggerate the 
importance of the Internet, in terms of its ability to prevent the few people who 
seek to seize power and control everything from doing so.3 
From this perspective the internet is acting as the mechanism where individuals 
outside of the traditional power elites can make their mark or at least plausibly re-
enter the political arena from which they were previously alienated or excluded. For 
some this demonstrated a transition from a largely passive electorate of previous 
years, addressed by political advertisements in the mass media, towards the 
involvement of substantial numbers via the internet. This internet activation took 
many forms: self-directed research into political issues, getting involved in the 
election as volunteers, providing and raising funds, discussing the campaign with 
others through social networking, creating media such as online videos and acting as 
commentators through blogging. Potentially such activism might result in new 
political groupings, policy initiatives or whole new approaches to politics. The idea of 
the potential importance of people using IT was famously illustrated by Time 
magazine in 2006 whose cover featured a mirrored computer screen and which 
heralded “You” as the person of the year.4 In this reading the 2008 campaign might 
then be seen as the first campaign of the internet age; its precedents and importance 
perhaps as vital as any racial aspects of the campaign.  
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In contrast to continued broad claims for the revolutionary, transformative power of 
the internet, recent academic work has sought to measure more closely the effect of 
online activities. Hindman, a scholar critical of claims for democratisation through the 
internet, notes that there is a “new wave of Internet scholarship that is no longer tied 
up in the unsatisfying debates of the 1990s.”5 Discussion and analysis in academia 
has started to move away from the dichotomy of the transformation of everything by 
the internet on the one hand and its dismissal as business as usual on the other, 
towards more detailed and nuanced readings of the development and impact of 
politics online.  
The authoritative Pew survey of The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008 supported the 
argument that the population in general had become more informed and more 
involved through online mechanisms, but provided qualification as to the scope of 
such changes. Overall the proportion of the population which had used the internet 
for political purposes in the campaign increased from 37 per cent of the population in 
2004 to 46 per cent in the 2008 election. It showed that in the 2008 campaign, 24 per 
cent of those who had used the internet for political purposes posted, discussed or 
forwarded something about the election online or on a mobile phone – either on 
Facebook, Twitter, a blog, website, or in a text message etc. This number translates 
as 18 per cent of all adult internet users and about 13 per cent of the adult 
population. The self-reported dominant election news source remains television: 76 
per cent described TV as one of their major sources of election news (they were able 
to select two) as against 26 per cent for the internet and 28 per cent for newspapers. 
Though notably these numbers do not reflect the extent to which online news 
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sources are the online or mobile versions of mainstream media as is commonly the 
case.6  
Strong claims of revolutionary transformation by the internet are also countered by 
academic sociological critiques of technological determinism (or of the media 
determinism associated with Marshall McLuhan). As one paper succinctly puts it, 
there is “a large body of work on the mutual shaping of technological, political, 
organizational, and cultural forms”.7 While being sceptical of claims that new 
technologies act as a determining factor for changes in campaigning, nonetheless 
technology should not be dismissed as merely symptomatic of other developments.8 
Strategies, tactics and means of communication were developed and used to effect 
by interested parties in the 2008 election such that technology should be seen as 
one of the determinants in accounting for what happened. Paradoxically, it might be 
argued that notions of the transforming power of technology drove on efforts of 
people excited to be involved in the playing out of such change. 
Two central connected themes inform the discussion of the impact of internet 
engagement: changes in the media landscape and in civic engagement. The political 
significance of the internet has been identified as relating to the undermining of 
existing media structures and the revival of democracy. Writing as long ago as 1994 
Howard Rheingold discussed this as the capacity to “challenge the existing political 
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hierarchy’s monopoly on powerful communications media, and perhaps thus 
revitalize citizen-based democracy.”9 
In the first theme the changes arising from the use of internet in politics are said to 
have played a disruptive role in the power and function of mainstream media. The 
traditional role of the media has been undermined or modified through online activity. 
This takes place through user-based selection and highlighting of material 
supplanting the editorial/journalistic process, through media content created directly 
by individuals, and by changes in patterns of communication that bypass traditional 
media in its function of shaping a public sphere. The “gatekeeper” role of mainstream 
media has, to an extent, been undermined by the presentation of journalistic material 
ordered through popularity – a process which has been called “gatewatching”10 – in 
aggregation sites, as lists of links, as social media postings, or when media content 
is said to have “gone viral”. Gatekeeping is an important concept in critiques of 
mainstream media where media agents are said to control what is reported as news 
and so filter content along ideologically or commercially informed lines. Many such 
critiques, for example the “propaganda model” of Chomsky and Herman11, rely on 
the idea of gatekeeping by media corporations and so the diminution of this role and 
an “active-audience” acting as gatewatcher12 are seen as potentially opening up 
media to alternative, previously excluded viewpoints and voices. For one writer, 
“Gatewatching technology which characterizes much of today’s UGC [user 
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generated content], allows non-elites for the first time, to act as an effective 
collaborative filter before news flows to a mass audience.”13  
For some, however, content selected through popularity is seen as diminishing 
public debate overall because of the growth of “soft news” centring on entertainment, 
celebrity and the personal which crowds out attention that might be given to public 
issues. A comparison between content selected by popularity and that selected 
through the editorial process would suggest that journalists are more enamoured 
with hard news, i.e. news focused on straightforwardly public topics, than the readers 
of their material: approximately 20 per cent more soft news was highlighted when 
news was judged by popularity.14 One survey looking at the most viewed political 
news YouTube videos of the 2008 presidential election campaign suggested that 
gatewatching did not disrupt the presentation of elite voices to the extent that has 
been suggested. Over 80 per cent of these videos featured elites in their content and 
the creators of the content were over 70 per cent members of elite groups. However 
the people who posted the videos were two thirds from non-elites. This is perhaps 
partially due to the intellectual property issues that result from putting content onto 
YouTube.15  
The second central theme of the effect of the internet on politics is the idea of the 
revival of democracy through online engagement. The large numbers of people 
taking part in presidential campaigns using internet based tools, for example, have 
led to a re-examination of discussions about the decline in US civic engagement. 
Robert Putnam’s seminal study, Bowling Alone, presented comprehensive research 
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that pointed to the decay of US civic life and civic institutions.16 Putnam argued in 
2000 that the internet was unlikely to revive civic life because it was so often used for 
entertainment. Academic studies looking at the relationship between political 
participation and internet use, however, point to increased engagement. A meta-
analysis of 38 studies of the relationship between political participation and internet 
use – looking at 116 different effects – shows a positive, though not overwhelming, 
correlation between internet use and political engagement; albeit with the caveat that 
the causality may be political interest affecting internet use.17 At a basic level 
Hayward argues online mechanisms, although not revolutionary, create new 
sustainable opportunities for democratic participation and are thus ultimately 
democratising.18 Hayward considers using the internet for independent political 
research and communication reduces barriers of time and resources for individuals 
looking to engage politically. Another of Putnam’s key arguments, one that 
potentially brings into question whether the form of engagement online might 
reinvigorate civic life, is that the backbone of civic life is “bridging” social capital i.e. 
the connections between people of different backgrounds. The concern is that 
already weakened bridging social capital might be further reduced as people seek 
out only those that agreed with them online, a concern echoed by other 
commentators worried about a possible fragmentation and/or polarization of the 
public sphere.19 The Pew survey shows a mixed pattern: of those that used the 
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internet for politics during the 2008 election, 33 per cent of individuals “typically” 
sought out partisan voices of agreement; 21 per cent sought out content that might 
challenge their current views; and 25 per cent sought out neutral news sources.20 
However, perhaps rather than seeing civic activities as unitary it may be that there 
are elements of the past orthodoxies taking place at the same time as new types of 
motivation and engagement. One paper contrasts civic action and communication 
which is “dutiful” being replaced with one of “actualizing” – based on particular 
causes and consumer sensitivities. Here citizenship is changing with elements of 
both the “fragmentation of an old civic order” and new “emerging civic styles”.21 
Networking 
Political activism online was not solely a feature of the Obama campaign. However, it 
reached a new scale, importance, and sophistication with Obama’s use of the 
internet to organise activists and to raise funds. From the outset the goal was using 
online mobilisation to practical effect signalled by a series of local “community kick-
off meetings”.22 Obama’s focus was that networking online should translate into 
campaigning activities, most often offline. This focus was a response to the 
difficulties experienced by the Howard Dean Democratic presidential campaign in 
2003 in turning online support into an effective campaign tool. The problem of more 
tightly linking the field operations of the campaign with online volunteers was one the 
Dean campaign and associated technologists had worked on in the campaign and 
subsequently to the summer of 2003 when Dean dropped out of the presidential 
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race. When Obama’s campaign began, much of the infrastructure and the practices 
for combining the two was available either in the form of consultancies, software 
companies such Blue State Digital or in personnel. And, as Kreiss notes, Obama 
made use of these new socio-technical resources to a much greater extent than his 
rivals Edwards or Clinton.23 One of Dean’s software team hired by the Obama 
campaign, Franklin Hodge, explained how they had cemented the lessons of the 
Dean campaign: “Yes, there are blogs, listservs [automated email-based discussion 
lists] but the point of the campaign is to get someone to donate money, make calls, 
write letters, organise a house party.” With the online systems deployed by the 
campaign, “[t]he core of the software is having those links to taking action – to doing 
something”.24 Running through the campaign’s efforts was the harnessing of social 
networking techniques through my.barakobama.com the campaign’s own bespoke 
social networking site, which came to be known by the shorthand of “MyBo”. The 
MyBo site was used as a mechanism to cohere, organise and harness the energies 
of supporters rather than as a general means of communicating. Users of the site 
could readily liaise with others in their area and were given feedback on how they 
were doing compared to their fellow campaigners in meeting the campaign’s goals. 
Zephyr Teachout, Howard Dean’s internet director, notes that Blue State Digital, the 
software development company in Boston working for the Obama campaign, based 
the MyBo site around software applications (called “Get Local”) created by the Dean 
campaign that were then further developed and integrated around the MyBo site. 
The campaign’s kudos was such that it was able to enlist the services of 24-year-old 
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Chris Hughes, co-founder of Facebook in developing its tools and strategy. Hughes 
who was drawn to Obama’s message was known internally as the “online organising 
guru”.25 The MyBo site was the success story of the online campaign with over 2 
million profiles resulting in 200,000 offline events, 400,000 on-site blog posts and 
35,000 volunteer groups. Obama raised over $500 million online from 3 million 
donors who gave 6.5 million donations at an average of $80 a time. 26 
To effectively harness the energies of so many people via the MyBo website/social 
networking system, the campaign sought a balance between allowing supporters 
some discretion in exactly how they organised activities on the one hand with 
ensuring that the campaign’s strategic goals were pursued on the other. The idea 
was to promote the grassroots “ownership” of the campaign and at the same time 
co-ordinate activities such that they benefitted the campaign.27 This approach was 
not merely technical; it was also a political message about what the campaign was 
doing. As Obama’s New Media Director, Joe Rospars, made clear, “In everything we 
did, the narrative, the underlying expectation or message was that you have the 
power to affect the course of the campaign. And we maintained that throughout our 
online strategy.” Campaign goals, however, shaped the expectation as to what form 
local initiatives took. This meant, for example, that states with a caucus system 
worked for eligible caucus turnout while other states organised a general get out the 
vote campaign. According to Teachout, “They’ve done a great job in being precise in 
the use of the tools. In Iowa it was house parties, looking for a highly committed local 
network. In South Carolina, it was a massive get out the vote effort.” MyBo worked to 
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bring people together in the caucus states and the early primaries; in later-voting 
states – such as Texas, Colorado and Wisconsin – by the time paid staff were 
directly deployed, according to the campaign, “they supplemented an already-built 
infrastructure and volunteer network” having been supplied with remote training and 
the “opportunity to build the campaign on their own”.28 The campaign team sought to 
identify leaders they could work with or through; the target being 1,000 “precinct 
captain officers” in each state with “e-mail lists and good data” and to include these 
field organisers and volunteer co-ordinators in conversations taking place about 
campaign strategy.29 In passing it should be noted that this does not mean that 
supporters were by and large corralled or turned into robots by the campaign. As 
Nielsen notes in extensive fieldwork with volunteers and paid staff in US political 
campaigns, despite scripting and close attempts to manage the message put forward 
by supporters, more often than not canvassers and phone-bank callers go off-
message and often get involved in long messy political conversations. And while this 
may be troubling for campaign staffers, this personalised communication about the 
campaign to a public often cynical about air-brushed politics is at the core of the 
appeal of the personalised communication that such supporters provide.30 
While the main aspect of the Obama campaign’s online strategy was to organise 
supporters, a secondary aspect was to use the new communications technologies to 
reach out to as many sections of the electorate as possible. The Democrat vote was 
expected to benefit from increased turnout from young people and minorities. The 
Obama team co-ordinated and channelled this engagement through external social 
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media in addition to its internal systems. The Obama campaign had profiles on more 
than 15 social networks including AsianAve.com, MiGente.com and BlackPlanet.com 
(targeting Asian, Hispanic and black members respectively) on the basis that the 
campaign should go wherever people congregated online.31 Expanding the 
campaign’s reach was important because sections of the electorate especially young 
people are considered difficult to reach and not fully engaged with, and therefore not 
readily accessible by, traditional media. The campaign’s presence on external sites 
was treated sensitively – seen as setting up “embassies” – and there was an 
emphasis placed on getting people to join MyBo or else sign-up to receive campaign 
emails. The reach-out effort also took into account the rapid changes in generational 
adoption of communication platforms by using mobile. According to a Republican 
New Media consultant:  
You have an entire generation of folks under age 25 no longer using emails, not 
even using Facebook; a majority using text messaging. I get Obama’s text 
messages and everyone is exactly what it should be. It is never pointless. It is 
always worth reading and it is an action for you to take. You have hundreds of 
recipients on a text message. You have hundreds of people trying to change the 
world in 160 characters or less. What’s the SMS [text-messaging] strategy for 
John McCain? None.32 
This was not quite the case – by the end of the campaign according to the Pew 
survey 17 per cent of McCain supporters received campaign messages via mobile 
compared to 28 per cent for Obama supporters33 – but the Blackberry wielding 
Democratic nominee made full use of having supporters spread the message using 
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their mobile phones. The ability to have supporters re-post, re-tweet, re-send or 
simply “like” messages on Facebook leveraged personal connections to gain the sort 
of reach that impersonal mass media could not replicate. According to Andrew 
Rassiej, founder of Personal Democracy Forum, a politics/technology website, the 
Obama campaign also became a personalised media operation:  
the campaign, consciously or unconsciously, became much more of a media 
operation than simply a presidential campaign, because they recognise by putting 
their message out onto these various platforms, their supporters would spread it 
for them. We are going from the area of the soundbite to the sound blast.34  
Perhaps the main perceived challenge of involving so many people for the Obama 
campaign was to maintain clarity of message. Traditionally campaigns have been at 
pains to control communication and carefully manage media coverage to minimise 
the impact of any gaffes, or of errant supporters, and to try to ensure political 
priorities and positions are made clear and consistent.35 With interactivity comes a 
potential loss of control of the campaign’s message. One mechanism to minimise 
problems was the 100-strong Obama new media team36 which worked closely with 
supporters and acted as consultants with campaign staff at a national and state 
level. The focus on activity, and especially on local activity, also minimised the extent 
to which the MyBo site became a forum for policy discussion or debate – with one or 
two exceptions discussed later. As one commentator noted of the MyBo site: “there 
                                            
34
 Ibid.  
35
 Matthew R. Kerbel, Netroots: Online Progressives and the Transformation of American Politics 
(Boulder: Paradigm, 2009), 40. 
36
 Levenshus, “Online Relationship Management”, 322. 
112 
seems to be little deliberation or even disagreement among this particular online 
community.”37 
The McCain campaign was always playing catch-up with the Obama online effort. 
Personally, McCain seemed more comfortable with more traditional forms of 
communication. McCain presented a regular radio broadcast seeming almost a 
throwback to previous modes of political address, though also leveraging the right’s 
domination of the talk radio format. McCain admitted that he was unable to use a 
computer and could not send an email. An Obama TV ad even tried to make this into 
an issue and Obama spokesman Dan Pfeiffer told the LA Times, “It’s extraordinary 
that someone who wants to be our president and commander in chief doesn’t know 
how to send an e-mail.”38 The potential usefulness of online campaigning was far 
from unknown to McCain, however. In 2000 McCain raised $1 million online in his 
New Hampshire primary victory over George W. Bush. The development of social 
networking tools nonetheless was well behind the Obama camp’s efforts developed 
as they were from Dean’s antecedents. An academic survey of leading candidate’s 
websites that compared McCain’s site with Obama’s in March 2007 noted that  
While some aspects of the site, such as the “action center,” suggest that the 
website’s designers seem aware of the need to incorporate this type of 
engagement, the designers still cling to the notion that websites are, above all 
else, a forum for inscribing a candidate’s image/message. Because of its 
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limitations, the McCain website only allows for a moderate level of user 
participation.39 
The McCain campaign had a social networking system of their own from February 
2007 called “McCainSpace”, but it took time to fully develop, suffered from technical 
problems and was a poor alternative to that created by the Obama team. As late as 
August 2008 with just 70 days of the campaign left, McCainSpace was relaunched, 
the new software based on a generic social networking system without features built 
specifically for a political campaign.40 The 70 days remaining was woefully 
insufficient time to build a community online. 
The Clinton campaign was much less enamoured with the use of social media. 
Clinton, an established candidate, tended to work through existing institutions and 
with an existing base of support rather than open up the campaign to volunteers 
online. Clinton’s view approaching the Iowa primary was reportedly that caucus 
voters “do not look like Facebook”.41 The campaign’s overall approach militated 
against the development of online networking. According to Joe Trippi Howard 
Dean’s National Campaign Manager: 
[Even if you] have all the smartest bottom-up, tech-savvy people working for you. 
If the candidate and the top of the campaign want to run a top-down campaign, 
there is nothing you can do. It will sit there and nothing will happen. That’s kind of 
what happened with the Clinton campaign.42  
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Existing networks of activists and organisations were unable to match the numbers 
Obama mobilised online. For example, in Texas Clinton had 20,000 volunteers 
against the 104,000 Texans that signed up at my.barakobama.com.43 Towards the 
end of the campaign Clinton started to look to the internet in a limited way to raise 
funding – which effectively shored up the last three months of the campaign – 
however by that stage the momentum was firmly with the Obama camp. 
The Renewed Importance of the Ground War 
One way to understand the move to online campaigning is via the renewed 
emphasis in campaign strategy on employing people in electioneering on the ground. 
The idea of the importance of volunteers and paid workers for campaigns has been 
part of a longer-term change in campaign strategy of looking to the “ground war” (i.e. 
the personalised mediation of canvassers and phone bank callers) as much as the 
“air war” (i.e. mass mediated communication such as TV ads and mainstream news 
media). There was a relative decline in mobilisation from the 1970s as parties 
increasingly moved away from being sources of patronage.44 In this period the 
parties suffered from institutional decay and an erosion of their activist bases. From 
then on raising support for particular campaigns became more feasible than on-
going organisation for parties proper. Without a standing base of support, there is 
what Nielsen calls an “assemblage” of activists, concerned individuals, traditional 
groups such as organised labour and the parties themselves coming together around 
the campaign of particular candidates.45 This ad hoc organisational form reflects the 
weakness of the party organisations and their main backers. For much of the late 
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twentieth century having large numbers working for US presidential campaigns had 
been deprioritised in media-based campaigns. While in the 1968 election year the 
American National Election Studies showed 6 per cent of the population having 
worked for one of the candidates or parties the trend since then had been downward 
reaching a low-point in 1996 where only 2 per cent of the population were similarly 
involved.46 In recent years, however, there has been renewed of interest in the 
ground war. The success of the Christian Right and then the mobilisations of union 
canvassers around the Nafta treaty, along with research pointing to the effectiveness 
of personalised communication, led to the reconsideration of how effective using 
people to front the campaign can be.47 The revival in getting people out on the 
ground has been combined with attempts to use voter data to ensure that this effort 
is made where it counts most. In the 2000 election the Republican Bush-Cheney 
ticket was able to mobilise more volunteers – 450,000 – than could the Democrats 
with Gore-Lieberman.48 However, through the use of targeted campaigning the 
Democrats used their numbers more effectively. According to the Republican 
campaign strategist Karl Rove, this led to the Democrats winning the ground war in 
the 2000 election.  
The experience of Dean’s 2004 campaign, where on the ground campaigning 
backed by substantial numbers of online activists, gave further impetus to developing 
the infrastructure for the ground war. Dean was elected chair of the DNC in 2005 and 
oversaw the creation of a national voter file and associated internal systems that 
have been used for the efficient targeting of potential supporters in local, state and 
national campaigns including Obama’s. The development of such systems was a 
                                            
46
 American Election Studies, “Worked for a Party or Candidate 1952-2008”, accessed 1 June 2013, 
http://electionstudies.org//nesguide/2ndtable/t6b_3_2.htm  
47
 Nielsen, Ground Wars, 44-45. 
48
 Ibid., 42. 
116 
substantial technical achievement and involved difficult negotiations to bring the 
state organisations of the party on board. The Republicans had nationalised their 
voter information in the mid-1990s but the Democrats were able to leverage the 
flexibility of web-based systems and work from the best innovations that the state 
parties had made. Nationalising and working to ensure the quality of the voter 
databases signalled a systematic approach to conducting a ground war and ensuring 
more seats were contested. The consistency of the data was vital for the Obama 
team to be able to build interfaces and mount a national internet-backed campaign. 
And as each campaign cycle progressed the data would improve: a condition of 
using the data was to feed updated information back into the system.49  
Taken in historical perspective there was indeed a growth in public participation in 
the 2008 campaign but this was only a partial reverse from previous decades where 
many more were engaged in campaigning or were approached by activists: 4 per 
cent of the population worked for campaigns in 2008 according to the American 
National Election Studies survey as against the 6 per cent in 1968.50 Despite the 
huge number of volunteers Obama still needed to pay phone bank workers in the 
campaign.51 And despite the online donations, big business remained an important 
source of finance. Even the financial services sector, excoriated in many circles, 
remained an important source of campaign finance.52 
Rather than see the online aspect of the campaign, then, as an entirely new form of 
campaigning it might be better to see it as an efficient way of organising the ground 
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war of canvassing and phone banking and also for raising funds for the air war. A 
renewed emphasis on the ground war was partly because of the perception of 
diminishing returns from mass media advertising. An increasingly fragmented US 
media audience, the oversaturation of advertising and the limited effectiveness of 
campaign messages were all contributing factors.53 Ironically, despite this, a major 
aspect of the campaign fundraising online was to pay for mainstream media 
advertising. The main expenditure of campaign resources was on television 
advertising. Obama, for example, spent at least $250 million on ads – over $100 
million more than John Kerry in 2004. One 30 minute prime-time “infomercial” across 
several stations cost the Obama campaign about $3 million, gaining 33 million 
viewers. McCain spent $128 million – but was limited by the Federal Campaign Act 
when he agreed to take federal funding.54 In comparison online ads across all 
campaigns amounted to $50 million in total.  
Blogging 
Political blogging was seen as an important factor encouraging online activism in the 
2008 election. The reach of blogging in the election was such that it came to rival 
mainstream print media. Towards the end of 2008, Daily Kos the behemoth of 
progressive blogs had a readership roughly equivalent to that of USA Today.55 In 
October 2008 the home page of the Drudge Report blogging site was viewed more 
than 798 million times.56 The blogs undoubtedly represented a fresher approach than 
the “horserace” coverage that according to the Project for Excellence in Journalism 
dominated mainstream media – although horserace coverage existed on blogs 
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also.57 Political blogs were seen as credible and useful by the increasing numbers 
that viewed them. One study in 2004 found 90 per cent of blog readers said they 
became more knowledgeable about politics after reading blog posts and almost 75 
per cent of blog readers found blogs to be “moderately credible” to “very credible.” 
Traditional media in contrast was seen by these readers as only “somewhat 
credible.”58  
A key reason that blogs represent a change in political mediation is because they are 
most often openly partisan in contrast to the default presentation of most mainstream 
US media. Bloggers follow many of US journalism’s default precepts such as the 
pursuit of truth; the idea of that blogs should fact check mainstream media is a 
common approach. However, journalistic norms of objectivity are considered 
secondary.59 By taking subjective positions blogs are seen to narrow the gap 
between the individual and public discourse. For example, many politicians have 
taken to blogging for direct communication with citizens. Political discussion on blogs 
can be more informal and personal compared to the discussion in mainstream 
media. For one academic this is “illustrative of how personal and intimate narratives 
are increasingly used in political discourses” and so can “translate impersonal 
policies into the vernacular language of the lifeworld”.60  
Political blogs are a subset of a wider phenomenon. In 2008 an estimated 22 million 
adult Americans, or 12 per cent of internet users, had blogs. Fully 50 per cent of 
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Internet users said they had read someone else’s blog.61 It is estimated that 70 per 
cent of blogs are personal journals with 11 per cent of blogs covering political 
issues.62 In a wider sense the process of blogging is seen as an important potential 
counter to trends towards atomization and long-identified tendencies for individuals 
to see themselves as consumers rather than citizens. Siapera stresses the “authorial 
position” of the blogger whereby the blogger creates themselves as subject, through 
a subjective stance applied to gathered information and the interaction with other 
subjectivities that takes place through blog comment discussion. This can extend 
beyond narrow liberal individualism through its connectedness. For Siapera, this 
position does not conform to the colder communicative action posited by Jürgen 
Habermas as indicative of a public sphere but nor does it dissolve its author into 
disconnected hypertext as postmodernists such as Mark Poster suggest. The 
limitations for Siapera come rather with the extent to which the blogger deals with 
questions of “power” instead of lapsing into “emotivism” or else being party to 
“publicity” and subordinated in wider spectacle. 63  
Despite the large numbers of bloggers only a few have established themselves with 
large numbers of readers. Outside the impact on individuals establishing the 
subjectivity that comes from authorship, direct claims for the democratization of 
public voices are undermined somewhat by the structuring of readership around a 
few key blogs. According to Bowers and Stoller writing in 2005, of the “few hundred 
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thousand” US blogs discussing politics “less than one-tenth of one percent of them 
account for more than 99% of all political blogging traffic.”64 Or, as Hindman puts it: 
Most online content receives no links, attracts no eyeballs, and has minimal 
political relevance. Again and again, this study finds powerful hierarchies shaping 
a medium that continues to be celebrated for its openness.65 
For Hindman there is a pattern of online media concentration which even surpasses 
that of mainstream media: there are a handful of massively read blogs, a very large 
number of seldom, if at all, read blogs with a hollowing out of any middle layer.66 The 
handful of widely read bloggers are said to establish a grouping that is now difficult to 
join – a blogging royalty or elite. There is the possibility of becoming established as 
posts are referenced by established commentators but this referral process suggests 
is something akin to a gatekeeper role has been recreated in the “blogosphere”. For 
Chait among progressive blogs this has encouraged a worrying trend to enforce a 
shared “political sensibility” as only those flagged onside by elite bloggers can 
“escape total anonymity”.67 
Even when taking into account the large numbers of bloggers, a common critique of 
how much they represent political democratization is that they are far from a 
representative cross-section of the population: they are predominantly white, 
educated male professionals. McKenna and Pole’s 2008 study of political bloggers 
found the majority of political bloggers are Caucasian, well educated, and male – 
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only a quarter were female and the majority were “aged 26 to 41.”68 The 
demographics of blog readers are similar, Johnson and Kaye in 2004 found “90 per 
cent of blog participants were Caucasian, 77 per cent were male and 93 per cent 
reported some college or higher”. Alongside the blogosphere not being 
representative of the public at large, nor are these bloggers representative of those 
who volunteered for the campaign and contributed money.69 Hindman is sensitive to 
the elision of the originators and readers of progressive blogs with the “much larger 
body of activists who gave money or time using online tools” that is a feature of 
much of the coverage of online politics.70  
For Davis, established elite bloggers who act as opinion formers have increasingly 
become enmeshed with political campaigns and the parties themselves through 
“transactional agenda setting”: “Political blogs affect politics through a transactional 
relationship with other agenda seekers (politicians, groups, political organization 
etc.), journalists and the audience.”71 The bi-directional relationship with journalists 
and parties modifies elite agenda setting rather than undermining it. Increasingly 
politicians, PR groups and political campaigns look to establish lines of 
communication with such established bloggers. 
The Netroots and the Importance of Blogging 
While in 2008 Obama from the outset looked to online support, in 2003 Dean was 
sought out by Democrat online campaigners. As Wired magazine argued, the 
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internet “invented Howard Dean.”72 This was part of a wider pattern of Democrat 
online activists scouring the field for candidates they might support, sometimes 
setting up campaigns for candidates before the candidates themselves knew.73 Dean 
and others supported by online pioneers were the beneficiaries of a political vacuum. 
Left-leaning Democratic activists were disconcerted at the lack of opposition to 
George W. Bush, the War on Terror and in particular the Iraq War that began in 
2002. As one of the few major figures to oppose the Iraq War, Dean was taken up by 
online supporters. General Wesley Clark was similarly supported but his professional 
campaign team systematically dismissed and undermined online backers.74 
Alongside the lack of opposition to the Iraq War, activists also differed on the 
predominant Democratic approach of triangulating a position between that of 
Republicans and traditional Democrat policies. This strategy had worked in Bill 
Clinton’s second term to revive the presidency, but the absence of strong arguments 
in favour of traditional Democrat policies was considered as problematic for a section 
of activist-inclined Democratic supporters. Triangulation was seen as self-defeating 
because rather than make arguments that might win people over and challenge 
conservative framing of events, the party often seemed on the wrong end of a “52 
48” split at the polls.75 Howard Dean’s declaration that he represented the 
“Democratic wing of the Democrat Party” was pointed at the perceived timidity and 
insincerity of his party’s approach. 
The growth of progressive blogs represented a turnaround from their position in the 
early 2000s; in 2003 it was estimated that conservative blogs had twice the 
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readership of progressive blogs, but by 2005 the positions were reversed.76 The 
absence of strident Democratic figures and the poor infrastructure of the Democratic 
Party allowed space for these bloggers. The progressive blogs were seen as part of 
the “netroots” movement, a term coined in late 2002 by Jerome Armstrong founder of 
the MyDD blog – and informally known as the “Blogfather”.77  
We should note here that alongside the progressive blogs something of a wider 
infrastructure has developed. In addition to individual blogging sites there are several 
related online campaigning organisations such as MoveOn.org, Media Matters for 
America, and Think Progress. The most powerful is MoveOn.org, formed in 1998 in 
response to attempts to impeach Bill Clinton and which petitioned against the 2002 
Iraq War. Moveon.org is a progressive campaigning organisation that acts as 
clearing house for multiple issues both institutional and contentious and has been 
notable in raising large amounts of money for a number of causes and running its 
own Political Action Committee.78 As of 2008 MoveOn.org claimed 7 million 
members – although membership is free and without responsibilities or other 
qualifications. Media Matters for America is a research group formed to counter 
conservative disinformation and has played an important role in undermining 
Republican attacks through detailed analysis and fact checking.  
It is important to understand that the motivation of online progressives is not solely 
about differences of policy with the mainstream Democratic Party, however. For 
Kerbel, rather their dispute centres on “power” in that they see the more assertive 
promotion of liberal values as the mechanism through which to get more Democrats, 
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and in particular more progressive Democrats, elected. Summarising Kerbel’s survey 
of key progressive bloggers, Hindman argues: 
The bloggers featured here are not extremists or naive idealists. They do not 
share ideological orthodoxy, though they agree on a series of diagnoses about 
what is wrong with the Democratic Party, contemporary media, and with American 
politics more generally. It is the quest to achieve a durable progressive majority – 
select “more, better Democrats” – that is bloggers’ central goal. The divide 
between bloggers and Democratic officials is thus not about different policy 
preferences, but rather about strategies, tactics, and political process.79 
Kerbel describes progressive bloggers as a “bourgeois elite” in contrast to the 
“entrenched aristocracy” of the party establishment and the “proletariat” of active 
supporters such as were involved in the Obama network.80  
One important strategy difference has been where increasingly the Democrat Party 
has let what are considered Republican strongholds go uncontested. The rationale 
had been that resources would be better used in other parts of the country to shore 
up defences or else contest marginal territories. This left Democrat organisations in 
Blue states to atrophy and many potential activists isolated. Chris Bowers of the 
MyDD blog in response to this problem promoted a 50 state strategy which was 
initially dismissed by professional Democrat campaign strategists, but later promoted 
by Dean in his time as chair of the DNC. As Bowers pointed out, the difficulty was 
that the Republicans themselves could divert resources from uncontested seats to 
expand the places where they contested the vote and potential Democrat activist 
talent was going to waste. Part of the reason for netroots activism can be seen in 
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individuals setting something up in places where tumbleweed was blowing through 
Democrat central. 
Obama and the Netroots 
Obama’s relationship with bloggers has been described as a “cautious distance”.81 In 
a roundtable on political blogging and the 2008 campaign in January 2008, Obama 
was considered third of the prospective Democrat candidates in terms of his 
engagement with progressive bloggers behind Edwards and then Clinton and was 
not noted otherwise in his presence in the “blogosphere”.82 The lack of “outreach” 
itself was considered a reason to be wary of the candidate.83 Indeed for much of the 
primary campaign Obama was not the preferred candidate for the netroots and there 
was no consensus among progressive bloggers on who they might support. While in 
2004 Dean and Clark gained backing, there was no clear candidate to court in 2008 
and none that wanted to directly pursue the netroots’ agenda. As blogger Matt Stoller 
noted, “for progressives, the lack of leverage in the presidential race is 
disheartening”.84  
In the early stages of the campaign there was a civility to discussions about the 
various Democrat candidates. However, as the field thinned and especially following 
Edwards’ departure from the race in January 2008 the online debate became more 
pointed. To some extent this reflected the increasingly personal exchanges between 
Clinton and Obama. However, online, there was the impression by Clinton 
supporters that this had gone too far and that they were facing comments that were 
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often ugly and vitriolic. For blogger Glenn Greenwald the attitude shown by many 
Obama supporters on the progressive blogs towards Clinton “really is 
indistinguishable from how the right hates her”. By March of 2008 one of the more 
established writers at Daily Kos staged a “strike” in protest at the treatment of Clinton 
supporters on Democrat supporting blogs. Boehlert argues that Clinton was not well-
regarded because she “did not represent the blogosphere’s model of a fighting 
Democrat ready to wage partisan war with George Bush’s Republican Party.”85 
However this description would also not fit Obama. Obama has often struck up 
against the partisan nature of US politics and might easily in many ways be seen as 
politically centrist. Nonetheless Obama became the consensus candidate for the 
blogosphere. This was undoubtedly connected to the sense for many progressive 
bloggers that Clinton was an “establishment” candidate and the sense that her 
political approach might follow that of Bill Clinton and look, for example, to a strategy 
that triangulated political positions between a traditional Democrat approach and that 
of the Republicans.  
In May 2007 Jonathan Chait writing for the moderate Democrat magazine New 
Republic, argued that the netroots had adopted the political style of the “conservative 
movement” by ultimately subordinating critical enquiry to the goal of supporting the 
progressive Democrat cause or movement and attempting to knock down those that 
failed to do the same. For Chait, “What they consider treasonous is any criticism of 
any part of the Democratic Party or its activist base from the right.” In effect they had, 
partly consciously, adopted Republican tactics by policing those on their own side 
that opposed what they saw as the interests of Democrat politics.86 Chait’s argument 
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seemed somewhat vindicated by the closing of ranks once Obama became seen as 
the netroots’ selected candidate and the hostility to those opposing this choice. This 
is not to say that there was no dissent – MyDD.com was one of the holdouts for 
Clinton supporters – but, once the Obama win was considered to be the goal, “The 
left blogs have basically become what they have despised about the right-wing 
blogs: cheerleaders for candidates and parties not for issues.”87 
Perhaps the issue that most tested the relationship between Obama and the netroots 
was on the subject of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA was a 
bill to reduce constraints on government electronic surveillance which included 
particularly controversial retrospective immunity for telecoms companies that had 
worked with Bush on what many considered were cases of illegal wiretapping.88 
Glenn Greenwald, an “A-list” blogger who had authored several hundred posts on 
the FISA bill, raised the issue most stridently when in June 2008 Obama reversed 
position on his opposition to FISA. The controversy even spread onto the MyBo site 
when Mike Stark, a pugilistic blogger but also long-time Obama supporter, setup a 
“Get FISA Right” group. The group attracted 24,000 supporters and became the 
largest group on MyBo.89 On 3 July – as many were preparing for 4 July celebrations 
– Obama responded on a MyBo diary posting of Joe Rospars which was followed 
with about 30 minutes of online consultation with policy staff. Obama argued the bill 
was not perfect but necessary for national defence. Obama conceded that “going 
forward, some of you may decide that my FISA position is a deal breaker. That’s ok. 
But I think it is worth pointing out that our agreement on the vast majority of issues 
that matter outweighs the differences we may have.” One angry poster in the 
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discussion noted the implicit political opportunism: “You reap the benefits, then 
abandon the position to exploit another, thinking: Oh well, who else are they going to 
vote for?”90 By this stage as the Democrat’s chosen candidate Obama felt able to 
vote for the bill including the clauses on retrospective immunity.91 In the mid-July 
Netroots Nation conference in Las Vegas that gathered 2,000 netroots supporters, 
Markos Moulitsas Zúniga who runs the Daily Kos site conceded it had been a 
“cluster fuck” but argued that everyone would soon get over it. 92 The netroots focus 
on Democrat victory at all costs left little option at that stage. 
New Campaigning? 
For Shaw and Benkler the “already-mythical Obama online campaign” had been able 
to capitalise on “immanent practices in the left wing of the blogosphere”93 and was 
“largely an extension of practices that already characterised the left-wing 
blogosphere rather than a new order imposed on a previously disorganised or 
nonparticipatory population.”94 However, it might be better to see the initial 
enthusiasm of netroots supporters of Dean’s campaign as establishing the idea that 
the internet might be used to systematically wage the ground war and transform 
campaign finances through numerous small donations. Obama was able to leverage 
organisational innovations from the Dean campaign honed by campaign staffers and 
technologists combined with the Democrat’s newly minted national database 
infrastructure to full effect in “the unprecedented integration of its new media and 
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field efforts”.95 Bruns notes that the netroots discussions and deliberations that 
formed part of the Dean campaign did not mesh well with presidential campaigning – 
a lesson that Dean veterans themselves had taken on board: 
As Howard Dean’s 2003/4 experiment with U.S. Presidential Primary campaign 
blogging showed, however, this community-driven model of political deliberation is 
ultimately incompatible with the personality-driven, celebrity-style politics of the 
late mass media age.96 
Obama’s internet campaigning, then, involved “limited volunteer action” rather than 
individual activity that might move “beyond campaign-imposed strictures”.97 For 
Bruns the test of real engagement “will come as the communities of users which 
form around such sites express a desire to become involved in the policy 
development process itself.” – something that was never a real issue in the Obama 
campaign.98 But as Kreiss argues it may be that presidential campaigns are not best 
suited to this type of mass deliberation:  
As temporal entities with very clear metrics for success, campaigns simply are not 
designed to be the training grounds of radical democratic participation that many 
desire… Many supporters not only accept but embrace this, given the basic goal 
alignment between these campaigns and their supporters: the objective is to 
defeat rivals, not remake democracy.99 
Some netroots precepts have been more fully accepted – notably with the resources 
mobilised online the emphasis on the 50 state strategy has become possible. 
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However, despite the space opened up by dislike of the Bush presidency the 
assertion of traditional Democrat policies was limited. Dean’s “Democratic wing of 
the Democrat Party” was replaced in Obama’s campaign with opposition to the 
partisan turn in US politics. The netroots shared Obama’s anti-Washington 
sentiments but for Obama, the capital was the host for partisan short-sightedness 
and gridlock, whereas the netroots saw it as the location for a timid Democrat 
leadership, fawned upon by self-interested consultants more interested in their jobs 
than Democrat victory. The impetus for the remaking of campaign organisation came 
from outside the Beltway and the netroots outlook favoured any victory, but a fervent 
expression of liberal/progressive values was sporadic at best in the Obama 
campaign. Despite its success, the Obama online effort does not necessarily mark 
the end-point for political mobilisations using the internet, however. MoveOn.org, for 
example, has acted to mobilise people around issues based on the metrics of people 
visiting its site to target flexible responses to a host of issues with just 20 staff in 
what Karpf calls an example of “organisation without organisations”.100 Nor are the 
netroots the sole form that progressive blogging may take – arising as they did from 
a particular political juncture. 
Ultimately, the state of the art online campaigning system harnessed support but 
could not account for the levels of that support. In other words the networking took-
off because people decided to invest themselves in the campaign. According to 
Obama’s Iowa Caucus Director, Mitch Stewart “people really wanted to come to an 
event. Every campaign wants to be volunteer driven. But we recognised that 
incredible enthusiasm and we were able to harness that energy.”101 Or as Stewart 
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quoted one of his operatives saying, “Everyone’s built a sail, but we’re the only 
campaign with the wind to use it”102 Michael Slaby, Obama’s chief technology officer 
noted, “We didn’t have to generate desire very often. We had to capture and 
empower interest and desire…. We made intelligent decisions that kept it growing 
but I don’t think anybody can really claim we started something.”103 Put succinctly by 
one software developer: they had built buckets so that they could capture the rain.104  
As perhaps was to be expected, the research here not found in the online campaign 
a novel source for new ideas on race. Rather it highlights the internet’s use by a 
section of Democrat activists on the one hand and the larger numbers who were 
involved in the Obama campaign on the other. This division supports Fiorina’s 
contention that the political sorting, around for example culture war issues, in the two 
main parties has not fully stamped itself on the wider electorate.105 As with the wider 
election campaign, an understanding of how Obama won and especially of the 
changing role of race is not fully possible to discern online. The next section attempts 
a reconstruction of how race gained such importance in US politics, starting with a 
critique of the main way in which elections have been understood in the academy. 
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Chapter 4. Theories of Electoral Change 
This chapter surveys the main way in which historical and political research has 
interpreted US electoral change, i.e. “partisan realignment” or “critical realignment” 
(often referred to simply as “realignment”). This is important because an appreciation 
of how elections are understood will provide insights for the thesis and such theories 
are ultimately being addressed. The chapter aims to sensitize the reader to the 
mainstream view of elections and also to an approach where race is largely taken as 
an external factor when it comes to electoral analysis. 
This chapter used the wealth of academic journal articles on realignment and a few 
key studies around which these discussions were made. There are several hundred 
papers in peer reviewed journals on realignment. The key work used in the chapter 
to contextualise the wealth of research was the Rosenof book which superbly 
navigated the wealth of material.1 This was discovered well into the investigation, but 
nonetheless helped to contextualise the papers and in particular the VO Key works 
and their relationship to the Chicago School of polling. Rosenof helped fully explain 
why a small article about a distant election had such pull over a long period of time.  
Notably there was limited use of the idea of realignment in either academic papers of 
as reflected in the journalistic discussion. The theory was not used in any significant 
way to analyse the 2008 election. Rather the analysis is made to see the limits of 
realignment and the empirical approach to change where categories are treated as 
the same over an extended period of time i.e. with no sense that the categories 
under discussion are subject to changes in meaning. 
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Given the analysis presented here the chapter does not attempt to apply the theory 
of realignment to the Obama election. Here we present a critique of the ability of the 
theory to connect with the changing categories with which it engages. In our analysis 
it is in the limits of this empirically based theorising that are demonstrated rather than 
ability for the theory to bring light to bear on the changes in the electoral sphere. 
Overall the theory of realignment uses the idea of loyalty as a stand-in for, as a 
watered down version of class analysis. Further the static way in which loyalty is 
understood speaks to the inability to grasp the changing meaning of the ideas under 
consideration. This might be considered a basic failing of the theory. It might be 
considered that this inability to get to grips with the changing character of categories 
is a failing that it shares with many of the theories of race and whiteness that we 
discuss in this thesis. 
The inability of the theory to interconnect race and class which is a feature of the 
developments in US politics means that questions of race, as with much of US social 
science, only become important from the 1960s when race becomes a public issue 
despite the enormous effects race has over a great period of time. As the 
predominant US political science approach to elections the lack of connection with 
race is incredible. Rather than academic investigation being independent of the 
political situation it is striking that race becomes part of the academic discussion only 
with the civil rights movement. This shows the limited ability for the theory, through 
abstraction, to work independently from contemporary political concerns. 
John Podhoretz’s 2008 piece in Commentary magazine asks whether there is “An 
Obama Realignment?” Much of the article discusses how important Obama is:  
135 
That November 4 marked the emphatic end to one period in American political 
history and the no less emphatic beginning of another is a proposition no one 
seems to doubt.2 
But after the journalistic bait, the switch: to find out what we are changing to “we 
need to return to politics”, there to dismiss Obama’s election (and his claims for 
realignment) as part of the chequered, confusing pattern of electoral results of recent 
decades.  
Since the 1960s partisan realignment (also known as critical realignment or as a 
theory of critical elections) has been the predominant view of US electoral change 
among US historians and political scientists. Lichtman, writing in 1976, considered 
that this type of model has “dominated recent attempts to study political contests in 
the United States”.3 McCormick, in 1982, sees the realignment perspective “looms 
dominant” in the “most innovative and influential research”.4 Mayhew, in 2002, even 
while seeking to (fatally) critique realignment, describes it as being “one of the most 
creative, engaging, and influential intellectual enterprises ever undertaken by 
American political scientists”.5 Rosenof, in his excellent history of realignment, has it 
as “the theory that changed the way we think about American politics”.6 Looking 
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forward, Carmines and Wagner, in 2006, “find great potential for future study under 
the realignment tent” and so seek to rescue the core approach of a “rich and fruitful 
intellectual tradition”.7 Despite being subject to some trenchant criticism, partisan 
realignment has maintained its status as the main theory through which long term 
electoral change is considered in the academy. While Clubb, et al, writing in 1990, 
argue that it is a “serious exaggeration” to say that the realignment viewpoint 
“dominates the study of American political history”, they nonetheless concede that it 
has become almost conventional for realignment eras to mark the periodization of 
political history, creating an “organising or synthesizing framework for the study and 
discussion of the American political past”.8 Even during periods where partisan 
realignment was seen as most lacking as an explanation, it could be argued that 
electoral change was being considered along the same axis as set by the 
realignment approach, but with a negative sign for both Democrats and Republicans, 
as de-alignment or even, for some, as the “decay phase” of realignment.9  
Partisan realignment was first developed in 1955 by V. O. Key, Jr. in “A Theory of 
Critical Elections”.10 In his article, Key proposed the existence of an intense election, 
a “critical election”, such that through the election there are large-scale changes in 
support for the parties. The strength of change in voter loyalties means that the 
underlying pattern is set for several less-critical elections that follow. In other words, 
the critical election engenders a change in party support of large numbers of people 
of a deep and lasting kind that amounts to a “partisan realignment”. Key’s starting 
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point was an empirical one. Key’s study focussed on general election returns in the 
New England states (of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Maine and 
Connecticut) in the 1928 election with some comparison material of a less definitive 
but similar change in the 1896 election. Key shows a huge shift to the Democrats in 
the 1928 election which is, by and large, maintained through to the 1952 election and 
Key’s own time. Key was not the first to look at the idea of lasting realignments in 
party loyalties11 but he clearly and graphically illustrated the idea in such a way that it 
would have seemed to use history to illuminate his present day. Key lays out a graph 
that shows elections with close party competition end abruptly in 1928 – with some 
further consolidation in 1932 – where a sizeable gap appears between opposing 
parties. He paints a picture of a new landscape suddenly emerging out of the seismic 
eruption. Key’s short paper makes no strong claims for the existence of critical 
partisan realignment outside of the 1928 election. He is circumspect about claims for 
other critical elections; he identifies none before 1928 and merely suggests that we 
may start to look for a similar pattern.  
At first consideration a short paper written in 1955 about the 1928 election based on 
the pattern of voting in a few states seems too esoteric to affect so much of 
subsequent thought about US elections. However, the importance of Key’s approach 
was not just as a historical theory about an election in New England almost three 
decades previously; it was a response to the general failure of US political scientists 
to spot the Democrat majority that emerged in these three decades. It was a 
reassessment of political science brought on by the shock of the 1948 election where 
pollsters expected and experts predicted a Republican victory, but the electorate 
produced a victory for the Democrats and Harry S. Truman campaigning on a New 
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Deal ticket. In so doing the underlying weakness of US political science at that time 
became apparent.12  
The Truman victory of 1948 – and how it was accomplished – was a shock. Just two 
years earlier, in November 1946, the Republicans had won overwhelming control of 
Congress – of both the House and the Senate – something seen as clearly 
prefiguring presidential success. Even before the campaign Roosevelt’s son had 
been manoeuvring to have Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated as the Democrat 
candidate in place of Truman. The Democrats were divided three ways. Against 
Truman was J. Strom Thurmond, a candidate in the South, opposing civil rights and 
the former US Vice President Henry A. Wallace on the left. Wallace had split off from 
the Democrats via the 1948 incarnation of the Progressive Party and was running on 
a platform supported by the American Labor Party. The Republican candidate, 
Thomas E. Dewey, had long been polling ahead, and the pollsters, following the 
understanding of the day that little would change at that stage, had ceased activities 
in April 1948. A Washington Post cartoon capturing conventional wisdom asked 
“What’s the Use of Going Through with the Election?”,13 and the Chicago Tribune 
printed a front cover announcing “Dewey Defeats Truman” (produced early due to a 
strike) that Truman ironically brandished with victory. Although Truman started 
complacently – his nomination acceptance speech stressed that the nation ought to 
simply be “grateful” for the material success brought by the Democrats – with defeat 
imminent his campaign became ferocious both in terms of energy and often in the 
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rhetoric defending the New Deal and attacking the Republicans.14 His 21,000 mile 
whistle-stop campaign tour made political use of, in particular, the Taft-Hartley anti-
union legislation passed by overriding his presidential veto. The tour brought out 
massive crowds which increasingly shouted, “Give ’em hell, Harry”.15 With the result, 
the New York Times had to conclude that this was a victory for New Deal ideas, and 
suggested that Truman, who himself had thought his chance of victory poor, “has 
probably never been so impressed with the strength of the New Deal philosophy”.16  
To say that pollsters and pundits had failed in 1948 was one thing – after all, 
elections can bring upsets. However, as Rosenof argues, political scientists had little 
in the way of a framework that could accommodate this result. New Deal ideas had 
been considered as popular because they offered a response to the Depression. The 
effectiveness of these ideas in the absence of the Depression was something novel 
and there was a dearth of explanations of this effectiveness, or of this novelty, in the 
prevailing cyclic theories of electoral support. Likewise those academics whose 
business was surveying the electorate had failed to connect with those being 
surveyed such that they might have seen this alteration of viewpoint as latent. What 
was worse for the academy was that there had been twenty years to identify a 
change. Political scientists had thought that the “pendulum” was swinging back from 
Democrats to Republicans and that “politics as usual” would resume with the 
Republicans the default party of government. All the special factors had gone: the 
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political mastery displayed by Roosevelt, the exigencies of war and of Depression 
were absent. While the post-war liberal trajectory towards the Great Society or 
indeed the importance of the New Deal coalition may seem clear from our 
retrospective vantage point, the sense was prior to the 1948 election that the New 
Deal and its coalition were a spent force. Political science had largely missed one of, 
if not the, biggest stories of the twentieth century. 
What was apparent was that this was not a return to politics pre-1928: there was no 
swing back on the pendulum to the Republicans or continuity. There was something 
new. US political science as it approached elections; however, was not 
accommodating to substantial secular change, i.e. change over time. Rather, 
electoral analysis was dominated by cyclic theories. The overall idea was that within 
the party system when one party’s programme was exhausted the other would take 
its place. So Louis H. Bean could write in 1942 that “[t]he existence of political tides 
in American history is usually taken for granted”.17 Bean and Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Snr. were the authors of the most influential of these cyclic theories.18 Bean’s 
theorization of the cycle was more numerical and related more to the business cycle 
whereas Schlesinger’s cycle owed more to alternating and mass psychological 
reactions to first excessively liberal and then excessively conservative policy.19 
Although Bean was one of the few who predicted a Truman victory, it seemed his 
approach had little to say about the how and the why. That some dry statistics about 
the state of the economic cycle pointed to Truman said little about the ideas that had 
been deployed or the reaction to them. Schlesinger who was surprised by the 
election outcome could – rightly – argue that his approach looked at underlying 
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changes rather than guaranteeing exact election results every time, but it seemed 
that both the liberal/conservative pendulum swing and the business cycle failed to 
capture the power or character of the underlying change that Truman had 
harnessed. This is not to say that these two cyclical theories said that nothing 
changes over time, but that their secular components had insufficient explanatory 
power to grasp the enduring loyalties to the party of the New Deal.20 
To get a slightly broader view of Key’s reinterpretation of electoral change it should 
be noted that his 1955 article does not stand alone. Often, though usually in passing, 
when citing the origins of the realignment school Key’s 1959 article “Secular 
Realignment and the Party System” is included. Although as Ladd notes, while 
justifying skipping the piece in his critique of the realignment approach, “secular 
realignment has never loomed large in orienting disciplinary research”21, the article 
reinforces Key’s sense of a need to replace cyclical theories and establish a sense of 
change over time. In “Secular Realignment…”, Key – compared to his 1955 article – 
both uses more specific empirical data about trends in New England towns and also 
makes more general statements that derive from his data. Key compares voting 
patterns in New England states between those in industrial towns and the rest of the 
population. Whereas previously Key had shown a sharp discontinuity in 1928 – with 
the aftershock of 1932 – establishing new political terrain, here he looks at the 
figures in more detail to show secular trends within sub-populations. So again rather 
than a “cyclic” political tide pushing and pulling politics, Key attempts to bring out 
where a shift in a particular direction might be considered within the data. In this 
case, Key tried to show agglomerations of individuals establishing new party 
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attachments over time. And, while the data here is less stark, Key’s argument that 
there is the potential creation of new constituencies, through many individuals having 
similar experiences, has to be considered as empirically likely, if not perhaps a 
given. In the 1959 article Key further distances himself from cyclic theories by 
emphasising the role of leadership and a lack of inevitability; Key stresses the 
changes he is discussing are ultimately political rather than sociological, ethnic or 
demographic: a change in a group over time “in itself does not produce a 
realignment but it creates opportunities for exploitation by political leadership”.22 Key 
considers these types of changes are distinct from any “peculiar factors” that operate 
in individual elections and take place in the long term – from a decade to a couple of 
generations. Among the examples of these phenomena that Key discusses are the 
formation of an industrial working class, the increase in the number of white collar 
employees, suburbanisation, and the falling away of ethnic identities over time.  
Although it may seem that critical and secular realignment are unrelated other than 
they both attempt to explain shifts in electoral support, there is an important internal 
connection: they are both tied up with political inertia or resistance because of the 
weight of existing party allegiances. Critical realignment is based on the idea that 
there is a deep partisan attachment that must be overcome. Key’s secular 
realignment is predicated on a lag, measured in years, between objective changes in 
a group and the working through of political consequences which Key argues is 
because of the durability of existing party attachments. So, for Key there are both 
long term processes of attrition working on and perhaps replacing existing party 
attachments, and occasional critical elections that, in the heat of crisis, re-form such 
deep attachments. As both types of realignment are related it is possible they 
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interact and so it could be that, just as an example, a process of slow secular change 
might obviate the need for critical change. 
The two types of realignment have, however, sometimes become a source of 
confusion. When discussing “realignment” it has become unclear whether this refers 
to the “critical realignment” of 1955 or to the secular realignment identified by Key in 
1959 or to both. This thesis – following Ladd’s point that critical realignment has 
been the realignment with which the literature has been concerned – takes partisan 
realignment as referred to in Key’s 1955 piece on critical elections and refers where 
necessary to secular realignment specifically.  
While Key seems able to address examples of both “critical” and long-term secular 
change in the electorate that previous cyclic theories were incapable of explaining, it 
is difficult to understand how central realignment theory became without reference to 
the influential “Michigan school” which had something of a symbiotic relationship with 
partisan realignment. The literature seems to underplay the strength of the 
relationship between Key’s realignment and The American Voter, published in 1960, 
the main work of the Michigan series from the University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research, headed by Angus Campbell. 23 Rosenof shows Key often worked 
closely with Campbell especially as allies against the Columbia school.24 Key 
considered the then dominant Columbia University approach to voter surveying as 
being too mechanistic, with a tendency to consider political outlook as inferable from 
social position. It was the Columbia view that influenced the decision in the 1948 
election campaign to stop polling because it was considered that the electorate’s 
outlook would not change (as it was thought to be largely based on individual social 
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situations that would not alter greatly in the last few months of the campaign and that 
had consistently been showing a preference for the Republicans).25 Key was aware 
of Campbell’s work from the early 1950s. Importantly, in April 1952, Key 
recommended Campbell test party loyalty in his surveys as a “better predictor” than 
other attributes and went so far as to suggest questions.26 Key was keen to be able 
to move from survey data from individuals at the micro level through to his macro 
analysis.  
Realignment theory and the survey work of The American Voter were able to support 
one another strengthening the coherence of both. Partisan realignment assumes an 
account of how the strength of partisan loyalties transcends the vagaries of 
responses to particular policies or a simple choice of what the policies and 
candidates are in one particular election year. The central realignment argument is 
that party support or identification is both strong and resilient and only some 
elections rouse sufficient passions to be able to fully overcome existing loyalties. 
One of the findings of The American Voter based on detailed surveys over three 
elections was to support a correlation of voting with partisan loyalty. And while The 
American Voter supported realignment, conversely, as McKay argues, The American 
Voter’s thesis is supported by realignment: “the Democrat majority must have come 
from somewhere; it cannot be purely psychological. The answer is that there have 
been certain periods in American history when rapid social and economic changes 
have forged new political coalitions.”27 The American Voter needed something above 
the psychology of the surveyed individual to explain the levels of partisan support in 
place (or the prompts for that loyalty to change) and Key’s numerically identified 
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theory of critical elections requires something with more fervour than large numbers 
of narrow, calculating homo economicus. Each theory, then, could stand steadily 
only by resting on the other. 
It may be that the relationship between The American Voter and realignment has not 
been emphasised by those wanting to use and explore realignment because they do 
not wish to engage with the considerable specialised literature on the psychology of 
individual voters and polling technique, and that there is difficulty conceptually 
reconciling the political science approach and a psychological approach to electoral 
analysis.28 Key, himself, for example, in his work with The American Voter 
researchers had what he considered a disputatious though productive dialogue. This 
relates to another possible reason the relationship between Key and The American 
Voter is not emphasised: Key’s criticisms of its approach in his posthumously 
published 1966 work, The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 
1936-1960. This later work sought to counter some of the arguments of The 
American Voter. Key objected to what he saw as The American Voter’s argument 
that the electorate was uninformed about the issues of the day and prone to make 
irrational judgements: Key’s strongly held belief was that “voters are not fools”.29 Key 
suggested instead that there were those among the electorate which he called 
“standpatters” who were oriented towards maintaining party loyalty. Alternatively, 
there were those – he called “switchers” – who were much more likely to vote based 
on the record of the past party in office – this became known as “retrospective 
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voting”30. Here it seems that Key is attempting to step back from any narrow view of 
critical election theory that suggests an electorate that is prone to blind loyalty and 
unthinking responses. However, at the same time, this places qualifications on how 
much realignment and voter loyalty/partisan attachment can be seen as 
comprehensive explanations of the critical changes he identified when it was 
necessary to categorize types of voters and bring retrospective voting into the mix. 
It is also important to note that despite realignment becoming the central thrust of 
understanding US elections, Key’s initial focussed approach on 1928 has been – and 
remains – contentious. Key argued, following Samuel Lubell, that the changes he 
identifies start not with a reaction to Hoover’s failure to deal with the Depression but 
in Hoover’s 1928 Democrat opponent, Al Smith, who was responsible for the 
“activation” of new Catholic immigrants “in New England, at least”.31 However, The 
American Voter, suggests instead that much of the vigour of the 1928 election 
related to Al Smith’s Catholicism rather than his ideas on social reform. It then 
becomes questionable whether the 1928 election is a foretaste of what was to come 
in 1932 and subsequently. Alan Lichtman following this line points to the novelty of a 
Catholic candidate with a chance of winning as being behind some of the features of 
the 1928 election. He also stresses that the divisions of religion often followed into a 
division between town and country – and so while levels of voting may seem to go in 
the same direction, the factors in 1928 did not play through into 1932. What we have, 
according to Lichtman, is not a complex of the 1928-1932 elections but distinct 
events. Ladd in contrast argues that scholarship has noted “changes manifest in the 
New Deal years began long before the Great Depression”.32 Indeed, while it seems 
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logical that the competing responses to the Depression between Hoover and 
Roosevelt are what would have forced the electorate to reassess strong 
commitments in this period and thus 1932 would be a more likely location for critical 
change, it would seem that as a historical point that the experience of the 1928 
election would at the very least have prepared an important part of the New Deal 
coalition through the testing out of arguments and organisation.33 Further, although 
religion might seem the divisive point in 1928, it may be that the ecumenical 
differences are, at least in part, the form in which the town/country and recent 
immigrant/nativist divides surface. Once surfaced both differences would be 
expected to play a part in the reception and development of New Deal style populist 
politics. In subsequent work Kristi Anderson has argued that the activation or 
recruitment of a new generation of voters who were the children of recent immigrants 
played the most important part in creating a New Deal majority.34  
Indeed, Key was aware of the difficulties of whether to separate or combine 1928 
and 1932. He struggles with whether activating or converting (i.e. formally speaking 
re-aligning) taking place in 1928 – favouring converting, though without a clear 
basis.35 The empirical method adopted by Key could not tease out the difference 
between activation and conversion, because the difference was just not apparent in 
the simple aggregate empirical data of votes cast. This difficulty, however, could 
simply be eliminated by many of those that worked with the realignment thesis who 
were not so circumspect as Key about the use of the critical election approach. The 
American Voter itself, for example, bypassed the difficulties in identifying the roles of 
particular elections and of identifying a critical realigning election by adopting the 
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idea of a realigning era. Such critical changes could then, perhaps, take place over 
several elections:  
Although Roosevelt’s margin of victory in 1932 was large (59 per cent of the two-
party vote), it was not until 1936 that the Democratic wave reached its peak. The 
long-entrenched Republican sympathies of the electorate may not have given way 
easily in the early days of the Depression. Had not Roosevelt and his New Deal 
won the confidence of many of these people during his first term – or even his 
second – there might well have been a return to earlier party lines similar to that 
which occurred in 1920. From this point of view we might speak not of a realigning 
election but of a realigning era.36 
Interestingly this formulation poses the response to the New Deal as an aberration 
from the standard cyclic political pattern as a wave upsetting the tidal ebb and flow. 
However, it is more important for the elision of the different reactions of different 
parts of the electorate combined under the rubric of realignment. Here those 
supporting the 1928 campaign are brought together with those falling into the 
Democratic camp as late as 1940. It would seem at least open to question whether 
the type of slow and staggered secular change identified here as a realigning era is 
the same character as that of the explosive change of one election brought out in 
Key’s empirical data.37 Key’s formulation of standpatters and switchers, and his view 
of activation and conversion are attempts to at least conceptualise such differences 
and the meanings that lie behind the numbers or behind the many new partisan 
attachments. In passing, it should be noted that this discussion relates directly to our 
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own era. Those looking for a 1930s style reaction – i.e. a New Deal style 
leftist/populist realignment – to the present crisis might consider that only in the 
context of political parties and outlooks already in position in 1928 prior to the 
Depression does the New Deal reaction fully make sense.38  
Together with a looser conception of the time over which realignment took place, 
The American Voter took up the circumspect conclusion of Key’s 1955 article that 
“Further development of an electoral typology would probably point to useful 
speculation in a variety of directions”.39 The American Voter drew on Key’s work 
seeking to pin down an electoral classification by adding to his maintaining election 
(where existing partisan attachments remain intact), and realigning election (where 
new partisan attachments are formed), a deviating election where: “the basic division 
of partisan loyalties is not seriously disturbed, but the attitude forces on the vote are 
such as to bring about the defeat of the majority party”.40  
Again The American Voter attempts to make realignment more general, in this case 
by adding flexibility in a way that distinguishes between short-term “attitude forces” 
and longer term party identification. Thus, for example, Eisenhower’s two terms as 
Republican president could clearly be marked off as the result of “deviating 
elections” with the “attitude forces” at work – of voter identification with a national 
hero, i.e. liking Ike. The deployment of the diffuse concept of attitude forces weakens 
the definition of a deviating election and brings into question the character of 
“partisan” attachment that might readily coexist with a vote against the party of 
attachment.  
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Another point to consider is that while Key’s theory was a response to the enduring 
effect of the New Deal coalition (at this stage fully from 1928 to 1955), it was 
couched in such a way that it did not look to New Deal politics, but rather to the 
mechanism of party identification as an underlying factor that could explain changes 
not always readily apparent on the surface of politics. Rather than deal directly with 
why New Deal arguments had such staying power, the more general and indirect 
idea that a party had gained strong and enduring loyalty became the locus for 
investigation – and so particular policies or ideas of the party in question could 
remain amorphous in this formulation at the very least at the initial stages of any 
enquiry. This meant that the psychological aspect of the electorate as having loyalty 
or strong identifications with a party as raised in Michigan school surveys came to 
the fore. It was unnecessary to test why or how much voters were loyal to particular 
parties or to particular party policies to see whether the pattern applied; all that was 
required to establish critical realignment was an enduring change in party 
identification. With this approach, it became possible – and there was an implicit 
invitation even in Key’s circumspect initial work – to trawl historical data looking for 
patterns of a critical election at play in other US elections. With The American Voter 
understanding that there may be critical eras rather than simply critical elections, a 
broader range of two or three elections where an enduring change in party loyalty 
took place could be sought. Without historical voter survey data on party 
identification the test would be simply applied against voting patterns and partisan 
attachment implied and often assumed.  
When looking for patterns of critical elections/eras, there is another assumption 
being made that party loyalty is an independent variable, that continued support for a 
party could be considered as much the same thing in different elections and different 
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times. To put this in perspective, consider something like class identification; it 
seems clear that class identification means different things at different periods, in 
different places and for different classes. Likewise being a Republican in 1928 
means something different to being a Republican in 1980, 1968, 1948 or even 1932. 
For such a strong reading of party identification in and of itself, there is the 
supposition that party identification or loyalty has something of a timeless or constant 
character both at the level of individual psychology and for aggregate voting data. 
Loyalty and identification would at minimum seem relative to what that loyalty is 
being tested against or identified against. That the loyalty in question often seems 
unable to pass the test of one of the several deviating elections should cause 
consideration of the quality of such loyalties, for example the idea of strong, deep 
partisan attachment. More specifically the sense of mutual reliance of party and 
those people involved in New Deal programmes, formed during the depths of the 
Great Depression would seem to have a novel character as would the war-time 
organisation that followed it. Indeed, fixing the idea of partisan loyalty hides the 
problem of explaining particular loyalties.  
When comparing voting patterns across different historical periods there are 
limitations to how much can be gleaned. A long period of a particular party’s 
dominance following a particularly hard fought and intense election, would suggest a 
larger role for the hard-fought election than previously thought and to further enquire 
just what was settled in the contest in a way that was not previously considered. 
However, the strength of the pattern in 1928 identified by Key, of being something 
that could not readily be accommodated by a cyclic theory might cause a pause for 
thought. That previous electoral results could evidently be interpreted as ebbs and 
flows was evidenced by the preponderance of such cyclic theories. But the thesis is 
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that 1928/1932 produced something powerful enough to echo or persist into the 
election of 1952. Perhaps there was something here that should be investigated in 
its own specificity and studies that establish what is distinct, might be necessary 
before being able to establish comparisons. Investigating what the ideas were and 
how they imprinted so strongly might seem to be a logically prior problem to resolve. 
After Key, the main figure in the development of realignment theory is Walter Dean 
Burnham. In his influential Critical Elections and the Wellsprings of American 
Democracy published in 1970, Burnham sought to defend and develop 
realignment.41 In his book Burnham wanted to tighten up critical realignment as a 
theory by more clearly defining it and linking it to general features of US politics. 
Burnham goes so far as to argue that in the literature until that point “one is 
impressed with how little theorizing has been forthcoming” that uses the idea of 
critical realignment to analyse American politics “across time and space”.42 To 
develop critical alignment as a theory Burnham uses the Weberian device of an 
ideal-type. Burnham’s “characteristic” critical realignment is short, involves at least 
20-30 per cent of the electorate changing allegiance, is intense in both the campaign 
and the nomination, usually has a high turnout, and alters or even overthrows the 
organisation and leadership of the parties involved.43 These initial points roughly go 
along with the thesis as already stated. It is, however, with subsequent points in his 
definition that Burnham should be seen as moving the theory on.  
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Critical realignment, argues Burnham, should be considered as a phenomena 
related to the scale and heterogeneity of the US political process.44 Following Lowi, 
he sees that, unlike the more cohesive mass organisations of European politics, in 
the USA parties are “constituent parties”; they are made up of separate groupings or 
constituencies whose approach is under construction rather than being fully formed. 
The diversity of such a party’s components means that it is only through a political 
process that the party is made more coherent and leadership emerges. The electoral 
process is about the formation (and re-formulation) of the parties themselves at the 
same time as acting on the electorate – the extended party primaries where 
candidates attempt to unite the party before trying to unite the nation are evidence of 
this. Using Lowi’s temptingly enigmatic formulation, Burnham argues that, 
“electorally, American parties represent outcomes in general; parties seldom shape 
or represent outcomes in particular”.45 Thus, for Burnham, realignment happens not 
just as an electoral result but acts as something that re-constitutes the parties and 
their leadership – sorting factions and personnel and through this resets a deep 
relationship with their constituents. 
The other US-specific factor is the designed-in inertia of the US political system. 
Rosenof sees the use of this insight as arguably Burnham’s most original 
contribution: the checks and balances and separation of powers, i.e. the design of 
US government that sought to temper change and thus stymie the possibility of 
autocratic government, builds up frustration and bottlenecks that can only be 
resolved by an explosive response that emerges periodically in response to these 
tensions.46 For Burnham, then, it is the relative conservative rigidity of the system of 
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government which leads, ironically, to the repeated eruption of realignment at the 
polls. This is important for realignment because the focus on institutional political 
arrangements lessens – without necessarily eliminating – the reliance of the theory 
on the idea of partisan loyalty and its relationship with psychology. One might 
suggest that in this view, institutions and policies buffered by constitutional 
arrangement from easy alteration require a strong, clear shift in partisan support to 
be remade. The focus on institutions also suggests an international point of 
comparison and contrast with which to test the theory – and perhaps partially 
account for the low take-up of realignment theory as a way of explaining electoral 
change in other countries.47 
Burnham’s arguments about constitutive parties and a political system oriented 
against change seem to move realignment theory on and suggest useful points of 
tension to explore. However, he is also notably linked with the attempt to reinstate a 
cyclic character to realignment. And while Burnham notes that the periodicity of 
critical election is variable – of roughly 30 years – and that shocks external to the 
political system seem to prompt the realignments,48 he also sees “approximately 
once a generation”,49 “a broadly repetitive pattern of oscillation between the normal 
inertia of mass electoral politics and the ruptures of the normal which realignments 
bring about is clearly evident from the data.”50 The critical realigning elections that 
Burnham identifies numerically are divided by between 30 and 38 years, however 
the series under investigation contains just five such elections. Critical elections have 
been mooted for elections in 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 and 1928-1932.51 However, to 
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empirically derive a theory of cyclic elections from such a small sample seems like 
overreach. Burnham’s generational point does fit well with realignment. Existing 
loyalties might falter because the memory of the event that prompted the realignment 
and the memory of the realignment itself would fade over time; thus the partisan 
loyalty based on this would also fade, with some new voters perhaps not yet alive at 
time of the realignment, only gleaning a weaker, second-hand version of why a party 
might be trusted and supported. However, although this points towards an important 
reason for the potential weakening of existing loyalties it does not speak to why there 
might be a new generational impetus for deep-cutting realignment. Taken as a whole 
the idea that conditions for a realignment would conveniently occur every 30 or so 
years seems arbitrary rather than given, as it requires the following elements – at 
least – to line up: external shocks linked to the identified realignments, the 
constitutional system’s inertia having built up enough resentment to prompt explosive 
change in a particular direction, and a successful response to events made available 
outside of the dominant leadership in the ruling party.  
The other problem with Burnham’s intimation of a generational/cyclic realignment 
was that it became increasingly difficult to identify a new realignment arriving to meet 
his schedule – roughly 1960-1968. An early writer on the subject and one of the most 
influential was James L. Sundquist. He was looking to analyse why realignment, 
which seemed to be so successful in helping to periodize US politics, seemed not to 
be working for contemporary elections. Writing in 1973 he was dismissive of the idea 
of cyclical realignments that “simply read too much precision into history”.52 Instead 
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his focus was to investigate what the drivers for realignment might be through an 
examination of the issues that required rapid change from the electoral process.  
To investigate how political issues might play a part in realigning an electorate 
Sundquist creates a hypothetical “preliminary”53 model of a community where the 
existing political setup struggles to contain a powerful new issue. Views on the new 
issue have an appeal that works across existing party lines and if the issue is strong 
enough a reorganisation that reflects these new divisions can take place. He argues 
there are five variables that determine whether such an issue will bring such a 
realignment: the breadth and depth of the underlying grievance, the capacity of the 
proposed remedy to provoke resistance, the motivation and capacity of the party 
leadership, the division of the different sides on the new issue in the existing parties, 
and the strength of the ties that bind voters to existing parties. The simple model that 
Sundquist creates lets him clearly make the point that both the issue itself and also 
the political context in which the issue arrives play a part in determining whether 
realignment takes place.54 Sundquist approvingly quotes Kevin Phillips that “[A]n 
electorate that could be realigned at one time only by the most powerful of polarizing 
issues may be realigned in later years by one much weaker”.55 Realignment then, 
argues Sundquist, requires an issue that cuts across existing party lines. Further, the 
issue must manifest as a political concern rather than being just an identified social 
change, must be a major issue – that has a “lop-sided” effect – to polarize the 
electorate and be amenable to distinct responses. And, for Sundquist, it must be a 
new issue that arises when older issues have, at least to a degree, faded.56 
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The old issues, then, were unlikely to become realigning issues – at least in their 
present form. The 1928/1932 realignment was, according to Burnham, based on 
“ethnic/class” divisions. And, while an important part of the assessment of the New 
Deal realignment was its continuance through the 1948 election, Sundquist argues 
that the “Bloody shirt” revival of class antipathies” by Truman in 1948 soon faded – 
and conciliatory figures were brought into government despite the campaign rhetoric. 
With Truman’s departure from politics and the arrival of 1952 Democrat candidate, 
Adlai Stevenson, the “move towards the centre” was further consolidated.57 So, while 
the existing alignment was based at least in part on class, the post-war USA was 
largely built on consensus on class issues and maintaining many New Deal 
institutions.58  
With criteria in place, Sundquist could then assess the issues in play and whether 
they might point towards a partisan realignment. For example, from the mid-1960s, 
there was a sense of crisis which came together in as the “social issue”:  
Ghetto riots, campus riots, street crime, anti-Vietnam marches, poor people’s 
marches, drugs, pornography, welfarism, rising taxes, all had a common 
thread: the breakdown of family and social discipline, of order, of concepts of 
duty, of respect for law, of public and private morality.59 
Sundquist argues that the “social issue”60 was too diffuse to act as a realigning issue. 
It was in fact many issues that could then have different responses even from one 
individual. So, for example, someone wanting a crackdown on drugs might yet 
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support anti-Vietnam protests or be in favour of the freedom to consume 
pornography. Additionally while these issues invited some strong – potentially 
realigning – responses, the programmatic response was not evident. Other than 
broad demands to “get tough”, what might be done to respond to this diffuse sense 
of crisis was unclear.61 And, even then, all parties declared themselves against crime 
and disorder. 
The most powerful issues that might cut across party lines and so reorganise the 
parties, and the rest of the polity, are race and civil rights, argues Sundquist. (Race 
also lent some of its power to the social issue which it was associated with.)62 He 
identifies as a particularly important period as the 1960s where both Democrats and 
Republicans had wings of the party that sought to maintain white privilege. There 
were two main leaders who might be said to oppose civil rights advances in the 
1960s. The first, Barry Goldwater was the Republican nominee in the 1964 election. 
He ran on a states’ rights ticket rather than giving overt support to segregationist 
policies. The second was George C. Wallace, who attempted the Democrat 
nomination several times, and stood for the American Independent Party (AIP) in 
1968. Goldwater gained the Republican nomination in 1964 and was, however, 
crushed by Lyndon B. Johnson. Wallace gained about 9 million votes mostly from 
Southern Democrats, establishing what was to become an important precedent in 
the “solid South” in 1968 as Nixon squeezed through against Hubert H. Humphrey.  
Sundquist argues that although there were segregationists in each party there were 
also pro-civil rights factions and ultimately moderate centrist elements in the parties 
were strong enough to keep control. He ascribes some of the reticence to reorganise 
                                            
61
 Ibid., 387. 
62
 Sundquist refers to this at one point as the “racial-social issue”. Ibid., 393. 
159 
as Democrat segregationists being unwilling to try to make a home with hostile 
Republicans in the South and to Wallace abandoning the AIP to try to return to the 
Democrat fold. The Republican leadership at a local level was generally not open to 
race-based campaigning having set themselves up against discrimination. Sundquist 
quotes a liberal Republican of the time, “The Republican party will never go racist 
because the liberals won’t let it…. They can’t afford to lose us. We include the big 
contributors and the press, and they can’t win without us.”63 Sundquist argues that 
the local Republican leadership acted as a buffer to the take-up of the segregationist 
outlook of Wallace and his supporters. The existing Republican elite were a “country 
club” set isolated from, and so not concerned with, competition with blacks for jobs or 
housing, nor were they socially amenable to bringing segregationists into their ranks. 
That said, Wallace’s votes were tempting, and so the use of race was trialled in 
South Carolina in 1970. It failed with many Republicans defecting and Wallace 
voters reverting to – perhaps considering themselves to have a partisan attachment 
to – the Democrats.64  
In the absence of a major realigning issue, Carmines and Wagner have sought to 
use a modified version of Sundquist’s reading of realignment. In an article to assess 
the “issue evolution perspective”, Carmines and Wagner explain that they want to 
incorporate the idea of a cross-cutting issue into their approach but that “most 
partisan change occurs incrementally over long periods of time” and so a type of 
secular realignment should be the preferred mode of analysis today.65 Rather than 
expecting a single cross-cutting issue to change party loyalties, they argue that there 
are currently a number of smaller issues, creating a dynamic “issue competition” 
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(though the term “dynamism” seems somewhat at odds with the suggested slow 
pace of realignment). The default method then should be to assess such issues and 
in particular the process of transmission from elite – through an important layer of 
activists – to the electorate. In this view the attachments to parties are magnified by 
the electorate gravitating towards ideas they have a strong emotional attachment to 
and which are further amplified by organic links with activists.66 Carmines and 
Wagner’s perspective posits a relationship between elites, activists and public that 
has been undermined by Fiorina et al in their empirical study showing that electorate 
has generally not followed elite polarisation.67 Moreover the idea that the type of 
deep partisan attachments, discussed in both critical realignment and in Key’s 
secular realignment, might be formed on a large scale by a process of ideologically 
fishing for voters seems unlikely.  
While it has been difficult to find realignment, this could always be just a matter of 
time, and so a difficulty that relates more to the core of realignment has been the 
decline in party identification. Many authors, from at least the 1970s – began to note 
that there were a growing number of the electorate counting themselves as 
independents and that generally there was a weakening of association with politics 
and the parties themselves. This move away from party identification has often been 
called dealignment. 
Rosenof notes three different responses to incorporating dealignment into a 
realignment approach. The first was that dealignment was happening rather than, or 
as an alternative to, realignment. The second was that dealignment was a particular 
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case of realignment (though this seems to stretch definitions too far). Thirdly, 
dealignment was incorporated into a standard feature of a long electoral cycle. The 
last point was developed by Paul Allan Beck in 1979 when he attempted to integrate 
the generational aspect of dealignment into the electoral cycle.68 For Beck, 
dealignment automatically starts when new voters who did not experience the events 
surrounding the critical election become part of the electorate. This is similar to the 
point Burnham makes to support his argument for periodicity, but it stresses that 
without some type of realignment then inevitably the deep partisan attachment 
created through a critical election will decay over time. Further, argues Beck, this can 
then be seen as part of an extended electoral cycle moving from realignment, to 
some stability and then dealignment. While Beck makes an important point that the 
allegiances forged in a critical election are not timeless and self-sustaining there is 
more to consider than individual memories in political allegiance. It would seem at 
least plausible that the achievements of a party might linger past the election via the 
institutional, policy or organisational forms they take. There are mechanisms for a 
collective memory in politics that are active on a level wider than that of individual 
experience and might even reinforce as well as renew partisan attachments. So, 
while, up to a point, Beck’s assessment makes sense, there is an argument that 
without a clear realignment that it might be better to consider that something new 
has happened: that at least for now dealignment has replaced realignment. By 
standing back from realignment theory for a second, the idea of a prolonged, 
widespread political disenchantment demands further explanation.  
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Waiting for realignment has become difficult for empirically aligned political 
scientists. Even with changes in the parties in office, “underlying party identifications 
remained unchanged or were changing only glacially”.69 Forty five years of 
anticipation, of waiting for such change, may have become wearing. Carmines and 
Wagner argue that critical realignment as it was originally understood has 
“disappeared as a phenomenon”.70 For Ladd writing in 1990 waiting for realignment 
had turned political scientists into the characters from Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for 
Godot.71  
Harvard academic David R. Mayhew’s 2002, book-length attempt to undermine re-
alignment, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre, argues that it is 
now time to abandon the realignment perspective that after initial innovation brought 
diminishing returns and that the weight of previous theory has “blinkered” graduate 
students and created “opportunity costs” for those wanting to develop new ideas. 
Mayhew can see little of a coherent “conceptual structure” in the canon and so he 
takes up realignment via 15 empirical claims he has selected from the literature.72 
This prompts the question that if one could not untangle the complicated structure of 
the theory, how could one untangle the empirical claims? Mayhew presents the 
“essential” claims of the realignment taken from a “fully fleshed-out maximally 
ambitious version of the realignment perspective”.73 However, it is unclear why the 
most ambitious version would be used when looking to extract the theory’s essence. 
The answer for Mayhew is this version “has proven, I believe, to be particularly 
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engaging and influential.”74 The proof, however, is not forthcoming, and, further, as 
he himself notes, two of the main theorists, Key and Sundquist, are cautious and not 
of a “maximally ambitious” bent. Mayhew, without reconstructing the theory he 
wishes to critique, is instead critiquing a collection of features from the straw man of 
a non-existent theory he has cobbled together. Carmines and Wagner call this a 
critique not of realignment, but of an “amalgam” of the literature, where Mayhew’s 
fifteen characteristics of realignment are symptoms or secondary expressions of 
realignment rather than fundamental features of the theory.75 In particular Carmines 
and Wagner, following Rosenof, contest one of Mayhew’s main views that 
“periodicity” is a characteristic of realignment theory.76 Reassembling partisan 
realignment – which Burnham in 2006 estimated had 500 solid publications to its 
name – is no trivial matter, but it is one that has to be addressed by anyone wanting 
to critique it.  
Mayhew’s disgruntlement with theory is highlighted when he argues that to select 
patterns within history is itself limiting. He prefers that historians should stress much 
more the role of short term factors: the contingencies thrown up in a campaign and 
the strategy of the actors involved. He also suggests a better way to understand 
voters that cannot be accommodated by the idea of valence which notes the idea of 
trusting a party to do something – for example, look after the economy.77 However, 
he concedes that historians must try to create some sort of framework for their story. 
His suggestions are war, race and economic growth as alternatives to the 
progressivist, class/dialectic view he sees being put forward by realignment theorists 
such as Burnham. Ironically the realignment thesis he attacks can be seen as an 
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empirical alternative to a class perspective, where attachment to party is a watered 
down stand-in for a watered down version of class. One way to proceed in the 
understanding the 1930s, for example, would be to follow Samuel Lubell’s point, a 
journalist whose work Key admired and recommended, who argued in 1941 that the 
New Deal had “drawn a class line across the face of American politics”.78 
Some authors do maintain, however, that we might best interpret the electoral 
developments of recent decades as realignment. Campbell writing in 2006 argues, 
versus Mayhew, that there has been a staggered secular realignment to the 
Republicans starting in 1968. Campbell argues that “Republicans have registered 
durable gains in presidential voting starting in 1968”79 and that on the basis that 
realignment is “a durable and substantial shift in the parties’ national electoral 
balance of power”, this should be considered a realignment.80 He notes that some of 
the overall Republican success was hidden because of poor showings in 
congressional elections in the South that he sees as resulting from the lack of a 
Republican organisation there and which had only been rectified by 1994.81  
Campbell may well be right that there have been Republican gains, but he is on 
weaker ground when he argues that this is sufficient information to constitute 
realignment. The questions to answer from a realignment perspective would be on 
what basis is this change built and is it of a deep and lasting character. The problem 
of meaning is manifest in his argument for the reason that 1968 should be seen as 
the year of the realignment: “the strongest equation is clearly the third. Equation 3 
                                            
78
 Samuel Lubell, “Post-Mortem: Who Elected Roosevelt?”, The Saturday Evening Post, 25 January 
1941 cited in Rosenof, Realignment, 33; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics, (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1952), 34-41. 
79
 James E. Campbell, “Party Systems and Realignments in the United States, 1868-2004”, Social 
Science History, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2006): 359. 
80
 Ibid., 361. 
81
 Ibid., 380, 364-365. 
165 
specifies 1968 onset regression with 1972 as the realignment onset…(adjusted R2 of 
.33 versus .26 in table 3 (t+4)”82 
What the particular variables signify is not relevant here, but that a difference 
between .33 and .26 stands in for a decision about an historic turning point. And as 
Daniel J. Gans, writing in 1985, argues such numerical distinctions of degree are 
inevitably arbitrary and subjective.83 Gans himself takes up the whole idea of 
realignment by attempting his own simple test that might not be affected by any 
selection bias of numerical data and the particular analysis applied to it. Gans does a 
statistical analysis of runs of results in national elections from 1856 through to 1980 
to determine whether it can be said that one election victory sets up a pattern of 
future elections. Other than for incumbent presidents, Gans finds no pattern 
statistically distinct from a random set of results. Gans strikes a useful note of 
caution about using statistics, but this is also seen in his own use of statistics 
because he has too simple a binary model. The difficulty here is that a critical 
election remoulds the opposition such that in Lubell’s formulation the second party 
plays an orbiting moon to the main party’s sun, so creating a situation, for example, 
where “we’re all Keynesians now”.84  
One of the great hopes for realignment and a reason it was taken up so widely was 
undoubtedly that it might mark a more scientific and objective approach to history. 
Writing in 1971, Thomas Jahnige, makes the explicit claim that V.O. Key Jr.’s critical 
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election theory is an “empirically verifiable law analogous in physics to the gas 
law”.85 For Jahnige this is important because previously historians failed to agree on 
even the periodization of the history they studied – their approaches to him seemed 
arbitrary. Here political science could approach the veracity of the natural sciences. 
Lichtman in 1976 argues that “critical election theory” could be seen as part of a 
wider move to incorporate the insights and methods of the social scientists that took 
place in US history since the mid-1950s. Lichtman notes the “common sense, honest 
preparation and individual preparation” of the traditional historical approach and 
contrasts the “formal models of man and society” and “quantitative methods” that 
have been brought into the discipline.86 McCormick contrasts much of political 
history, where research focuses on particular people or events, with research such 
as that based on realignment which synthesises across locales and eras and uses 
both the theories of the social sciences and of quantitative statistical analysis.87 
Realignment theory has been able to provide a rough periodization of US history, 
though not definitive, that has provided an important starting point and framework for 
discussion between historians. Key’s paper has helped establish a broad sense of 
historical change and thus aided discussion and research. However in some of the 
literature there is an attempt to seek safety in numbers. The arguments in this 
chapter have hopefully shown that realignment, from Key on, works best not as a 
definitive set of statistics, but when used as part of a political and historical 
discussion that attempts to establish meaning. 
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The waiting for realignment that comes with each election can seem like a 
straightjacket – even a waste of time. Although realignment seems to help create a 
sensitivity to change, when this becomes formulaic, the routine it involves might 
mitigate against a thorough search for new types of change taking place. Likewise 
the popular use of “realignment” in the media and political commentary more 
generally seems to have little meaning other than a large shift in support in a 
particular election – and so the overuse of this jargon, albeit used incorrectly, now 
acts to obscure rather than illuminate. The points we might best take from 
realignment theory – especially where it has long not worked it reorganising magic – 
are that political science missed the importance of the New Deal coalition because it 
saw the past repeating itself. Further there is a sense in realignment theory in the 
moment of change it most seriously attempted to capture in the 1930s that the ideas 
of the electorate can change.  
The theory of realignment attempts to make change a central part of analysis. The 
idea that there would be realignments is, it might be argued, an attempt to make 
change part of the theory. However, the theory to make empirical comparisons of 
categories ends up being blind to the qualitative changes in these categories. The 
meaning of class and race change even as the numbers are totted up in the 
analysis. The way that the theory has retained importance over a number of years 
bears testament to the limitations of US political theory and to attempt to grasp the 
complex interactions between race and class.  
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Chapter 5. Negotiating Whiteness 
If the previous chapter showed the surprisingly limited ways in which race has 
figured in the default understanding of US politics in the academy especially when it 
comes to an understanding of electoral change, this chapter begins a historical 
narrative which attempts to establish that race should be considered as playing a 
central role in the formation of modern US politics. Its starting point is not the racial 
outlooks of whites; rather it attempts to show the coming together of various strands 
of thought and of organising that developed a deepened racial outlook. Rather than 
treating race as set aside on its own, the chapter attempts to show how race plays a 
vital role in the negotiations of class, religion and nationality, and so how the late 
nineteenth century began a new period of racial organising. It provides an analysis of 
the interaction between questions of immigration, the position of newly emancipated 
blacks, evolving ideas of race and of class conflict. This will setup the following 
chapter which shows the mechanisms through which the racial approach created in 
this period extended into the twentieth century. Understanding the dynamics of the 
attempts to incorporate whites and the related exclusions of blacks and Asians is 
important because later developments play out in the context of the accommodations 
made in this period. The relatively uncontested physical separation of the races that 
takes place in the twentieth century begins to make sense given the political 
approaches discussed here. 
This chapter works through a substantial number of years. It covers US history from 
the mid nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century. To do this it adopts a 
thematic approach. In terms of sources it uses a series of substantial historical works 
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that cover a number of years and where necessary goes into some depth by drawing 
on specific investigations or material from the period.  
The initial theme the chapter identified was a coming together of a group of political 
campaigns around race in the late nineteenth century following the civil war. The first 
campaigns were around the Chinese: the thesis draws on left wing commentaries on 
the trade union movement in the West and the success of the anti-Chinese 
campaigning.1 The second campaigns were the reaction following the end of 
reconstruction and the attacks by the Democratic Party in the South on trade union 
organising, the Progressive Party and on black voters to undermine black gains.2 
The third campaigns can be grouped together as the nativist movement. The core of 
the analysis is the exemplary work by John Higham. Strangers in the Land: Patterns 
of American Nativism 1860-1925. 3 
The second theme of the chapter is the 1924 Immigration Act. The source for this is 
Ngai. Her analysis clearly marks out the connection between whiteness and being 
American expressed in the act. We use Ngai to explain how the Act undermines the 
nativist movement without removing all divisions and leaving racial ordering still at 
issue.4  
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The third theme the chapter examines the interaction between ethnic conflicts 
among whites and the development of the New Deal. It connects FDR’s concerns to 
an intellectual antecedent in Teddy Roosevelt drawing on Gary Gerstle’s analysis.5 
Roosevelt’s concerns about the political instability around industrialisation and the 
fear of racial decline among whites is connected to the New Deal. It also uses Mike 
Davis’s sensitivity to divisions in the labour movement between Catholics and 
Protestants. Davis helps chart the continuing difficulties of racial ordering and some 
of the impetus/political importance of breaking down the barriers behind different 
white groups. 
The fourth theme is developments from the New Deal. Here Gerstle’s work provides 
the spine for the discussion of race from the New Deal to the post-war period. While 
the thesis questions Gerstle’s separation of civic nationalism and a racial 
nationalism, his work, nonetheless, very usefully brings together a great deal of 
relevant material around race in one place from this period in a clear form and with a 
strong timeline. Gregory and Sugrue are also useful in assessing the desperation 
blacks face in this period and the consequent importance of the New Deal despite its 
connection to the enhancing of spatial divisions between blacks and whites.6 It 
should be noted that there is no work in this period that directly sets out the 
contradictions within the New Deal.  
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Race and Postbellum Reorganisation 
In the late nineteenth century and with the dawn of the industrial age, race and racial 
thinking became central to the formation of US political constituencies. Race was 
used to create coalitions cutting across incipient class division. This happened not 
just in southern states where anti-Negro sentiment was mobilised but also in the 
West with the displacement of the Chinese population and also in the racial sorting 
applied to recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Through anti-
Chinese mobilisation in the West, the Democrats, Republicans and trade unionists 
competed to establish support. Through racially framed responses to labour 
organising in the South, Democrats made some recovery from what they saw as the 
indignities of Reconstruction. Republicans legislated to exclude non-white 
immigrants from naturalisation and their strongly Protestant nativist base was more 
often than not at odds with new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe that 
began to arrive from the early 1880s. Agitation by labour and by the Populist 
movement in this period was stymied and countered by racial thinking and 
organisation, but was also crucially informed and promoted by a racial outlook.  
Across the Pacific Northwest in the late nineteenth century there were around a 
hundred pogroms against Chinese Americans who were expelled from numerous 
towns and either scattered across the continent or returned to China. This was 
coincident with the arrival of European immigrants and those either demobbed or 
escaping economic downturn from the East in numbers.7 The major wave of 
expulsions of Chinese in the mid-1880s was facilitated by labour in collaboration with 
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small producers hostile to competition from large landowners that employed Chinese 
labourers. In one example, following debates in 1885 prompted by the setting up of a 
local Knights of Labor group – an early trade union grouping at the forefront of anti-
Chinese campaigning – 500 local whites in the city of Tacoma in Washington state 
marched Chinese residents out of the city after giving them just four hours to pack.8 
Expulsions followed from local exclusionary policies and attacks on non-white 
immigrants from China and Latin America from the mid-century centred in mining 
areas. In the 1880s the California state government came under the control of 
southern Democrats and proceeded to set special taxes and ordinances against 
local Chinese (and to limit the political freedoms of emancipated slaves).9 Even West 
Coast Jews were involved: the Anti-Coolie League met at the B’nai B’rith service 
each Friday in San Francisco.10 While in the 1870s about one in 10 Californians was 
Chinese, by 1902 Chinese made up less than 3 per cent of the population.11 
Saxton argues that the campaign for Chinese exclusion became part of national 
politics that undermined the black gains of Reconstruction.12 The argument against 
unfair competition from the Chinese – organised under labour contracts sold by 
Chinese merchant companies to US employers – by association pointed to the threat 
of competition from newly emancipated but impoverished blacks and so began to 
make acceptable and rehabilitate Democratic arguments about the need to control 
black labour. The anti-Chinese organising in the West came to influence thinking in 
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the East and those whites migrating West took up anti-Chinese politics in what 
Saxton argues was a feedback loop.13 The campaign against Chinese exclusion can 
be seen as growing out of the ideology of the time – the Indian wars had whipped up 
racial sentiment as had the war with Mexico, and, despite emancipation, the 
sentiment of white racial superiority predominated. However, the anti-Chinese 
movement then reinforced the predominant racial approach in politics.  
The regional protests against the Chinese played a formative role in the shaping of 
the political outlook of unions – even on a national basis. Daniels notes that “As a 
rule it was the liberal rather than the conservative, the labor organizer rather than the 
employer, the proponent of change rather than the defender of the status quo who 
sparked and organized the first half-century of anti-Oriental agitation.”14 The Chinese 
were seen by many to be the tool of big business and monopoly interests used to 
undermine wages. According to Mink the use of anti-Chinese politicking “transposed 
anti-capitalist feeling with anti-immigrant hostility.’’ But the success of these 
mobilisations also “invigorated national union solidarity.” 15 It made political goals 
relatively clear (the exclusion of non-white immigrants from competition in the labour 
market) and appealed to existing racial and national outlooks rather than negotiating 
the cleavages of class. In so doing it established an outlook based on the group 
identities of workers that was to plague the US union movement and to limit a 
general unionism of the type that appeared in Europe by bolstering craft unionism 
with racial and ethnic exclusiveness.16 The issue became, according to Saxton, a 
way for the unions which were predominantly of skilled or craft workers to “shortcut 
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the pressure for radical reform” from the unskilled while also becoming a means to 
politically appeal to such workers who were the ones most in competition with the 
Chinese.17 The power of anti-Chinese campaigning was such that at times it had to 
be reined in. When, for example, the Workingmen’s Party of California formed in 
1877 and led by Denis Kearney which used the slogan “The Chinese must go!” 
organised unskilled labourers and the unemployed against the Chinese, the craft 
unions were at pains to try to gain control of the party and isolate Kearney. The 
Democrats and Republicans too acted against Kearney by running a joint ticket in 
elections. The explosiveness of the anti-Chinese issue became part of the reason for 
the craft unions forming under the American Federation of Labor in 1886 on the 
basis of forswearing politics and pursuing a more “pure and simple” unionism without 
the wider political goals of the Knights of Labor. Democrats, Republicans and the 
other third party groupings that emerged could then promote anti-Chinese sentiment 
in a division of labour that left the craft unions undisturbed. As Mink argues, this 
retreat from external politics was being made by a trade unionism that was already 
politicised internally along the lines of ethnic/racial affiliations.18  
We have stressed how the campaign for Chinese exclusion became politically 
important in the West and affected the craft unions’ relationship to politics on a wider 
basis. Nonetheless, it is worth injecting a note of caution about the relationship of 
these campaigns to the immigration legislation that was enacted and to question 
what this means in understanding workers outlook on race more generally. As early 
as 1875, the Page Act banned the entry of almost all Chinese women and in 1882 
the Chinese Exclusion Act banned Chinese immigrant labourers and disallowed 
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Chinese immigrants from naturalisation (a law not overturned until 1943).19 Gyory 
notes that in passing these acts “Politicians not California, not workers, and not 
national racist imagery ultimately supplied the agency for Chinese exclusion.”20 
Further he argues that while white workers were racist, they were no more racist 
than other sections of society and, on a national level, workers largely showed 
indifference to the cause of exclusion.21 For Gyory, in an era of close party 
competition legislation for exclusion was the cause of politicians on a national basis 
to “deflect attention from genuine national problems, economic depression, mass 
poverty, and growing unemployment by magnifying and distorting a side issue of 
paltry significance into one of seemingly overriding national importance”.22 This is an 
important qualification for our argument because it was not an ingrained working 
class racism that set the Chinese as a distinct inferior race in legislation and 
established Chinese immigration as a national cause. Rather this was the politicians 
of the Gilded Age attempting to secure support by setting out a scapegoat. Here the 
opposition there was by workers to the importing of contract labourers might be 
distinguished from the machinations of Democrats, joined by the 1880s by many 
Republicans, eager to establish the Chinese issue as something that would work for 
them. The longer-term impact of these measures and the dispersing of the Chinese 
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population largely removed what had become in Saxton’s words an “indispensable 
enemy” for the various political actors.23 
It should be noted here that that there was little counterweight to the racial outlook 
being expressed in this period in the ideas mobilised against slavery in the Civil 
War.24 The war itself was not initiated against slavery as such (however implicit 
slavery is to the causes of the war). As Horton puts it “the important issue having 
been, for most white northerners, the preservation of the Union, rather than the 
abolition of slavery” 25, or stated more forcefully by Frederick Douglass the civil war 
was initiated for slavery, to ensure the slave states remained part of the union.26 
Saxton points out that there were three main intellectual currents at play that came to 
oppose slavery. The first, abolition, was based on a fundamental belief in equality 
and generally took a Christian form. The second, “free soil”, was in support of new 
settlers working in the absence of competition from slaves. The third, the main 
outlook, “unionism”, was opposed to slavery to the extent that it prompted the 
southern states to pursue a sectional approach which often ran counter to the 
national interest. The abolitionist banner was taken up in the war as the strongest 
and so most cohering condemnation of slavery when it became clear that an assault 
on slavery – as the economic underpinning of the South’s power – was necessary. 
Lincoln for example took up the anti-slavery position in 1863, two years into the war. 
Of the three approaches only abolition explicitly proclaimed or required racial 
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equality. Indeed the “free soil” outlook easily resonated with hostility to Chinese 
employed as contract labourers, for example. Outside of the exigencies of war, the 
absolute appeals of abolition to the equality of man returned to being a minority 
approach. This became clear as early as 4 July 1870 in the discussion of the 1870 
Naturalization Act. Charles Sumner, senator for Massachusetts, argued that the 
word “white” should be removed from the bill and therefore the prohibition of 
naturalisation by non-whites. Sumner appealed to the Declaration of Independence – 
“that all men are created equal” – but was roundly defeated 30 votes to 14 in the 
Republican dominated senate.27 
While in the West the Knights of Labor campaigned against the Chinese, in the 
South their approach was often to work across the colour line to organise both 
whites and blacks. The reasoning was that without the co-operation of the large 
numbers of black workers – who could not, unlike the Chinese, reasonably be 
expelled – employers would be in a position to divide the workforce. The Knights 
were not organising on the basis of equality: the default belief was one of white racial 
superiority. However, it was considered that the subordination of lower class whites 
was tied up with the suppression of the many black labourers. Moves by the Knights 
to work across racial lines were met with anti-negro hysteria and repression from 
local white militia in the South. The bloodiest dispute was in Thibodaux, Louisiana in 
1887. The Knights of Labour organised the withdrawal of labour from the sugar cane 
harvest in response to wage reductions in a workforce which though mainly black 
also had white workers. The cane planters persuaded the Governor to bring in state 
troops to evict strikers from their cabins – a Gatling gun was even set up in the main 
square of the parish. The strikers were taken in by local urban blacks but a white 
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defence committee, ostensibly following shots being fired in the direction of one of 
their patrols, removed strikers from these houses and executed at least 30 and as 
many as 200. In the process of race baiting and repression, the bulk of white strikers 
were peeled away from supporting the strike and the Knights of Labor driven out. As 
a consequence of this defeat rural labour disputes in Louisiana were muted until the 
1950s.28 
Where the Knights of Labour foundered, just a few years later the People’s Party, 
part of the Populist movement, tried again. In the 1896 election the People’s Party 
promoted limited but nonetheless for the time radical forms of co-operation between 
poor white and black farmers and sharecroppers.29 Tom Watson the Populist leader, 
writing in a newspaper editorial, described the race-based response to his campaign: 
“The argument against the independent political movement in the South may be 
boiled down into one word—NIGGER!”30 In the elections of 1892, 1894 and 1896 the 
People’s Party in the South was confronted by voting fraud, hostility and violence. In 
the 1892 election, for example, 15 Populist campaigners were killed.31 In the wake of 
the 1896 election defeat of the Populists, which put paid to the movement, from 
1889–1908 the Democrats implemented new restrictions on voting based on poll 
taxes and literacy tests to target blacks – and many poor whites. This was followed 
with the attentions of lynch mobs to ensure that eligible blacks were discouraged 
from voting. Turnout in the South following restrictions on suffrage declined on 
average 37 per cent – 26 per cent among white voters and 62 per cent among 
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blacks – and voter registration in Louisiana, for example, for whites declined from 
about 164,000 in 1897 to 92,000 in 1904, while black voter registration declined from 
130,000 to 1,300 in the same period.32 The racial divisions in the South then were 
not merely a continuation of slavery: it was from this defeat of the Populists through 
the question of race that the Democrats were in a position to forge the solid South.33 
Nativism 
Racial dividing lines, though more fluid in this case, were also present in the 
divisions between the native white population and ostensibly white immigrants. The 
situation of the Irish that came to the USA in the wake of the Irish potato famine in 
the 1840s showed the process of incorporation of immigrants into the existing racial 
order was not as straightforward as such immigrants simply being recognised as 
white or designating themselves so. Indicative of these difficulties were several 
cartoons of the period which depicted the Irish with simian, brutish features and 
linked them to either blacks or Chinese or both.34 With little capital and from 
predominantly rural backgrounds the Irish fleeing the famine were, in the main, only 
slotted into the division of labour in low skilled service jobs or else in the most difficult 
and dangerous manual employment. In some cases, for example, Irish navvies were 
employed in work that was rejected for black slaves as being too likely to cause 
damage to the slaves who were valuable property.35 Roediger argues that in the 
1840s there was popular support among Irish immigrants for the emancipation of 
slaves with whom they shared the lowest rungs of society. However, by the 1850s 
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Irish immigrants had come to see their best hope for advancement to be in 
distancing themselves from blacks and black labour rather than in solidarity. This 
was shown, for example, in the New York waterfront campaign for an exclusively 
Irish workforce and to exclude the small numbers of blacks employed there. The 
New York Draft Riots of 1863 saw the Irish not simply opposed to the draft but also 
to their positioning alongside blacks more generally. The riots became the occasion 
where “white workers enacted their desires to eradicate the working-class black male 
presence from the city”36 – attacking not just individual blacks but black businesses 
and even a black orphanage. Though at the bottom of the pile, the possibility of 
taking on more fully the status of being white through attacking blacks held greater 
promise, it seemed, than attempting solidarity with blacks.  
Nor was the negotiation of whiteness straightforward for the later immigrants from 
the 1880s on. Roediger discusses the racial epithets of “guinea”, “greaser” and 
“hunky” applied to recent immigrants during the period of nativist agitation that 
questioned the extent to which these immigrants were fully white. He notes that the 
Irish, having taken on board the necessity of being accepted as respectable 
Americans, provided a model of incorporation and the personnel of politicians, 
policemen, teachers, priests and foremen that judged and regulated new 
immigrants.37 Davis argues that the religious divide became central here and that for 
Catholic immigrants this amounted to a parallel system of acculturation in a militantly 
Protestant country based around the relatively liberal American Catholic Church that 
came with the Irish. In political terms this meant Catholic immigrants found a place in 
the culturally laissez faire Democratic Party in an “unholy alliance” with the backward 
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agrarian South.38 It should be noted here that there was another countervailing trend 
towards the maintenance of existing ethnic identities. The division of labour was 
such that new immigrants used their ethnic connections to carve out a place within 
particular industries. Glazer and Moynihan, for example, detail how in New York City 
over time various ethnic groups were able to develop a niche within the working life 
of the city in particular areas of employment that provided some shelter from wider 
labour competition.39  
The main political response to these “strangers in the land”, as John Higham referred 
to them40 took the form of the nativist movement. It focused on the differences 
between a settled American population – often emphasising their Anglo-Saxon or 
Northern European origins – as against the perceived disruptive force of new 
immigrants. This reaction set such immigrants intrinsically apart and so was central 
in the placing of immigrants within a racial order, but it cannot be reduced to simply a 
racial outlook. Starting from the early 1800s the various outpourings of nativism were 
episodic and far from stable and drew upon concerns of nation, religion, political 
radicalism and morality as well as race. Higham’s definitive survey of nativism from 
1860 to 1925 identifies three strands to the nativist approach that waxed and waned 
over time: anti-Catholicism, anti-radicalism and racial nationalism.41 The response to 
a perceived immigrant problem also differed between the regions. For example for 
much of the early periods of nativism the nativist banner was taken up in the South 
and the West only at the high water mark of nativist agitation. Overall, the pattern 
was that the strength of such nativist campaigning varied inversely with the 
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confidence in the nation’s prospects – and so its perceived ability to incorporate 
these immigrants into the existing polity.  
The wave of immigration from southern and eastern Europe that began in earnest in 
the 1880s, especially when combined with economic downturn, set the pattern for 
the bouts of nativist campaigning that spilled into the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. However, it should be noted that during several periods nativist 
agitation was quiescent. The Civil War, for example, where half a million immigrants 
took up arms for the union had, at least for a time, largely subsumed 
nativist/immigrant divisions. As Higham argues for most of the immediate post-Civil 
War period there was optimism about the prospects for integrating new immigrants – 
at times the idea of the US as a mongrel nation made up in the mix of immigrants 
was celebrated. Later on the imperial ambitions floated at the end of the nineteenth 
century with victory in the US Spanish War saw a temporary optimism about being 
able to bring what were seen as lesser peoples into the fold.42  
One important strand of nativism was anti-radicalism. The disruption of labour 
radicalism brought with it a nativist reaction and at times fused it with a racial 
approach. Recent immigrants, it was argued, were particularly prone to radical 
ideologies. A race-based approach to immigrants developed more systematically in 
reaction to anarchist and later socialist activities. In particular the Haymarket Affair of 
4 May 1886 was illustrative. The incident was at a rally in Chicago’s Haymarket 
Square mainly of German immigrants against an employer lockout. When police 
attempted to clear the square, anarchists bombed policemen and then the police 
fired into the crowd and a riot ensued. Four anarchists were later hanged for the 
bombing. The political response to the bombing and to the radical politics involved 
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took on an explicitly racial form. Subsequent commentary raised the delinquent racial 
character of immigrants and linked this to support for radical politics. An editorial in 
the business journal, The Age of Steel, raised the prospect of being overrun by the 
“communistic and revolutionary races”. The New York Sun argued the bombers were 
“foreign savages” as different from the respectable working man as are the “Apaches 
of the plains”. The Chicago Tribune pointed to aliens abusing the country’s 
hospitality. An article in the Labor Compendium that year discussed the “danger that 
the hot-blooded races, emotional, savage, and clannish, would submerge in a sea of 
kerosene the old Saxon solidity and granite.”43 The radicalism of anarchism or of 
socialism, then, was painted as un-American – as alien to citizens of a republic 
formed from Anglo-Saxon individualism based on property rights. In the nativist 
approach this counterposed a native population with a stake and belief in existing 
property rights to newcomers who might seek to redistribute property. To the various 
property owners might be added those native workers seeking to differentiate 
themselves or retain their differentiation from new immigrants seen as potential 
competitors. The expression of the material and political differences in racial terms 
appealed to contemporary notions of racial superiority and acted to cohere potential 
conservative forces against radicalism defining it as outside of the national/racial 
polity. Here anti-radicalism might become a test both of racial and of national 
soundness. 
In the early twentieth century, racial concerns began to solidify taking an increasingly 
“scientific” form expressed in the eugenic approach.44 In particular the anxiety, first 
elucidated in scholarly circles, was that the quality of immigrants was dragging down 
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the native stock and precipitating “race suicide”. The native “Anglo-Saxon stock”, it 
was argued, was well suited to traditional rural life but less so to urban industrial 
capitalism and had become demoralised by competition with immigrants, supposedly 
much more comfortable with urban squalor. Consequently many natives were loath 
to bring children into the world. By 1907 Theodore Roosevelt, then President, 
described race suicide as the “greatest problem of civilisation”.45 Fears of racial 
degeneration were such that they were taken up as a rationale for breaching a 
laissez faire approach and became important justifications not just for immigration 
controls but also for labour reforms such as working hours and minimum wages 
legislation. This was on the basis that weaker races that might subsist on the low 
wages they could command should be discouraged by enabling employers to 
choose candidates with stronger racial characteristics.46 The immigration act of 1907 
showed how eugenic concerns worked alongside the racial casting of radicalism. 
The act combined an outlook to strengthen the racial characteristics of the nation 
together with an opposition to anarchist politics by prohibiting immigration by the sick 
and feeble-minded but also by anarchist sympathisers. While Gerstle’s influential 
history of race in US development brings out two major strands in political thought – 
of a civic nationalism and a racial nationalism – in this period, at least, this division 
often breaks down. The civic and the racial aspects of nationalism could merge both 
in the nationalist/racial opposition to radicalism and in the racial basis for civic 
national development.47  
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Such was the concern that at the level of government, a more formal attempt to 
negotiate a response to these new immigrants was set up in 1907 in the shape of the 
bipartisan Dillingham Commission (or the United States Congress Joint Immigration 
Commission). After four years, in 1911, it submitted its 41 volume report with 
detailed statistical analysis to Congress – the largest report ever submitted at that 
time – as an attempt to appraise these newcomers.48 The commission worried about 
the sheer numbers of immigrants and their offspring especially concentrated in parts 
of the country and recommended some form of literacy test for new immigrants. Its 
recommendations were, however, buried in the prevailing business consensus that 
the US still required a steady stream of new labour. 
The First World War starting with the rearmament drive to supply the British 
heightened the sensitivity towards ensuring that the USA’s foreign born population 
were sufficiently attached to the nation. Predictably there were scares around the 
loyalties and activities of those of German descent, but the war effort also came with 
a campaign to win over the loyalties of recent immigrants more broadly. The 
Americanisation movement starting from 1914 harnessed the crusading energies of 
civil society increasingly backed by federal agencies in a programme of civic classes, 
patriotic meetings, Liberty Bond drives and a general outreach to immigrant 
communities taking the form, for example, of home visits: “to go among our alien 
residents and to see that they understand the desirability of becoming citizens [and 
appreciate] the debt they owe to the country which is protecting them.”49 With US 
entry into the war the movement shifted towards more strident demands for 
becoming fully American. The cry was that each should be “100 per cent” American 
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and forswear previous national ties. For example former President Theodore 
Roosevelt speaking to the largely Irish Catholic Knights of Columbus at Carnegie 
Hall on Columbus Day 1915, argued that “There is no such thing as a hyphenated 
American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the 
man who is an American and nothing else.”50 Roosevelt was cheered to the rafters 
by his audience following a pattern of Irish determination to show they should be 
considered fully loyal and part of the nation. The stridency of such demands is also 
captured in President Woodrow Wilson’s final address in support of the League of 
Nations in 1919:  
I want to say – I cannot say too often – any man who carries a hyphen about 
with him carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this 
Republic whenever he gets ready. If I can catch any man with a hyphen in this 
great contest I will know that I have got an enemy of the Republic.51 
Rather than concluding with the Armistice, the Americanisation campaign buoyed by 
its wartime success spilled over into peacetime. The need to pull together had limited 
the coercive aspect of the war-time campaign.52 However, with the Red Scare of 
1919 that came in the wake of the Russian Revolution, the “100-per-centers” felt no 
such inhibitions. A network of volunteer organisations, acknowledged by state 
agencies, looked to root out internal dissent: striking workers and radical groups 
were attacked and dispersed and radicals lined up for deportation – though federal 
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law limited the scope for such deportations to be carried through especially with 
naturalised citizens,.  
In the early 1920s the Red Scare abated but merely made way for other nativist 
themes to re-emerge. Higham notes that the patterns of nativism in place prior to the 
war – anti-Catholicism and racial nationalism with the rationalisation of eugenics – 
reasserted themselves but with a greater energy, arguing that the strength of 
organising came with the combination of a post-war economic slump, the restarting 
of immigration and the moral reaction to the law-breaking that came with 
prohibition.53 In rural areas these conditions made Protestant fundamentalism into a 
significant force. Higham denotes this fundamentalism as “the characteristic 
response of rural Protestantism to the disillusion following America’s international 
crusade. The wartime hope for a new and beatific world produced nothing but crime, 
moral chaos, and organised selfishness on a grander scale than before.”54 On the 
back of such sentiment a new Ku Klux Klan – formed in 1915 – grew in strength 
enough so that from 1920 to 1924 it terrorised rural America, attacking Catholics and 
policing local morality, and built significant bridgeheads into regional politics. 
The 1924 Immigration Act 
The nativist agitation that followed the war meant that from 1917 until 1924 “state 
and national governments legislated almost ceaselessly against the successive 
dangers that seemed to arise from America’s foreign population.”55 The Immigration 
Act of 1924 or the Johnson-Reed Act became the culmination of the political 
response to the difficulties of assimilating new immigrants into a conservative 
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consensus. The strength of the nativist movement was such that it overcame 
traditional opposition by business to curbing the supply of new labour and 
steamrollered opposition by immigrant groups. The act set immigration quotas based 
on an annual limit of 2 per cent of the national origins of the US population in 1890 – 
in a period before the immigration that it found contentious affected the country’s 
demographics.56 The bill was strongly informed by a eugenicist approach. The “star 
witness” for the drafting of the 1924 immigration bill was the eugenicist Harry H. 
Laughlin who in November 1922 provided a report to Congress finding much greater 
degeneracy among new immigrants than native stock.57 And in passing the bill 
“[r]acialist language and eugenicist principles permeated discussion on the House 
and Senate floor.”58 It should be noted, however, that while the use of the 1890 
census was implicitly aimed against those immigrants from recent decades the 
sponsors of the bill took pains to avoid making this argument explicitly.59  
In controlling immigration and limiting that immigration to whites, the racial category 
of white was solidified and made distinct from the ethnic/national backgrounds of 
European immigrants. This ultimately created a basis for resolving tensions between 
a native white population and white immigrants. As Ngai argues the Immigration Act 
of 1924 established racial categories where previously ideas of race and nation had 
been used more loosely. While, on the one hand, the law had an implicit ranking of 
Europeans based on national origin; on the other, the law established a common 
white American race through the exclusion of others:  
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Euro-Americans acquired both ethnicities – that is, nationality-based identities 
that were presumed to be transformable – and a racial identity based on 
whiteness that was presumed to be unchangeable. This distinction gave all 
Euro-Americans a stake in what Matthew Jacobson has called a “consanguine 
white race” and facilitated their Americanization. But, while Euro-Americans’ 
ethnic and racial identities became uncoupled, non-European immigrants – 
among them Japanese, Chinese, Mexicans, and Filipinos – acquired ethnic and 
racial identities that were one and the same. The racialization of the latter 
groups’ national origins rendered them unalterably foreign and unassimilable to 
the nation.60 
For Ngai the Act set the “legal foundations for social processes that would unfold 
over the next several decades, processes that historians have called, for European 
immigrants, ‘becoming American’ (or, more precisely, white Americans), while 
casting Mexicans as illegal aliens and foredooming Asians to permanent 
foreignness.”61 At the same time as the 1924 Act marked out national/racial 
differences, the reduction in immigration also paved the way for a more relaxed 
approach to incorporating former southern and eastern European immigrants and 
gave space for efforts from those immigrants to mark themselves out as fully white.  
With the success of the bill in shutting down immigration from eastern and southern 
Europe – although the basis for the quotas was in dispute as late as 1929 – 
eugenics lost much of its impetus as it was the “eastern and southern European 
peoples eugenicists deemed racially inferior”62 Further by the 1930s eugenics was 
undermined first by scientific critiques that dismissed, for example, the viewpoint that 
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might see “feeblemindedness” as a simple genetic trait and later by its association 
with Nazi racial ideology. With the bill came the end of the storms of nativist energy, 
but also the end of the open welcome to the “huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore” that Emma Lazarus wrote of in the 
more optimistic circumstances of 1883. 
The Great Migration and Race in Northern Cities 
While European immigration became a national focus for discussions of race, 
internal migration in the First World War brought out that a reservoir of hostility 
towards blacks was national rather than only being a feature of the South. The Great 
Migration of Southern blacks to the North was in response to growing war 
production. Over 3 million new manufacturing jobs were created in the war industries 
and immigration had fallen from 1.2 million in 1914 to only 110,000 in 1918.63 
Migration north was not only by southern blacks: many more whites from the South 
moved to the North in search of a better life – a similar pattern to the later migration 
of the 1940s. However, while whites from the South were dispersed more widely 
black migration created distinct communities in Northern cities. When blacks 
attempted to move outside of these enclaves they were greeted with violence. For 
example, in Chicago between 1917 and 1921, 58 homes were bombed to deter 
movement away from black areas.64 As Gregory describes there was a concerted 
and organic/voluntaristic effort to police the boundaries of the black ghettos: 
Various tools were used to confine African American housing options. Real 
estate brokers and neighborhood associations organized the market, using 
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housing covenants and zoning ordinances to back up the informal system of 
racial exclusion. Violence was the key. In Detroit and every other city where the 
new ghettos took shape, whites used terror to keep African Americans in the 
black belt. Dynamite greeted many of the families who dared buy property in a 
white neighborhood. Hundreds of houses were damaged or destroyed by 
bombs or fire in the 1920s in cities across the North.65 
A campaign along similar lines to that pursued by the Irish, who in the 1860s 
attempted to expel any trace of blacks from alongside them on the New York 
dockside, had spread out across the Northern cities and become a cause for multiple 
white ethnicities and nationalities. It seemed that the pressures of the racial order 
were such that hope of acceptance and assimilation required the literal distancing 
from migrating blacks. Likewise the return of blacks who had served in the First 
World War, less accepting of their place in the racial order, sparked conflict. The 
“Red Summer” of 1919 at the height of the Red Scare was part of a year of violence 
and lynchings that swept across both the South and many Northern cities.66  
While the wartime expansion had accommodated an expansion of black 
employment, the post-war downturn and in particular the onset of the Depression 
showed these gains to be contingent:  
the Depression showed that the rules of race in the North meant that African 
Americans participated in the labor market as a reserve force, eligible to fill in 
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the lower ranks only as far as the supply of white workers and the power of 
hostile unions allowed.67 
In employment, as in housing, it was evident that in the USA blacks remained a race 
apart. 
The New Deal and Race 
The New Deal, at the same time as being a response to the Depression, was also 
the building of a coalition of support made up of “city dwellers, workers, ethnics, 
Catholics, Jews, blacks, intellectuals who favored governmental activity, and the 
solid South.”68 Previously the Democratic Party might have been seen as a sectional 
party. The Democrats had become a home to many Catholic immigrants in the 
Northern cities – and the sons and daughters of those immigrants – as something of 
a buffer to the moralistic campaigns of Republican nativists. Together with support in 
the South opposed to the party of Lincoln, the Democrats had as its base those 
groups opposing the forces of big business and modernisation represented by the 
Republicans. The broad measures enacted to counter the Depression and the 
“grand coalition” assembled, however, saw the Democrats applying a national 
approach that transcended the previous nativist/immigrant divisions. The equal 
recognition implicit in the equality in relief had the overall effect of accelerating the 
process of incorporation of recent immigrants more fully into the American 
mainstream. 
In some ways FDR’s measures were the seeing through of proposals made earlier 
by his political hero and distant cousin Theodore Roosevelt. In 1912 Teddy 
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Roosevelt previously Republican president formed the Progressive “Bull Moose” 
Party. This initiative built on the idea of a “New Nationalism” that applied state 
intervention to resolve social problems and sought especially to reach out to recent 
immigrants at the sharp end of industrial development. It was argued that “social 
rights” were required in the face of the grinding poverty that albeit free people would 
face in industrial capitalism.69 While the New Deal was more pragmatic and ad-hoc 
than these previous proposals, in the extremis of the Depression it began to cohere 
a coalition of interests that saw simply carrying on as before as unrealistic and that 
could look to a new social contract that included, and so developed a base of 
support in, the urban working class consisting in large part of ethnic minorities, in a 
way that echoed Teddy Roosevelt’s earlier initiative. The extent to which FDR’s 
electoral success was initially bolstered by the new votes of the sons and daughters 
of recent immigrants, totalling some 26 million by 1930 (the first and second 
generations combined made up 40 million and approximately one third of the white 
population)70 or else by converted Republicans is the subject of on-going academic 
dispute – and which we discuss elsewhere. However, by the election of 1936 it 
seems clear that there was a base of support for the implied social contract that 
came with the New Deal and that reached beyond old loyalties in Roosevelt’s offer 
for a “more equitable opportunity to share in the distribution of national wealth.”71  
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One way in which the New Deal politics seemed perhaps to test the political 
arrangements of race and ethnicity framed by the 1924 Immigration Act was in 
industrial relations and labour reform. The 1930s saw industrial militancy highlight 
the divisions between different groups of whites and take organisational expression 
through union groupings. Legislative support for union rights – as employees’ “right 
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing”– 
came with the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) and should be seen 
as connected to Roosevelt’s ethnic white supports. As well as dealing with labour the 
act included a programme of public works and the rationalisation of industry through 
the sanctioning of co-operation and the management of production to alleviate the 
deflation that went with competition and oversupply. The labour relations clause 
prompted the outpouring of pent-up frustrations at the petty injustices workers faced 
in US industry and a massive growth in trade union membership, the bulk of which 
was composed of second generation immigrants.72 Davis describes the wave of 
strikes that took place from 1933-1937 as “arguably the highwater mark of the class 
struggle in modern American history”.73 The strikes were spearheaded by radical 
shop committees and left-wing radicals. The Communist Party played an important 
role in these disputes. Its organisational effectiveness combined with its base within 
new immigrant communities: in 1930 in the USA it published eight foreign language 
daily papers.74 The institutional trade union expression of this upsurge came with the 
formation of the CIO as a grouping of unions within the AFL in 1935. Davis’ detailed 
history of US trade unionism, written from the left, argues that the CIO in the early 
years represented the “capturing” of an increasingly radical movement by a well-
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connected grouping of trade union bureaucrats which blunted worker’s demands and 
ensured limits were put on the radicalisation that was taking place. The CIO was 
helped by the 1935 National Labor Relations or Wagner Act which established the 
National Labor Relations Board as a means of labour mediation.75  
The wave of trade union militancy which culminated in a series of sit down strikes in 
1937 began to falter in 1938. Many commentators stress the role of Roosevelt’s 
sympathetic handling of the CIO – which he began to look to as an ally when the 
“second New Deal” had begun to alienate business – in calming the situation. 
However, an additional, but related, factor was the divisions within the trade union 
movement itself. In 1938 the CIO had become too radical for the AFL and was 
expelled. The split saw a revival of right wing unionism within the AFL and a “civil 
war” between the CIO and AFL. The AFL worked with business to try to establish 
“sweetheart” deals to keep the CIO out and opposed whichever political candidates 
the CIO supported. Part of the motivation for the AFL was undoubtedly in trade union 
leaders defending their bureaucratic position. However, as Davis argues, this “ancien 
regime ultimately drew its solidity from the relative conservatism of its predominantly 
skilled, native-Protestant and ‘old immigrant’ membership” influenced by “a profound 
middle-class counter-reaction to the CIO and the growth of the left.”76 Here Davis is 
referring to the predominance of native Protestants and of workers from the 
established old immigrant populations from Ireland and Germany in the skilled 
unions as against the more recent immigrants from southern and eastern European 
countries that made up most of the unskilled workers e.g. Polish, Italians, 
Slovakians, Hungarians etc. The ethnic division of labour, of the skilled and 
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unskilled, was reflected organisationally in the AFL-CIO split and in the political anti-
radicalism of many AFL workers.  
The ethnic divisions among workers continued to test the unions in this period and 
these divisions had important political repercussions. However, here, we must 
distinguish between the difficulties between white ethnicities, i.e. ethnic differences 
and racial divisions. Politically the 1924 immigration act prefigured a combined white 
racial identity that ultimately transcended such conflicts. It should be noted that 
though in the sense of industrial militancy Davis is right that there is a high water 
mark of unrest in this period. However as regards politics more widely by this stage 
workers had a connection to an identity around whiteness such that industrial 
militancy in the main did not transcend the assumption of a shared white racial 
identity overall.  
New Deal measures might also be seen to test racial arrangements in the South. 
The South was hit particularly hard by the Depression and so the New Deal, which 
acted both to stabilise agricultural prices and to provide relief to farmers, welcomed 
by Southern leaders. Initially care was taken by the administration that federal action 
in agricultural areas in the South was channelled through state and local agencies. 
This meant that initially, at least, such programmes did not bypass or directly 
challenge the existing political arrangements i.e. federal intervention was done in 
such a way as not to undermine the peculiar Southern institutions of segregation. But 
the labour question more generally was important here. The South’s reliance on 
cheap labour meant the decentralised programmes made pains to exclude 
agricultural and domestic labour from New Deal programmes – whether black or 
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white.77 The administration’s attempt to bolster agricultural prices – in effect through 
the restructuring of agricultural production – had a devastating impact on many 
Southern agricultural workers and sharecroppers:  
When the New Deal administration attempted to raise commodity prices 
starting in 1933 through the Agricultural Adjustment Act program of crop 
reduction, more rural livelihoods were lost. Landowners took their poorest fields 
out of production and told sharecroppers and tenants to leave. By the mid-
1930s, rural distress in some parts of the South was every bit as serious as the 
urban version.78 
The settled incorporation of the South, and its particular demands, in the widened 
electoral coalition was temporary, however. The 1936 election campaign saw events 
that would point to the later divisions in the Democratic Party between Northern and 
Southern factions based on race. One factor was the removal of the effective 
Southern veto on presidential nominations. In 1936 the Democratic Party abrogated 
the rule that presidential candidates had to be supported by two-thirds of delegates. 
Removing the rule had been floated in 1932 but only with Roosevelt’s second term 
looming was there the political capital to see it through.79 The implications were not 
seen clearly at the time in the enthusiasm to get Roosevelt nominated but the 
changes signalled that the party both sought to move beyond its sectional past and 
that support for the institutions of segregation could not be taken for granted.80 A 
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second factor was that white Southerners, now less numerically significant to the 
expanded Democratic vote overall, were “jolted by the fact that for the first time in 
history, black voters turned from their traditional moorings and overwhelmingly 
backed the Democratic ticket” – in other words black votes for the Democrats meant 
that segregationists faced the prospect of having to compete for influence with black 
electoral power in the North.81 For those attuned to a detailed reading of the polls, 
the bi-year congressional elections of 1934 had already intimated the growing 
importance of black votes in key swing Northern constituencies – something that 
became clearer in later elections.82 
Rather than simply resulting from the Democratic Party reaching out to blacks, the 
realignment of the black vote might rather be considered as a “leap of faith”. 
Confidence in Roosevelt’s support for civil rights was limited and his courting of the 
Southern bloc set limits on any measures that might be forthcoming. As late as the 
1936 election the Democrat platform held nothing for blacks specifically. However 
the New Deal had extended help to the black population. The sheer levels of black 
poverty, even if relief and employment opportunities were unevenly distributed, 
meant that many blacks benefitted from federal programmes: for example, “[b]y 
1935, in the mid-Atlantic region, which included New York, a remarkable 55.6 
percent of black families received relief because they were so destitute” and, during 
the course of Roosevelt’s first two terms, black federal employment had increased 
from 50,000 to 150,000.83 The reforms of the second New Deal starting in 1935 had 
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even seen the arrival of the Works Progress Administration and the related National 
Youth Administration in the South.84 While the previous southern New Deal initiatives 
had tended to exacerbate black poverty, the WPA set aside part of its budget for 
relief for blacks. And symbolically the “Negro Cabinet” – the name given to the 
Federal Council of Negro Affairs – was set up in the mid-1930s, although this was an 
advisory body rather than having true cabinet level status. Franklin Roosevelt said 
little in support of blacks, however the First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an 
important role in highlighting civil rights.85 Usefully for FDR, this division of labour in 
the first family was mirrored by criticisms on race being directed by Southern 
opponents against Eleanor rather than FDR himself – who remained relatively 
untouchable.  
The overtures made to blacks and a reaction to some elements of the “second New 
Deal” that extended federal intervention coalesced in opposition to Roosevelt in the 
shape of an informal “Conservative Coalition” from about 1937 and despite 
Roosevelt’s overwhelming victory in 1936. Southern segregationists had no natural 
home outside of the Democratic Party and Southern leaders were also attuned to the 
popularity of Roosevelt and the relief that came with the New Deal among many of 
their constituents. As John Temple Graves remarked, for many Southerners 
Roosevelt was “the Democratic party, the rebel yell, Woodrow Wilson and Robert E. 
Lee rolled into one.”86 However, with the interventions by New Deal supporters, such 
as the union drives by the CIO in the South and especially following Roosevelt’s 
attempt to pack the Supreme Court with members that would support the extended 
New Deal, southern Democrats increasingly began to oppose those elements of the 
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New Deal that infringed on their political arrangements. The reaction to Roosevelt 
did not, however, directly take the form of a defence of Southern institutions. Rather 
the criticism applied was one of freedom from federal interference.87 In his study of 
Democratic voting, Reiter shows how overall in the Senate, Southern Democrats 
remained more liberal than their Northern counterparts until 1941-1942 with 
rightward swings in the 1937-1938 period and in 1941-1942. In Congress the pattern 
is a steadier rightward drift from 1933 and southern congressional Democrats 
becoming less liberal than northerners in 1937-1938.88 Later, even in the midst of 
war, two sides of the Roosevelt coalition became more apparent. In June 1943 the 
Conservative Coalition, over a Presidential veto, passed the Smith-Connally Act 
which sought to halt wartime strikes and banned direct union contributions in political 
elections. This prompted the CIO to form a political fund, the CIO Political Action 
Committee (CIO-PAC). The Smith-Connally Act prohibited election contributions, but 
the CIO-PAC was able to act in the primaries where despite the formal forswearing 
of political alignment the fund acted to support the more liberal of the Democratic 
candidates even helping to unseat some of the strongest segregationist supporters. 
However, the bulk – almost two thirds of the CIO-PACs funds – went into voter 
registration drives.89 The registration of black voters in the South further hardened 
opposition in the South that shortly after the war would show the rifts within the 
Democratic coalition. 
On a broader note, the 1930s saw a slackening of tensions between nativists and 
others brought with an opening up of the polity to philo-ethnic positions. Together 
with the growing ideological competition with the National Socialists in Germany this 
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brought on a change in the intellectual climate such that by the middle of the 1930s 
race was increasingly being discussed in cultural terms. In the 1920s the word 
“culture” was a technical term used in specialist areas of academia. However 
students of Frank Boas’ work in anthropology had become influential. Following Ruth 
Benedict’s 1934 work Patterns of Culture, “it was scarcely possible to graduate from 
an American university without being exposed to discussion of racial differences in 
cultural terms”.90 In 1933 Boas brought together intellectuals to counter Nazi racial 
theories who determined to take-up the racial outlook that lay behind Nazi 
propaganda.91 The Hollywood machine also began to play a role in combatting 
fascist ideas. In 1936 Columbia pictures produced Legion of Terror which recounted 
the attempts of a Klan type group to impose dictatorship on a small mid-western 
town. In 1937 Warner Brothers brought out Black Legion which recounted how a 
fascist-style organisation stirred up racial hatred using anti-immigrant sentiment 
wanting “a united nation of free-white – one-hundred per cent American”. The film’s 
critique of nativism reflected the intellectual temper of the times as the 1915 epic The 
Birth of a Nation had previously. These changes meant that when Churchill visited 
Roosevelt in the Winter of 1941 with the intent of invoking an alliance of the Anglo-
Saxon peoples, Roosevelt explained to Churchill that this no longer applied, that 
American was composed of many nationalities and that Churchill should go away 
and read Louis Adamic’s recently published Two-Way Passage.92  
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World War Two 
Just as the interventions of the New Deal seemed to be losing efficacy and the 
economy seemed set to stagnate, rearmament for the Second World War prompted 
state intervention that would have been inconceivable previously. While government 
interference in what were seen as the affairs of business was increasingly being 
countered by Congress, the demands of war and the business friendly nature of 
these arrangements meant that the wartime measures went unhindered. The cost 
plus contracts of the war drive put industry to work and growth in production and the 
demand for labour were sudden and immense. Despite the enormous demand for 
workers, blacks were often being excluded from the new employment: “In October, 
1940, only 5.4 percent of all United States Employment Service placements in 
twenty selected defense industries were nonwhite, and even this figure fell to 2.5 
percent in April, 1941.”93 It took the threat of a march on Washington monument, to 
take place in July 1941, and so the embarrassment of open racial strife in the midst 
of the war effort against an enemy espousing racial theories to get Roosevelt to 
respond. The executive order was given that employers and unions should “provide 
for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries” regardless 
of race, and the Fair Employment Practices Committee was set up to investigate 
complaints with the possible sanction of cancelling contracts. This order was 
symbolically important as “for the first time since Reconstruction a president had 
made open cause with civil rights groups” and, further, this was done by a 
Democratic president in the face of his Southern constituency.94 Subsequent 
attempts to side-line the FEPC and limit its budget proved ineffective. While 
discrimination often remained, in several cases the FEPC exposed and implemented 
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measures to allow black workers employment – and some advancement – in the war 
industries. 
While a lever was applied to loosen the grip of race on employment practices in 
industry, the armed services remained segregated. At this time any pressure for 
desegregation would be insufficient as against the considerations of potential 
disruption that such desegregation might cause among whites in the military. The 
segregation was applied almost systematically and, in particular, there were limits on 
the extent to which blacks might play a direct role in combat:  
Throughout the war, all branches of the military remained largely segregated. 
Black and white GIs trained, served and socialized separately from each other. 
Proportionately far fewer black servicemen than whites, whether in the infantry, 
tank corps, air corps, navy, or Marines, were allowed to engage in combat; 
when they did, they almost always fought in all-black units commanded by 
white officers.95 
The military even segregated its blood supply to ensure that blood transfusions did 
not breech the colour line.96 The petty indignities of the armed services at times 
prompted near rebellion from black soldiers under the ministrations of their often 
Southern officers and, for example, there were race riots between black and white 
troops stationed in the UK – with many whites objecting to the racial intermixing 
between black GIs and British women. 
For blacks in the military Southern racial practices predominated; however for whites 
the war became a mechanism through which the importance of ethnic difference 
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might be seen to be overcome in the fraternity of battle. Importantly this was 
reflected by Hollywood’s portrayal of the war, forming part of the propaganda effort. 
Gerstle lists a “partial roster” of ten Hollywood war films from 1943 to 1945 featuring 
the multicultural armed forces and emphasising the co-operation and comradeship 
as (white) Americans – the stock “trinity” of characters being Protestant, Catholic and 
Jew.97 Only one film from this list features a black character and then for all of ten 
seconds. This was in the 1943 film Sahara that has a Sudanese fighter who is part of 
an international grouping and was situated firmly outside the race relations of the US 
forces.98 The war effort and its propaganda in effect pointed towards a common 
whiteness, even if in ethnic and religious diversity, working through the framework 
established by the 1924 immigration act. 
The Spoils of War  
Victory in the war and a resurgent US economy brought with it measures to spur the 
economy by aiding the returning troops. As with the relative positions of whites and 
blacks in the military these were unevenly dispensed. The 1944 Serviceman’s 
Readjustment Act better known as the GI Bill or the GI Bill of Rights is described by 
Sacks as “arguably the most massive affirmative action program in U.S. history” as 
“it was aimed at and disproportionately helped male, Euro-origin GIs” and was 
“decidedly not extended to African Americans or to women of any race.”99 Between 
August and November 1946, fully 39 per cent of African Americans as opposed to 21 
per cent of white soldiers received dishonourable discharges denying them rights 
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under the GI Bill.100 Some 20,000 black ex-GIs were able to attend mainly black 
colleges on the back of the bill by 1947, but some 15,000 were turned down.101 The 
way was being made for women to move out of the expanded workforce for jobs for 
the returning men. Posters depicted women swapping overalls for make-up – as a 
return to previous identities. However, with discriminatory hiring policies still rife there 
was no such identity to return to for those blacks that were expelled from the 
extended wartime workforce as the war came to an end.  
This chapter has attempted to establish the case for understanding the negotiations 
of race as being central to the development of the modern US political system. 
Rather than seeing race as a function of slavery or else a feature of the South, it has 
sought to make the case that race becomes important for reasons specific to the late 
nineteenth century which are important on a national basis. The picture we have 
attempted to paint is of how race became a way to assuage conflict around religion, 
ethnicity, nationality and class. Such an approach might be understood to have been 
trialled in the 1850s in the accommodations sought by Irish immigrants and 
subsequently set out most clearly in the 1924 immigration act. Race figured not 
simply as hostility to blacks, but rather a political project of establishing a common 
white polity. The next chapter attempts to show how this political project developed. 
It looks at the mechanisms whereby it grew out well into the twentieth century and 
took on a material form through the coming together of whites and their growing 
physical separation from blacks.  
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Chapter 6. Racial Separation 
In the previous chapter we examined how a range of considerations based around 
race shaped the early development of what we would recognise as the modern US 
political system. In this chapter we develop this argument by looking at the 
mechanisms through which the impact of racial thinking and organisation extended 
into the twentieth century. In particular we attempt to show how ideas of race took on 
a material form through the geographical separation of blacks and whites and how 
this impacted on the post-war political organisation of the USA. From patterns of 
segregation, we then examine how attempts to tackle civil rights through confronting 
formal discrimination were ultimately limited in the face of the material separation 
that took place. This chapter allows the thesis to move beyond an analysis based 
simply on the racial outlooks of whites.  
One key source in this chapter is Loewen. Loewen’s work does not primarily discuss 
the development of suburbia – the main way that whites were separated from blacks 
– but his original research brings out events that were otherwise forgotten. The 
exclusion of blacks from thousands of small towns in the USA helps the thesis in 
substantiating the timing of anti-black sentiment and the form it took in exclusion on 
a national basis from the 1890s until the 1940s.1 The core of the chapter, however, 
uses the work on suburbanisation by Kenneth T. Jackson.2 This is supplemented by 
works looking at detail in the operation of federal housing initiatives by Hillier.3 
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Material on the informal racial distancing by whites is more patchy and comes from 
several sources. 
The chapter makes use of a number of sources in attempting to undermine a series 
of misunderstanding about race and the South. It makes a great deal of use of 
several “revisionist” scholars on the South.4 These help the thesis bring into question 
the narrative of the southern strategy and the Southernisation of racial politics and 
the idea that the South provided a racial blueprint for the rest of the country through 
Republican machinations. Dudziak helps explain further how the reaction to race 
retains a focus on the South and is partially directed by the imperatives of the Cold 
War. Russell is useful in bringing into question the idea of the middle class civil rights 
movement and its connection with blacks in the South.  
We start by revisiting briefly the period discussed in the previous chapter. We argue 
that while there might seem to be a continuity in the second class status of blacks, 
the period from the end of Reconstruction until at least the 1940s should be 
considered a particular low-point in race relations that had important long-term 
consequences. As described in the previous chapter there was a period of reaction 
developing from the later nineteenth century and, as we will go on to discuss, this 
sets the background for a growing geographical divide between blacks and whites. 
This separation is at the same time a racial consolidation of whiteness in the coming 
together of different European ethnic groups. While there is something of a melting 
pot for European ethnics, blacks are excluded from this process. The hostility 
towards blacks is such that it takes on a systematic physical aspect in the 
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geographic and spatial disassociation of the races. One example of this separation 
has recently been demonstrated in research on the expulsion and exclusion of 
blacks that took place during this period in small-town America.5 However, it is 
predominantly through the process of, what Loewen calls, “whites-only on purpose”6 
suburbanisation that both the exclusion of blacks and the consolidation of whiteness 
was played out. One consequence of these divisions was that despite the prolonged 
post-war economic expansion that might perhaps have helped facilitate the 
incorporation of blacks into mainstream American life, African Americans were shut 
off from participating from the most dynamic developments that became increasingly 
concentrated in the suburbs. This meant, for example, that the white picket fences of 
comfortable suburban existence that became associated with the American dream in 
this period were predominantly for whites. The massive scale of suburbanisation and 
the attempt of suburban communities to distance themselves from the problems of 
the cities and blacks, who became associated with these problems, created what 
has been called an “American Apartheid”.7 A pattern of attempting to keep 
“undesirables” out of suburban enclaves spurred on by racial animus subsequently 
created a suburban politics that becomes part of a fragmented polity that has 
consequences extending beyond race relations and which is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
From the perspective of the treatment of blacks over a great deal of US history, at 
least until the 1960s, there is a strong argument that there has been continuity. Over 
an extended period of time blacks have faced discrimination and been seen as 
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second class citizens. Writing in 1965, for example, John Hope Franklin surveyed 
the racial divisions in the USA from 1619 to his present day and argued that such 
were the divisions in the USA there had been in effect “two worlds of race”.8 Franklin 
could show evidence of widespread hostility, with occasional indifference, towards 
blacks throughout the period he examined. Although there were organisations in the 
white population that campaigned against slavery and some for equal treatment 
under the law, and even the impetus of the opposition to slavery of the Civil War, 
mobilisations supporting full formal equality were ultimately episodic and limited in 
scope. Crucially, argues Franklin, there was little forthright support in the USA for the 
idea that blacks were the equals of whites: the “ambivalence on the crucial question 
of equality has persisted almost from the beginning”.9 Franklin draws out how 
assumptions that whites were superior and blacks deficient were not merely the 
preserve of the South but constituted the default outlook both North and South. For 
example, even some Northern anti-slavery societies baulked at having free blacks as 
equal members of their organisations. As Litwack argues, looking at the period 1790-
1860, before the Civil War in the Northern states blacks were commonly denied the 
franchise, faced segregation in churches, schoolrooms and theatres and the parties 
competed to “outdo each other in declarations of loyalty to the ante bellum American 
Way of Life and its common assumption that this was a white man’s country in which 
the Negro had no political voice and only a prescribed social and economic role”.10 
The prevalence of hostility across parties and across states towards blacks goes 
some way to account for the invisibility of race as a subject of political analysis in 
academic writing for most of this period. We will return to this point when looking at 
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the relationship between the party political competition and race. However, it is worth 
noting here that the bi-partisan assumptions on the position of blacks meant that 
racial outlooks as regards blacks were ubiquitous, but at the same time seemed to 
have little political consequence: the constancy meant that such racial outlooks did 
not seem to reorient or redirect the polity. Indeed race was often factored in as 
personal, psychological or group/cultural prejudice that, strictly speaking, lay outside 
the remit of political investigation. Overall this meant that for extended periods race 
was neglected in academic inquiry in the political sciences. Similarly, whiteness was 
taken as an assumed category and so its formation and development not 
interrogated until much later. In a survey of the position of race in US political 
science, Hutching and Valentino note that academic interest in the role of race 
follows its perceived political importance more widely. In the study of the US political 
system scholarly enquiry has a “peculiar history” when it comes to the study of race, 
paying little attention to the subject until the 1960s with the rise of the Civil Rights 
movement.11  
In our analysis, however, we have attempted to show that despite the aspects of 
continuity, race played a particularly important role in the creation of the modern US 
political system. From the late nineteenth century well into the twentieth century it 
shaped political organisation and campaigning, and featured heavily in the contest 
for loyalty and identity, especially with recent European immigrants. In this argument 
we draw on several scholars who have attempted to interrogate the idea of 
whiteness such that race cannot simply be seen as a matter of the relationships of 
the mass of whites with blacks. So, for example, as central a phenomenon as the 
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New Deal coalition had important cohering imperative along racial lines where 
immigrants from many nationalities might be treated together as white. 
The Extended Racial Nadir 
As we have noted, the racial thinking that coheres a white identity comes with the 
negative sorting of other races. In particular this can be understood as meaning a 
particular low point for blacks in the period from the late nineteenth century 
stretching into the twentieth. Rayford Logan calls the period from 1877 through to 
1901 “the nadir” for race relations in the USA. Logan looks at the political retreat 
from support for Reconstruction, the “betrayal of the negro”, and identifies cultural 
distain and hostility towards blacks in the literature of the period. He argues that in 
the nadir the support for equality becomes minimal.12  
However, there is a strong case to be made that the nadir lasts beyond 1901 and 
has consequences lasting well into the twentieth century. One recent study presents 
evidence that the racial low-point identified by Logan carries on to at least the 
1940s.13 Loewen’s pioneering 2005 research uncovered a pattern of racial expulsion 
and exclusion throughout the Northern US states in the form of “Sundown Towns” 
where the presence of blacks was forbidden after nightfall.14 The name “Sundown 
Towns” comes from the practice of posting signs at a town’s outskirts warning blacks 
that they must not be present after dark. Loewen’s study was prompted by curiosity 
about why, unlike his childhood town in Illinois, several nearby towns had no resident 
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blacks. His investigation found a “hidden history” of racial exclusion in these towns 
and further evidence for thousands of examples across the USA – with the notable 
exception of the Deep South where blacks were integrated into the workforce as low-
paid agricultural labour. Starting around 1890 and peaking in 1940, white populations 
of small towns drove out resident blacks. The expulsion and exclusion of blacks 
generally happened with little or no documentation and was established informally – 
although it was sometimes described locally as an ordinance. Such exclusions 
peaked in Democrat controlled areas but were by no means limited to these areas. 
Blacks were driven out either by violence, often on some law and order pretext, or in 
some cases by a town simply refusing any interaction with blacks who sought to live 
there. Where violence and other discriminatory measures might be used in the Deep 
South to keep blacks down, in other states it was used to keep them out. Loewen 
notes that contrary to received wisdom until at least 1890 there had been a 
widespread dispersal of black families in limited numbers throughout rural America in 
small towns outside the South. From the 1890s onwards, in what Loewen calls the 
“Great Retreat”, there are thousands of examples throughout small town America of 
the ousting of black residents. This pattern is seen in the census results showing a 
rapidly dwindling number of black residents in small towns and documented by 
interviews with residents that corroborate the campaigns and measures to exclude 
black residents. The blacks excluded from these small towns either took up 
residence in ramshackle satellite dwellings or, more often, contributed to the growing 
populations of blacks in the major Northern urban centres.15 
This research is particularly important for our purposes. It gives a clear empirical 
measure of how views of race, hardened in the late nineteenth century, had 
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important national consequences for the relationships between blacks and whites as 
the twentieth century developed. The small-town racial organising in this period is 
not simply to be found in the South, or straightforwardly in the vestiges of slavery. 
The growing black/white racial separation comes alongside the back of the racial 
sorting and consciousness we discussed in the previous chapter on a national basis. 
And as we will see this was not merely a small town phenomenon. Racial thinking is 
such that it shaped policy and the separation of populations to a large extent without 
contestation. 
The Suburban (White) Melting Pot and the Spatialization of Race 
We have already looked at what might be understood as important aspects of the 
racial nadir of the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century. However, 
ultimately the most powerful movement that came out of the nadir was the way in 
which race took on a geographic form through the peculiar patterns of 
suburbanisation starting in the early part of the twentieth century and lasting until the 
1970s. The scale of this internal migration was such as to ultimately eclipse the scale 
of both the immigration prior to 1924 and the movement of blacks to Northern cities 
in the 1930s. This suburbanisation was strongly influenced by racial considerations 
and ultimately bolstered such racial outlooks. We now turn to look at how this 
happened in some detail.  
In the 1930s and following World War Two, mass migration to the suburbs backed by 
federal intervention further effaced the distinctions between whites as the various 
European ethnicities came to live alongside one another in identical suburban plots. 
Over an extended period of time this helped erode the political importance of white 
ethnic distinctions. In part this was because fewer lived where the urban political 
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machines of the Northern cities held sway and which were organised in part through 
ethnicity and national origins. But this was also because the particular economic and 
political problems they faced as a result of coming from immigrant backgrounds, that 
created strong support for the New Deal, were no longer such pressing concerns. 
The problems of the city previously experienced came to seem remote for those that 
moved as too increasingly did the problems of being accepted as fully American as 
faced by prior generations. As we discuss in more detail in the next chapter, by the 
1970s there was little distinction between whites from different ethnic backgrounds. 
The collective memory provided by city communities and local organisations 
dissipated with these communities. While whites came together in the suburbs, 
blacks were largely excluded from suburbanisation. Federal mortgage intervention 
together with private sector lenders who preferred all-white suburbs and the hostility 
of many whites helped create near universal segregation in housing throughout the 
USA. As whites and industry moved out of the central cities they left behind large 
pockets of urban decay and blacks, still city residents, became associated with urban 
problems. 
Suburbanisation, though, did not start in the 1930s. In some ways it marks the 
development of the US economy and the bringing into play of technical 
achievements to bring more spacious and better living conditions to large numbers of 
people. Even by the end of the nineteenth century several factors combined to 
enable the better off to move out of crowded inner-city conditions in a pattern not 
seen in Europe. The rapid deployment of a network of electric street cars from the 
1880s, themselves built with an eye towards property speculation; a new type of 
house construction, the balloon-frame method using a light timber frame developed 
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in Chicago in 1833 and still in use today16; and the enormous supply of land 
available in the USA meant that:  
By 1900 the center of the city had become an area of office and commercial 
uses that was almost devoid of residences. Nearby were the grimy factories, 
and just beyond them the first tenement districts of the poor, the recent 
immigrants, and the unskilled, persons unable to afford even the streetcar fare 
and forced to compete for housing space where real estate was most 
expensive and housing the least desirable. Along these same streets, the well-
to-do had lived only two generations earlier.17 
The initial waves of suburbanisation did not result in new political/administrative 
entities. Early suburbs were swallowed up either through consolidation or often 
annexation into metropolitan areas and became part of the expanding cities. 
However, increasingly in the twentieth century residents of new suburbs, especially 
around the established cities of the North and the West, rejected municipal 
government because of the desire to distance themselves from urban problems both 
material and moral.18 Judicial presumptions in favour of annexation faded alongside 
the growth of this local opposition. Even with the growth of these breakaway suburbs 
this was not initially overly detrimental to the central cities: most work was still 
located in or around the city core and with the radial spokes of the street cars, the 
city remained the hub, the centre-point, of activity. Fittingly Chicago invented both 
cheap construction for suburbia and the skyscrapers where many suburban 
residents worked. However, with the mass take-up of the motor car this began to 
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change. The lateral movement between suburbs for work became possible and road 
haulage meant that increasingly industry could take advantage of cheap land by 
relocating outside of the city. Previously rail transport allowed warehousing, which 
requires a large amount of land, to move outside the city at an early stage, and the 
expanding car production of Detroit was located at the intersection of rail lines, but 
road transport increased the options for a great variety of businesses.19 Later with 
major road building programmes in the 1940s, in particular with the interstate 
network, there was little barrier to the suburban relocation of business and because 
workers increasingly lived in suburbs this itself became an important motivation for 
business to up-sticks to suburban locations. 
Between the wars there was a rapid expansion of housing, much of it in suburban 
lots, enabled and spurred by growing automobile ownership: between 1922 and 
1927 there were on average 883,000 new houses built each year and by 1920, 46 
per cent of the population were homeowners.20 However, with the Depression, 
housing starts collapsed by 95 per cent of their previous level and defaults on 
housing loans became a national problem. In an attempt to stabilise the situation the 
Roosevelt administration created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 
1933. The HOLC created a national system of appraisal as the basis for refinancing 
loans and so to stabilise property values, and gave loan relief through a million low 
interest mortgages from 1933 to 1936.21 The appraisals worked by assessing the 
local area as the most important aspect of a property’s value – and likely future value 
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– above that of the construction of the property. The HOLC mapped areas based on 
a survey of the occupation, income and ethnicity of the local residents creating four 
grades, the lowest grade being “D” or “hazardous” and marked in red. In this 
appraisal there was a strong bias towards reading an area’s racial profile as 
determining the security of its residential assets: “even those neighborhoods with 
small proportions of black inhabitants were usually rated fourth grade or 
‘hazardous’’”.22 Nonetheless the HOLC applied its own assistance to these 
hazardous areas23 and also limited the distribution of its maps on the grounds that 
they might be misinterpreted as suggesting that no loans at all should be made to 
“hazardous” properties.24 Hiller argues that the HOLC was applying, though perhaps 
more systematically, assessment practices that were already widespread in the 
private sector from the 1910s. Documentation for lending practices on the basis of 
racial criteria has been found in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Miami and Los 
Angeles.25 The hostility faced by those blacks able to raise the funds necessary to 
move to white areas in the 1920s discussed in the previous chapter broadly supports 
the point that private discrimination was at play. It seems reasonable to conclude 
that discrimination by private lenders was already widespread as “[r]efusing to lend 
to certain areas, particularly those with African Americans, was such common 
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practice that apparently few people found it remarkable during the 1920s and 
1930s.”26  
In 1934 the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was created to provide inexpensive 
credit to enable mortgage financing to take place through a system of state backing 
of private mortgage provision. This aimed to resuscitate the building trade as an 
important source of employment and to revive the mortgage market. The FHA 
worked with the HOLC in setting its own assessment model to the extent that the 
same letter grades were used in its own initial mapping including the section ““D” 
grade27 – but it also applied these assessments to limit the underwriting of loans and 
thus made credit either unavailable or only available at significantly higher rates for 
housing to blacks or else in areas with a black presence. Again, the extent to which 
the FHA was simply applying standards already common in the private sector is 
unclear but the backing of the FHA in mortgage provision became in itself a 
significant factor. As the assistant secretary at a building and loan association in 
New Jersey noted, “The most desirable lending areas are considered to be those 
having the approval of the F.H.A., and in all probability no loans will be made in 
areas not approved by that agency.”28 The FHA also spread its method of 
assessment through the publishing of The Structure and Growth of Residential 
Neighborhoods in American Cities in 1939, in its widely disseminated Underwriting 
Manual, and in working closely with the various private agencies involved in the 
housing market.29 According to Jackson this meant that well into the 1960s the FHA 
“enshrined [segregation] as public policy” through “allow[ing] personal and agency 
bias in favour of all-white sub-divisions in the suburbs to affect the kinds of loans it 
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guaranteed – or equally important, refused to guarantee.”30 The ministrations of the 
FHA together with the bias for all-white locales in the private sector did not just mean 
squeezing off credit for blacks, it also meant that buying a property in the suburbs 
became often significantly cheaper than renting in the cities for whites that could take 
up the offer and thus contributed to the exodus from the cities. With the outflow, the 
low valuations given in areas with a black population became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.31 The Veterans Administration, created in 1944 to provide housing for 16 
million returning troops, followed the prescriptions of the FHA and so enhanced the 
discriminatory effect of FHA policies following World War Two. The FHA also 
followed on from the private sector in approving the use of racial covenants which 
stopped properties from being sold to blacks – indeed it recommended them in its 
Underwriting Manual. The Supreme Court ruled in 1948 against these covenants – 
narrowly that they could not be enforced in law. However, only in 1949 did the FHA 
announce it would not back mortgages with such covenants as of February 1950 
which gave builders notice that they should put these covenants in place before the 
prohibition was enacted.32 
Federal intervention incentivised mass white flight from urban centres and played an 
important role in supporting the creation of all white suburbs often out of the break-
up of white ethnic neighbourhoods. FHA intervention also prioritised the type of 
private sector single family occupancies available in suburban areas. The FHA 
approved financing on single family dwellings over multiple-family occupancies by a 
rate of 4 to 1 and financing was not extended to accommodation built for rent by 
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either public bodies or by non-profit corporations such as co-operatives.33 White 
ethnics, then, decamped to near uniform plots and housing leaving behind their old 
communities. Sacks describes her own childhood experience of starting in a Jewish 
enclave of the city where once moved to the suburbs the children brought together 
from a mixture of old neighbourhoods mixed and played together as white. Different 
religious or ethnic backgrounds became the subject of occasional childhood teasing 
rather than as previously the cause of a separate existence.34 In this suburban white 
melting pot, old allegiances could seem increasingly remote. In passing we note here 
that in addition to indirect measures based on federal backing for mortgage finance 
there were some more direct initiatives by the state associated with whites-only 
housing. According to Loewen, FDR saw through the creation of seven whites-only 
towns as part of the New Deal.35 
Where finance was available there were other obstacles to sales to blacks which 
demonstrate the crabgrass-roots nature of opposition to racial mixing in housing. Up 
until 1950, Article 34 of the code of ethics for the National Association of Realtors 
stated “A Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a 
character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any 
individual whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the 
neighborhood.” The clause was changed to read: “A realtor should never be 
instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or use which 
will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.” However 
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Laurenti, writing in 1960, noted that “most realtors seem to understand the rewritten 
article in the same sense” and that local real estate boards also maintained 
constitutional clauses similar to the earlier version in the national code – and 
enforced them on pain of exclusion.36 A 1955 Masters research project asking 
realtors in San Francisco about sales to non-whites in white neighbourhoods found a 
third of respondents cited an important motivation against facilitating such sales was 
fear of being boycotted for further business. However, the bigger factor mentioned by 
half of respondents was that sellers themselves refused to sell to non-whites. Asked 
whether, when a seller agreed to sell to a non-white, what their response would be, 
85 per cent said they would try to avoid brokering the deal.37  
We have looked at some of the mechanisms of racial separation fuelled by a racial 
approach both at federal and local levels. However it should be noted that separation 
becomes more than simply a matter of racial bias especially over time and can 
develop an entrenched – even self-reinforcing – character. As the movement, or 
potential movement, of blacks to an area undermines house values this itself 
became a powerful motivation for opposition to allowing blacks to move in 
independently of the outlook of white residents. Thus the market acts as an 
important mechanism to discipline against integration. Further because of the 
relative poverty of most blacks, rather than simply being a matter of racial 
discrimination their association with very real economic and social problems means 
that a “rational” rather than racially biased motivation for discrimination may apply. 
As an economist discussing continued racial effects in housing credit argues:  
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Our analysis suggests two reasons why race effects will not disappear in urban 
credit markets simply because bigotry (personal discrimination) is eliminated. 
First, …, personal discrimination is not the only category of economic 
discrimination. Rational and structural discrimination need not be fuelled by 
personal animus…. Second, personal and rational discrimination lead 
dynamically to structural discrimination. Slights against agents with equal 
resources, over time, create agents with unequal resources. This legacy would 
remain even if the bigotry fuelling it had died out.38  
We should note here that the idea of “bigotry” as “personal discrimination” discussed 
above would be interpreted more expansively as a racial outlook based not on 
personal psychology but rather connected to a racial political outlook.  
Or as Crowder argues because race is linked to other social, cultural and economic 
circumstances (i.e. those blacks that might move to an area are poor and 
disadvantaged) these circumstances themselves rather than racial hostility to blacks 
in general can become important reasons to avoid residence in areas with black 
populations:  
To the degree that neighborhood racial conditions are linked to other social and 
economic conditions, the mobility of Whites from these areas may reflect the 
desire to avoid residence in neighborhoods with unstable populations, large 
numbers of poor residents, weak ties between neighbors, or other deleterious 
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social and economic conditions, rather than an aversion to living near minority 
group members per se. 39 
An additional difficulty for blacks was that it was often economic problems that 
prompted large scale black migration. In particular one of the main periods of black 
migration to Northern cities took place in the 1930s with the collapse of Southern 
agriculture. Here, in particular blacks were moving from the Southern recession to a 
North likewise mired in Depression. The economic difficulties helped ensure that 
blacks could not follow the pattern of ethnic advancement into an expanding 
economy that generations of Euro immigrants had experienced. 
Overall, the racial divisions in the North took on a seemingly spontaneous character 
seemingly distinct or at least distanced from an overt racial political orientation. In 
other words, racial divisions seemed to be based on individual choices rather than 
the type of overt political or legal measures seen with Jim Crow in the South. Despite 
federal involvement, this might be considered as being “discrimination” as a choice, 
a preference, a matter of taste, rather than discrimination understood in its political or 
legal sense. This meant that in some ways the racial divisions of the North had a 
more organic and spontaneous character that could be more difficult to address and 
in some ways was more entrenched. While the more overt forms of racial 
organisation in the South were countered through campaigning for legal reform to 
achieve formal equality, what seemed to be the choice not to mix – as associated 
with, for example, “white flight” – was not so straightforwardly a political question.  
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Moreover, over time, from the 1950s and into the 1960s and 1970s, the movements 
of racial suburbanisation seen in the North were transplanted to the South. As 
Sugrue argues: 
The fact that northern racial reconstruction had also reached a climax and that 
both white capital and white people were fleeing the major northern cities 
added to the Sun Belt reversal. The incentives and aversions that drove 
companies and the white middle class out into the suburbs encouraged some 
to move farther, finding in low-tax and non-union southern spaces the ultimate 
refuge from northern big-city racial, fiscal, and union politics.40 
The pattern of the “spatialisation”41 of race through racial suburbanisation was to an 
extent copied in the South coming to partially replace previous forms of overt and 
legal discrimination of blacks and whites living in close proximity. For example, the 
city of Atlanta was more segregated in 1970 than in 1940. Again, this pattern was 
encouraged by federal funding. In the post New Deal period state expenditure on 
defence and infrastructure went disproportionately towards the South and West 
rather than to the North and East and towards suburban and rural areas rather to the 
North Eastern cities. Defence spending played an important role in California, Texas 
and Washington D.C. and the highway system laid the basis for suburban 
interconnections.42 Overall, however, the legacy of black concentration in Northern 
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inner cities was so great that “by 1990, twenty-four of the twenty five most 
segregated metropolitan areas in the United States were in the North.”43 
At the start of the twentieth century much of the American city would have been 
divided up into enclaves. Various immigrant groups would have concentrated their 
numbers to leverage the benefits of community, ameliorate the problems of language 
and pursue an ethnic niche in the division of labour. Over time, especially with 
second and third generations, success or opportunities would have led to some 
dispersal into the wider city – eventually integration would follow. Friends and family 
having made the transition out of the ethnic ghetto would provide a model to others. 
With the expansion into the suburbs, with access to cheap good quality housing and 
a booming economy this process was accelerated. The immigrant story of success 
and becoming American was the staple of the American dream. While this was 
significantly easier for white European ethnics, this way forward was possible for 
Latinos and for the smaller numbers of Asians. However, for blacks this transition 
was barred. In this process blacks became renewed and fixed as a race apart. A 
racial politics may have been behind many of the measures that limited opportunities 
for blacks, expressed both by individuals and in state and federal policy. However 
over time, the inequalities faced by blacks became more than simply a matter of 
racial politics – was not simply reliant on such racial prejudice – but rather became a 
structural reality. In other words the second class position of blacks informed the 
reaction to blacks. The depths of these divisions go a long way to explain the 
difficulties of dealing with race through legislation and for civil rights to address 
patterns of discrimination outside the formal practices in the South. 
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In the twentieth century, race in the USA, we have argued, not only acted to sort 
people politically, but also came to sort the population geographically – race took on 
a material character. The outlook developed in the long racial nadir and in the 
consolidation of whiteness, and backed by racially loaded federal intervention, 
influenced patterns of racial separation largely through suburban migration. The 
separation took on something of an entrenched character such that blacks in this 
period became increasingly a race apart. A racial apartheid was created not primarily 
through legal mechanisms, but rather through seemingly spontaneous choices. The 
market in housing acted as the means through which choices to separate were 
expressed and reinforced by movements in house prices. The most dynamic growth 
took place around the suburbs and gave added weight to such divisions. Many of 
these choices were no doubt influenced by racial prejudice. However, as divisions 
consolidated, rational discrimination could increasingly work independently of direct 
racial bias through responses to price movements at least partially based on broader 
considerations of economic and social difference. Thus while the mechanisms of Jim 
Crow in the South have been described as a “peculiar institution”, the pattern in the 
rest of the country was just as novel a US innovation. The spontaneous character of 
the northern patterns of racial division meant they were less at odds with formal legal 
equality than the overt mechanisms employed in the South. Rather than being based 
on legal pronouncements against equality they were seemingly the expression of 
free choices.  
We should note here that the distinction between these types of segregation has 
often been made using the terms de facto and de jure. But these terms to not always 
clarify. Generally the idea is that de jure applies as a description of formal legal 
segregation in the South, while de facto applies to the informal non-legal practices of 
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segregation in the North. According to Lassiter: “As a legal doctrine, “de facto 
segregation” means “innocent segregation”—spatial landscapes and racial 
arrangements that exist beyond the scope of judicial remedy, attributable solely to 
private market forces in the absence of any historical or contemporary government 
responsibility.”44 However, as noted the by US Commission Rights in 1970 and 
reported by Crespino, “practically all racial housing patterns…could be traced to 
official actions by state, local and federal governments, and thus could not be 
considered strictly de facto.”45 Where the term is used in this thesis it is in a looser 
sense of differentiating the formal segregation by law from indirect forms which may 
nonetheless be understood as having important elements of state backing. 
Cold War Civil Rights 
When race was raised as an issue in the post-war period and moving into the Civil 
Rights era, the informal character of racial divisions in much of the USA especially in 
contrast with the clear manifestations of organised and state-backed racial 
organisation in the Southern states had important repercussions. Essentially, while 
opposition to Southern institutions that violated legal norms of formal equality 
developed, there were much greater difficulties in addressing other expressions of 
racial division. It was one thing to enforce or establish legal equality but quite another 
to develop an effective political or economic intervention that might overcome 
entrenched divisions in states outside the Deep South which had been erected over 
such a long period of time.  
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Here we move on to briefly examine how race was tackled – and not tackled – in the 
politics of the Cold War. When the USA came under international pressure over its 
racial divisions in the context of its leadership role in the Cold War, the federal state 
adopted a legalistic response focused predominantly on the most overt expressions 
of Southern racial organising. The “de facto” organisation of racial politics in the 
North especially in contrast to the formal structures of race in the South meant that it 
was largely seen as outside of the scope of legal and political action. In the 
immediate post war period, the divisions between blacks and whites seemed to have 
limited political repercussions at home. While the position of blacks had been 
identified as a problem, for example by Myrdal, there was little domestic impetus to 
resolve these divisions. However, with the Cold War and the competition with the 
Soviet Union, international considerations meant the position of blacks in the USA 
took on a wider significance. The USA’s argument that it represented democracy and 
freedom was brought into question by the treatment of its own black citizens. The 
difficulties for US foreign policy and the competition of ideas with the Soviet Union 
meant there was support from important players to do something about blacks’ 
second class status, at least to the extent that it became an issue in the Cold War. 
The Cold War was a double-edged sword for civil rights campaigners. The red-
baiting and anti-Communism of the late 1940s and the 1950s had side-lined 
progressives that might otherwise have made headway building a constituency for 
and campaigning for substantive equality. The left in this period in particular was 
marginalised and often hounded by the authorities. At the same time, however, the 
USA had to be seen in the eyes of the world as living up to the ideals it argued it 
represented internationally. As Dudziak argues, “The Cold War created a 
constraining environment for domestic politics. It also gave rise to new opportunities 
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for those who could exploit Cold War anxieties, while yet remaining within the 
bounds of acceptable “Americanism”.46 Thus for example at the height of the Cold 
War the NAACP presented its campaign for racial reform as part of the struggle 
against communism.47  
The issue of race in the Cold War became an important consideration for the federal 
authorities. The connection between Cold War rivalry and the need to do something 
about racial divisions – “if we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom 
is in jeopardy” –was highlighted in a speech in February 1948 by President 
Truman.48 Similarly, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the architect of early US 
foreign policy in the Cold War made the case that this had become a key question 
for international relations. An early significant consequence of this changed 
approach was that in November 1948, Truman gave a presidential decree that the 
armed forces should be desegregated. The use of Cold War/foreign policy 
justifications for dealing with race also played an important role in key early civil 
rights cases in the courts. Though not always made explicit in the judgements 
themselves, for several important civil rights cases the Supreme Court was supplied 
with amicus curae – or “friends of the court” briefings – from the State Department 
that stressed the importance to the national interest of resolving these cases with the 
extension of rights to blacks. In cases relating to restrictive covenants, segregation in 
railroad cars that went across state lines and in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
State Department took the novel step of intervening through these briefings even 
when the direct interests of the country were not at stake. Dudziak makes the 
                                            
46
 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 15. 
47
 Ibid., 29. 
48
 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights”, American Presidency Project, 
2 February 1948, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13006  
230 
convincing case that State Department arguments were likely to be influential to the 
court already accustomed to making decisions taking into account national security 
during the Second World War and which was attuned to what was at stake during 
the Cold War. Additionally, several judges had travelled abroad and knew the 
interest shown abroad in the treatment of blacks.49  
The efforts of the federal government to counter overseas concerns had some 
success. The formal decisions in court for civil rights enabled both the State 
Department and friends of the USA abroad to develop an argument that civil rights 
were moving in the right direction and that the government itself was in support of 
these rights. By comparing the situation with slavery the argument could be made 
that the situation of blacks had improved greatly in a short time. Where court 
decisions relied on constitutional law rather than statutory law, as was the case, for 
example, with restrictive covenants and in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
argument could be made that this was a vindication of the country’s founding 
documents. Even the opposition in the South to integration, for example, could show 
the right to dissent was guaranteed by the federal structure in the constitution but 
also that civil rights could be redefined as entrenched regional prejudice that the 
government was working to overcome.50 It should be noted, however, that it was 
easier to establish formal equality in the courts or to make pronouncements about 
racial divisions than to overturn these racial divisions in practice. For example, 
Brown v. Board of Education while setting an important legal precedent did not 
greatly transform school segregation. The ruling was rendered ineffective through 
delaying tactics and other bureaucratic measures even after the Supreme Court 
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returned to the case and ruled that it must be implemented immediately. 
Bureaucratic measures outside the formal requirements of the law were used to 
greatly limit numbers of black students that went to white schools. The passage of 
laws was at the time, however, sufficient for presenting an image of the USA to the 
world. As Dudziak notes, the “Cold War imperative could be addressed largely 
through formal pronouncements about the law.”51  
With the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in October 1957, the stakes of the 
Cold War were further raised. The perception was that the USA had been 
complacent under Eisenhower and had fallen behind Soviet competition. For 
example, gross national product had grown only 2 per cent per year from 1953 to 
1957. The self-reflection this provoked helped usher in John F. Kennedy as a 
youthful dynamic leader who might revive the nation in the 1960 election and gave 
scope for liberal ideas that would countenance a more interventionist approach in 
domestic affairs.52 
Despite this potential, civil rights for Kennedy were still seen in international terms. 
According to Harris Wofford, Kennedy’s advisor on civil rights in the 1960 election, 
the “dominant issues” for Kennedy were always foreign policy and US-Soviet 
relations. Civil rights were always a problem rather than an issue to promote.53 In the 
wake of civil rights activism in the South – of the lunch counter sit-ins of 1960 and 
the Freedom Riders of 1961 – and the violent response that came with it, Kennedy 
was forced to try to deal with these issues, vitally because of the response in the 
foreign press. Kennedy, for example, negotiated with the Mississippi governor to try 
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to avoid damaging conflict although through the expedient of the state arresting and 
imprisoning the Freedom Riders. One measure of the importance of civil rights and 
perhaps a false sense of self-congratulation came with the end of Kennedy’s first 
year in office. A draft list of “Major Foreign Policy measures Taken by the Kennedy 
Administration” was drawn up. On this list came: “the orderly evolution of 
desegregation in the United States” and the note alongside: “This has had a 
favourable effect overseas.”54 Here segregation was seen only in its Southern 
incarnation. 
Over time civil rights campaigning led to the dismantling of Jim Crow in the South. 
However, this was not simply a matter of the power of the campaigning or of the 
external spotlight of media attention and the embarrassment of racial politics in the 
context of the Cold War. Several factors came together to make the regulation of 
labour under Jim Crow law inefficient and counter-productive. For example, labour 
saving investments in agriculture had undermined the requirement for cheap 
agricultural labour in Southern development and thus an important part of the 
rationale for Southern forms of segregation. Additionally the ability of blacks to move 
out of the South meant that crackdowns might be counter-productive. The amassing 
of blacks in urban areas in the South also meant that Jim Crow repression was 
increasingly countered. The costs and disruption of repression associated with Jim 
Crow came to be seen as retarding development and investment in the South where 
previously repression of the black population in disciplining black labour and 
reducing agricultural wages acted as a spur to agricultural production.  
Thaddeus Russell, an author at odds with the mainstream narrative of success by a 
united, respectable civil rights movement in the South, paints an interesting picture of 
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the situation in Birmingham, Alabama of what these changes could mean.55 Russell 
notes that prior to the media concentration on Birmingham in 1963 the city had faced 
several years of conflict. Thus it was not so much the peaceful civil rights protesters 
that were the subject of fire hoses and police dogs unleashed by Bull Connor, the 
city’s Commissioner of Public Safety, but rather locals who had pelted his men with 
rocks, bottles and bricks. In this context Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail” offered the authorities a way out as a means of negotiation rather 
than confronting “a frightening racial nightmare” that would result if blacks 
abandoned rapprochement with the authorities and came to support Black 
nationalism.56 Pushing on the other side was Sidney Smyer, president of the 
chamber of commerce, who presided over a city which had nearly a third of its 
property vacant and who took part in making a deal with the Civil Rights group, the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Smyer who described himself 
as a “segregationist from top to bottom” argued the deal to de-segregate was in the 
interest of Birmingham stockholders: “We’ve got to have growth if we want to 
develop [the city], and you can’t have it in a city of hate and violence.” Russell cites 
Smyer’s later recollection as “I wanted some peace, too, and that’s the honest 
truth”.57 
Any linear narrative of the building up of momentum around civil rights campaigning 
from Brown onwards seems flawed. For example ten years after Brown in 1964 as 
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the civil rights act was passed only about one per cent of black children in the South 
attended a racially-mixed school. However, by 1966 that had increased to 6.1 per 
cent; by 1967 to 16.9 per cent, by 1969 to 32 per cent, and by 1973 to 90 per cent.58 
Klarman argues that the most important role of Brown was in the reaction to the 
judgement. This reaction ensured that by the early 1960s segregationist hardliners 
often held office by the early 1960s. It was their violent reaction, he argues, that led 
to the TV pictures that alienated northern opinion.59 However, it seems a stretch that 
such hard-line support for segregation would be so overly affected by public opinion 
in the Northern states. For example bureaucratic measures that limited de-
segregation of schools might simply have continued. Rather it seems that 
increasingly the costs and inconvenience of dividing the population, the decreasing 
dependence on cheap agricultural labour and the effect of PR on investment and 
trade eventually outweighed the benefits for segregationists such that by the late 
1960s such forms of organisation had outlived their usefulness to the extent that 
support for formal segregation largely collapsed. That the violence and the portrayal 
of the violence had undermined the moral case of the segregationists did not help 
but this should not be understood as sufficient to explain the collapse of Jim Crow. 
By way of contrast attempts to overcome segregation in the North foundered on the 
opposition met there. Here Martin Luther King’s attempts to counter segregation and 
campaign for fair housing in Chicago in 1966 are instructive. Despite Chicago’s one 
million black residents King’s initial demonstrations could muster only a few hundred 
supporters. In July 1966 two hundred demonstrators met two thousand whites in 
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Gage Park. By August 600 marchers in Marquette park met 4,000 whites.60 Matusow 
notes that the opposition was fierce and determined: “the descendants of the Irish, 
Italians and Poles who resided in neighborhoods like Gage Park, Bogan and 
Marquette Park had already fled the black invasion – sometimes twice – and would 
not run again.”61 Against such opposition tied to the voting bloc behind Chicago’s 
Mayor Daley federal backing dried up. For Matusow this confrontation effectively 
signalled the end of Johnson’s civil rights push as “[t]empted he would count his 
divisions and then ingloriously quit the battle.”62 The political calculus for Johnson 
was such that “forced to choose between Daley and King – between the black 
minority in the ghetto and the white majority whom Daley represented – he did what 
any politician concerned with survival would do. He chose Daley.”63 
The Misleading Southern Narrative of Race 
While many discussions of race in the twentieth century USA focus on the South and 
map out the role of the South in particular our presentation has highlighted the 
patterns of racial separation that persisted in the North. In many ways there is a 
hidden history of racial division in the North that only emerges much later as an 
issue. Sugrue’s 2008 work, Sweet Land of Liberty is subtitled “The Forgotten 
Struggle for Civil Rights in the North”. Loewen’s 2005 work that focuses on racial 
exclusion in Northern towns is subtitled “A Hidden Dimension of American Racism”. 
The classic pattern is to discuss the inequities of the South and the civil rights 
struggle that fully emerges in the 1960s. However, the patterns of development in 
the North played an important role creating a basis for racial division, racial 
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conservatism and the establishment of whiteness as the opposite pole to blackness 
on a national level. 
The formal and legal separation of the South sets it out as unambiguous case of 
injustice and has become central in the narrative of the growth of civil rights. 
However, the unproblematic expansion of whites on purpose suburbs until the 1960s 
also speaks to the character of racial politics of the North. So, for example, Gunnar 
Myrdal’s whose 1944 work An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy became an important marker in mapping out the problems of race 
relations in the USA was mainly observed in relation to Southern states. Indeed, 
although the work is seen as being important, it “received fairly little attention in the 
war-torn decade in which it was published”.64 Despite the effective policies and 
pursuit of segregation in the North, effective opposition was only raised by the 
1960s. 
The government support for the development of suburbia as against the city or else 
the practices that reinforced racial segregation in housing until the 1960s were 
largely ignored at the time and not incorporated into an understanding of how racial 
divisions in the USA developed.65 By contrast in our reading the separation of the 
races comes out of the drawing of racial lines hammered out in the late nineteenth 
and early to mid-twentieth century. Although there was at times support in the North 
for state protection for blacks when attacked in the South, the separation of races in 
the North shows how the idea of the equality of blacks had been rejected nationally.  
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While inspiring and motivational in many respects, the fact that racial inequality was 
presented as an issue that plagued the white moral conscience tended to place 
undue emphasis on the strictly formal aspects of racial discrimination and the ethical 
intentions of white Americans. In the process, equally important aspects of the 
problem were written out of consideration.66 Hall argues that there has been a 
simplifying of the narrative of what the civil rights movement that limited it to being a 
fight for formal equality that allowed it to be “celebrat[ed] as a natural progression of 
American values” and be used as a “satisfying morality tale”.67
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The Shifting Meaning of Race 
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Chapter 7: Testing the White Electorate 
The last two chapters argued race in the USA in its modern sense came out of the 
accommodations of nationality and class from the late nineteenth century through to 
the 1940s. This was consolidated in the twentieth century through the physical 
separation of whites from blacks which was at the same time the coming together of 
whites of various ethnicities in the suburbs. This historical appreciation of race 
makes it part of political developments rather than simply being prejudice external to 
those developments. Subsequently we can approach race in the 2008 election from 
a fresh perspective. In this chapter and the next we look at two key themes related to 
race that were raised as part of the election: the idea of white bases of support 
(discussed in this chapter) and the importance given to the candidate’s racial 
background (discussed in the next).  
This chapter investigates the idea that the 2008 election demonstrated the extent to 
which race matters in US politics. An important part of how race was understood in 
2008 was that the candidacy of a black man would put the level of white racial 
prejudice under examination. This was shown, for example, in the claims following 
the Obama victory that the USA was “post-racial”. Presumably black votes for a 
black president did not demonstrate that these voters had moved beyond race and 
as so the test was one of non-black and predominantly white voters.1 This chapter 
examines the idea that the racial outlook of whites explains key electoral changes.  
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A short note on sources is appropriate at this point. As per the previous chapter the 
discussion of the Southern Strategy is further covered by a loose school of 
revisionist scholars looking at the South. Where the chapter covers the 1970s and 
the opening up of discussions on race –for example, the Kerner report sold in the 
millions – there are some difficulties. There is no definitive work that presents a 
picture of race in this period. The chapter makes its case through a series of works 
and some journalistic material. Some support is taken from Matusow who provides 
useful overview of the general politics of the period. The discussion on the end of 
racial exclusion uses the timely debate that came with the 2010 census between 
Vigdor and Logan facilitated by a symposium of the American Sociological 
Association. This provides useful empirical support for the idea of the end of 
exclusion and the main views as to the cause of this opening up. In attempting to 
understand one of the reasons why the turnaround in race seems stunted Frymer is 
used.2 He explains the orientation of the main parties towards race. He usefully 
develops the idea of black capture and that the attitudes of the main parties do not 
constitute a simple competition for votes. There are a number to authors used to 
understand the changed suburban landscape. Danielson is used in an old but not 
dated analysis of the political character of the suburbs that looks in some detail at 
the application and importance of local zoning laws.3 Self and Sugrue’s work is 
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important in examining changes in the suburbs4 but the chapter’s main source is the 
attempt at a substantial categorisation of heterogonous suburban spaces found in 
Land, Sanchez and Berube.5 
It has been argued that appeals to the racial prejudices of whites have been effective 
in attracting support for the Republicans in particular, but also in undermining a 
liberal approach in politics. The refrain that there are large sections of the white 
electorate responsive to appeals based on racial prejudice has been constant from 
the Civil Rights era onwards. Over time this has been discussed in several often 
overlapping ways. In the earliest period this took the form that simply there was a 
white backlash to civil rights legislation. Later the argument is that the Republican 
Party pursued (and some maintain still pursue) a “Southern strategy” using race-
related “wedge” issues to divide the groupings that came together as the New Deal 
coalition and especially to peel off white support. This approach began in the South, 
goes the argument, and then is later applied more widely in what has been described 
as the “Southernisation” of US politics.6 In more recent years the idea is that racial 
politicking takes on a more subtle form as coded racial appeals. This has also been 
described as “dog-whistle” politics where the implied racial message is either 
understood as such by racially motivated recipients or, in some readings, acts on the 
unconscious prejudices of the listener.7 For example highlighting black recipients of 
                                            
4
 Robert O. Self and Thomas J. Sugrue, “The Power of Place: Race, Political Economy, and Identity in 
the Postwar Metropolis” in Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (eds.), A Companion to 
Post-1945 America (Oxford: Blackwells, 2002) 
5
 Robert E. Lang, Thomas W. Sanchez and Alan Berube, “The New Suburban Politics: A County-
Based Analysis of Metropolitan Voting Trends Since 2000” in Ruy A. Teixeira (ed.), Red, Blue, and 
Purple America: The Future of Election Demographics (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
2009). Epub edition. 
6
 The term seems to have been first coined by John Egerton in The Americanization of Dixie: The 
Southernization of America (New York: Harper’s Magazine Press, 1974). 
7
 Ian Hanley Lόpez, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals have Reinvented Racism and 
Wrecked the Middle Class (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
242 
welfare might undermine support for the welfare state and related liberal policies. 
Likewise highlighting black criminality would reinforce the idea of an underserving 
poor and undermine liberal policy responses in general. 
Should the 2008 election signal a change in these perceived racial responses, this 
would, given the understanding, potentially reflect significant changes in white racial 
outlooks and thus in the political landscape. In the 2008 election this view and the 
“hope” for a polity that had moved beyond race were expressed indirectly. Obama at 
times described race as a distraction in politics. One way of reading this is that 
appeals to race worked on prejudices that stopped recipients from understanding the 
rational issues being presented and distracted them from their real interests.8 The 
excitement of Democrat activists that “race doesn’t matter” might be understood as 
simply that whites were open to voting for Obama, a black candidate. However, it 
can also be understood more expansively in that racial appeals might no longer act 
to undermine Democrat support and so leave Republicans unable to apply what has 
been one of their key political resources. Notably there was an added release of 
tension because these were actual votes for Obama – opinion polls it was thought 
might be subject to the “Bradley Effect” i.e. whites hiding their prejudices against a 
black candidate when responding to informal polling and would revert to a white 
candidate in the privacy of the polling booth.9 
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However, from our reading, the way in which racial prejudice is considered as being 
apart from politics means that there are assumptions being made that electoral 
support follows racial outlooks which exist independently of political arrangements. In 
other words the racial prejudices supposedly on display are taken for granted and 
inadequately theorised. A white majority is simply presumed to be showing (or in the 
case of the Obama victory, perhaps, now not showing) a racial outlook. Race is often 
seen as simply an irrational outlook that does not belong in political science whereas 
a rational, scientific view in contrast tells us that there are no meaningful racial 
differences.10  
On the basis of the understanding of race developed in the previous chapters we can 
attempt an investigation of the idea that the effectiveness of racial appeals explains 
shifts in support to Republicans through undermining liberal ideas and bolstering 
conservative ones. The thesis does not attempt to work through all the racial appeals 
and their effectiveness and relevance from the Civil Rights period onwards. Rather 
we use a case study of one key way in which these racial appeals have been 
understood: the Southern strategy. The Southern strategy, it has been argued, 
describes how the Republicans use appeals to the racial prejudices of Southern 
whites which in most readings has been extended to constituencies outside the 
South. Our approach brings into question the idea of a Southern strategy and with it 
similar ways in which race has been understood. Subsequently, we develop the idea 
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that a better way to understand racial appeals is through politics and in particular we 
suggest that rather than the politics of race, politics associated with a suburban 
orientation can better describe the changes in recent years. We suggest an 
alternative reading of changes in racial outlooks among whites, suggesting that the 
racial politics of the past as understood in the post-war period has little importance 
today. 
It should be noted that the analysis here is not questioning whether or not racial 
appeals were effective at times in winning support. Such appeals and responses 
have been important. Rather it raises two points. First it asks whether this is an 
explanation: do the changing racial tastes held in the minds of the electorate provide 
an adequate explanation for what happens. And second it asks, following an 
alternative reading of how race changes, how much the 2008 election might be 
described as being a test of white racial views. 
Southern Strategy Reconsidered 
The Southern strategy is associated with the work of electoral strategist Kevin 
Phillips in The Emerging Republican Majority.11 The idea was that the Republicans 
could, for example, use opposition to civil rights measures or state intervention that 
supported blacks as a means to undermine the New Deal consensus and its 
associated voting bloc. In presidential elections from Nixon on, Republicans 
gathered sometimes significant support in what was previously a Solid South for the 
Democrats – although congressional results continued to consistently favour 
Democrat incumbents until 1994. Phillips’ work was controversial at the time (and 
remains so); Philips himself made it clear in a preface to his work that it was not 
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official Republican policy although he worked for the campaign.12 And the Nixon 
administration distanced itself from Phillips, although parts of his book were used in 
White House policy circles.13 However, it has become something of an established 
view that a central and effective plank of Republican electoral strategy in the post-
Civil Rights period (and adapted at times as Democrat strategy14) has been cynical 
or Machiavellian use of appeals to racial prejudice.  
Our reading of race, however, is that the idea of a Southern strategy is flawed. 
Rather than Southern racial attitudes being at play it is rather the context of largely 
white suburban politics on a national basis that Republican strategy should be 
understood. In 1968, for example, Nixon faced a nation that where for the first time 
the majority of Americans lived in suburbs. Rather than a Southern strategy, there is 
a suburban orientation at work. The related idea of the Southernisation of American 
politics is equally flawed. Although some lessons may have been taken from the 
appeal of racial prejudice in the South, the political sensitivities of the key politicians 
making racial appeals had already been established outside the South and reactions 
to racial appeals come in the context of the political and spatial divisions on a 
national basis.  
This is an important distinction because the power or weight behind such prejudices 
is influenced not by the legacy of Jim Crow or else simply racial prejudice but by the 
culmination of white suburbanisation and the politics associated with it. The 
assumption behind the idea of the Southern strategy is racial prejudice as 
independent variable. Rather, an understanding of the development of racial 
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outlooks tied in with political change is required to gauge what has happened. In the 
post-Civil Rights period, it is changes in the political context of the suburbs, rather 
than a legacy of racial southern backwardness, that best explains political 
orientations.  
Several “revisionist” scholars15 have in recent years also questioned the Southern 
strategy thesis both from the aspect that it misrepresents the South and that it 
ignores national patterns of division.16 They argue that the painting of the South as a 
backward region mired in racial resentment makes little sense. Southern 
distinctiveness has been undermined by economic development, the mass migration 
of people from outside the area, the growth of “Sunbelt” suburbia and the relative 
decline of the population in rural areas. These changes meant that increasingly the 
South reflected the USA as a whole. Lassiter baldly states that “the ‘Southern 
Strategy’ explanation of the political transformation of the modern South is wrong”.17  
From the late 1930s onwards the South’s economy and politics was transformed by 
waves of state intervention. In 1937, per capita income in the South was half that of 
the rest of the nation and in July 1938 FDR declared the backwardness of the South 
as the nation’s number one economic problem.18 From that period on, in an attempt 
to resolve this problem and integrate the South into the US economy there was a 
prolonged period of state investment – generally done through military expenditure – 
in an attempt to raise the Southern economy to national levels. The relative 
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dynamism of the South and West, especially in comparison with the atrophying of 
many North Eastern cites meant that as early as the 1968 election a third of the 
population of the South was born outside the region. As Reagan bowed out to be 
replaced by George H.W. Bush in 1988 over 50 per cent of Southern voters were 
born outside the South.19 This is not to say that there do not remain some areas that 
seem to have changed little since Jim Crow, but overall the South has become much 
more like the nation as a whole. 
Perhaps the best example that highlights the limits of the Southern strategy idea is 
“busing”20 – or the organised transportation of children across existing school 
boundaries in an attempt to desegregate schools.21 There was strong opposition to 
busing in the South, but it was opposition in other regions where this attempt at 
desegregation was derailed. This illustrates how there was not only opposition to civil 
rights initiatives in the South but in some ways a more determined defence of the 
racial arrangements outside the South.22 Northern segregation was brought into 
question through a 1970 amendment to the federal education bill by Mississippi 
Senator, John C. Stennis. The Stennis amendment highlighted how desegregation 
efforts in Southern schools were proceeding while the “de facto” segregation in 
Northern schools was left untouched and so called for funding to ensure equal 
desegregation efforts. This was a ploy by Southern segregationists to undermine 
school de-segregation in the South. Nonetheless the call to challenge de facto 
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segregation was taken up by some Northern liberals. In particular Abraham Ribicoff, 
senator from Connecticut and former Health, Education and Welfare Secretary under 
Kennedy, used the opportunity to attempt to highlight racial politics outside the 
South. This sparked off a debate that brought home the opposition to federal 
measures for school de-segregation and called “into question liberal policies that had 
all but been taken for granted since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act”23 One 
example of the response was Alexander Bickel’s New Republic article which 
questioned whether too stringent a policy of integrating schools would be counter-
productive and lead to white flight or else potentially go against the wishes of blacks 
by forcing desegregation. The article was circulated and quoted by Nixon as a 
political resource. Subsequently the amendment was watered down by both 
Democrats and Republicans and Northern desegregation efforts were limited. It was 
by opposing the issue of busing in particular, perhaps because of its intrusive 
character, that Nixon gained support, but the cause had already been decried by 
many Democrat political representatives.24 
From our analysis it seems misguided and at best one sided to claim that racial 
appeals by Republicans were the mechanism that broke up the New Deal coalition. 
Rather, whatever other actions were taken through the state by the New Deal, it was 
also the major US racial project of the twentieth century. It was not Southern racial 
outlooks that gave Republicans a foothold of support. Instead it was the divisions 
established by the mass white suburbanisation that was seen through and 
sponsored by New Deal programmes. Racial divisions were not used to undermine 
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support for New Deal measures, rather black/white racial divisions – as an aspect of 
whites coming together – were an important product of New Deal measures and a 
central part of the support for such measures. In 1969 Phillips argued that: “The 
Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological impetus of a liberalism which had 
carried it beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of the many (the New Deal) 
to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great Society).”25 However, 
the seeing of blacks as part of the minority (and their concentration in the cities) was 
not a given nor an invention of right wing propagandists. Indeed these racial 
divisions had been established in seeing through the New Deal project.26  
Overall, it can be argued that successful Republican candidates relied not on their 
understanding of racial backwardness in the old Southern mould, but rather started 
with their own understandings of the white suburban outlook: 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan did not need to learn their political 
strategies from southern demagogues such as George Wallace. They honed 
their conservative platforms in the segregated suburbs of post-war California, 
and each secured forty-nine states in his presidential re-election campaign.27 
Rather than the Southernisation of US politics, it would be more accurate to talk in 
terms of the nationalisation of US politics where suburban concerns played a large 
part. 
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The idea that the South was a racist prototype was not universally accepted at the 
time. In particular it was questioned early on at least from the perspective that there 
was and had been large scale migration of Northerners to the South. For example in 
the review of Phillips’ book Polsby noted that the Sunbelt was far from being wholly 
conservative which was at least partially explained by the South being rapidly in flux 
because of an influx of northerners.28 Nonetheless, the idea of the Southern strategy 
and the Southernisation thesis has become the default reading. Lassiter argues that 
the simplicity of the argument goes a long way to explain its longevity.29 We might 
add that over time the Southernisation thesis can take on something of the character 
of an excuse for poor electoral results based on the racism of the white electorate. 
From this perspective weaknesses in Democrat support are explained as being a 
consequence of irrational racial outlooks. Subsequently rather than attempt to find 
explanations for why Democrat policies do not appeal or seem ineffective, the 
electorate and the machinations of the Republicans can be blamed.  
Diminished Race 
Our argument does not deny that racial appeals were made and at times accepted. 
Bringing into question the Southern strategy does not mean that a suburban strategy 
might seem at times to amount to similar prejudices gaining expression. Rather with 
a different understanding of racial appeals we can understand their effect and their 
limits.  
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We now move on to suggest that from the late 1960s onwards the importance of 
race diminished on the basis of our analysis. Our historical reading of race suggests 
that there will be changes over time. Race is not some sort of “cultural meme” 
passed down through the ages as the legacy of slavery, or as “being white”. Rather 
the racial outlook under discussion is historically specific and will change with 
changed circumstances. Over time there were reasons that the racial ordering 
lessened. We want to suggest two main reasons behind these changes. The most 
important is that the motivations behind the creation of a racial order no longer 
applied, largely because of the culmination of this order, i.e. those motivations are 
satisfied. The second is that for the first time in the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
racial approach outside the South, previously unquestioned, became subject to a 
period of sustained scrutiny.  
Increasingly the success of the racial aspect of the New Deal project meant that the 
initial reasons, justifications and motivations of accommodating white ethnics into a 
combined American whiteness were fulfilled and so had become less vital. Over time 
this seeing through of the racial order meant the original motivations lost much of 
their impetus. Whiteness was consolidated and white ethnicities dispersed in the 
suburban hinterlands. Over time white ethnics became indistinguishable from whites 
in general. For example, when looking at one increasingly important measure of 
social progress, college attendance, for those white ethnics born from 1946-1960 the 
levels of college attendance were the same as those for whites from Anglo 
backgrounds. For this cohort and its children the insecurities of fitting in to a white 
Protestant culture were no longer pressing. The figures for educational attainment go 
some way to show how much the various European ethnics had increasingly 
become white. Of US born “South-Central-East European ethnic” men born before 
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1916, roughly 21 per cent attended college compared to 30 per cent of third 
generation British born in the same period. While for those ethnics born from 1916-
1930 the percentage increased to 28 per cent, for those of British ancestry the 
percentage attending college was still significantly more at 41 per cent. However for 
the cohort born 1931-1945 the ratio was nearly equal: 49.3 versus 52.6 per cent and 
for those born in 1946-1960 slightly more of those from South/Central/East European 
ethnic backgrounds attended college (55.7 per cent) than those of British ancestry 
(55.1 per cent).30 
One side-effect of settled life as white was paradoxically that ethnic identities could 
be looked upon in a more relaxed way. With security as whites, European ethnic 
whites were secure enough to search out their ethnic past. For example the 
television serialisation of Alex Haley’s Roots in 1977 became the occasion for whites 
to look for their own rootedness through ethnicity in a way that previous generations 
would have found difficult to understand – although JFK partially prefigured this in his 
visit to Ireland in 1963.31 This did not so much undermine whiteness rather it was 
strengthened through a transformation from the whiteness of Plymouth Rock to a 
whiteness of Ellis Island.32 Indeed as Jacobson argues the change might be seen as 
a response to civil rights, as only through that adaptation is it possible “fully to 
understand how white primacy in American life survived the withering heat of the 
Civil Rights era and multiculturalism”.33 But it also signalled the impetus of the past 
had weakened. With the culmination of whiteness in suburbia over time the 
preoccupation of distancing from blacks became less important overall.  
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This falling away of motivation is enhanced by a generational effect. The concerns of 
those setting up in all-white suburbs were not the same as the later generations who 
had grown up in such neighbourhoods. The concerns about their position in the 
polity, of class and nationality were largely resolved through whiteness and 
integration into the American mainstream. For the generations that left the city, links 
to past backgrounds had faded into memory and there was little institutional 
expression to keep those memories alive. Having a white ethnic background 
increasingly had little or no meaning in the realm of politics. 
A second reason that race weakens is that for the first time at the end of the 1960s 
and in the early 1970s the racial ordering outside the South was effectively held up 
to scrutiny. The exposure of Northern prejudice – sometimes expressed as the 
North’s loss of racial innocence – brought out into the open a set of arrangements 
and orientations that were difficult to defend both morally and politically. For a brief 
period at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, there was an examination of 
the racial divisions that had been created outside the South and the insoluble 
problem that this presented. It was as if there was an awakening to the racial project 
after decades of its enactment. The Kerner Commission of 1967 was setup in 
response to three years of urban rioting and highlighted the massive segregation in 
Northern cities. The report produced by the commission sold in the millions.34 The 
discussion of the Stennis amendment added to the focus on the problematic 
Northern racial arrangements.  
A sense of what this scrutiny meant was that Northern racial divisions could be 
described as “evil” in the paper of record. In a New York Times op-ed in February 
1970, journalist Tom Wicker responding to the Stennis amendment noted that there 
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was “One Evil” of segregation that worked both North and South but that while the 
problems of the South were amenable to legal remedies those in the North were 
intractable. Looking to the federal government was possible through legal means in 
the South, but in the North the manpower to de-segregate schools was lacking as 
was, because of segregation’s informal character, the clear evidence against 
“virtually every American city”. Ultimately the barrier, according to Wicker, was what 
Ribicoff had called the “monumental hypocrisy” and widespread racism in the 
North.35 It should be noted, there was no political will to see through a reversal of the 
racial project that had seen the cities increasingly hollowed out. Nor was there a 
constituency to support such a project. Those that remained in the cities had much 
less weight and represented much less. The strife of the inner cities had to be 
tackled in some way, but there was little in the way of a programme to directly 
resolve the massive divisions that lay behind such strife. Instead the city, once the 
hub of a dynamic economy, came to be increasingly written off. Alongside this came 
the inability to incorporate blacks into mainstream US life. While there had been the 
mass intervention that effectively made the various European ethnics white through, 
for example, the GI Bill acting in the context of the post-war boom, a similar 
programme for the cities and the blacks left there seemed implausible in the 1970s 
as the economy largely stagnated.36 In many ways this impasse marked the end of 
the liberal project, something we return to in the next chapter.  
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The End of Suburban Racial Exclusion? 
Despite the inability to resolve the problems of the cities it was in this period that the 
racial ordering as the coming together of whites and exclusion of blacks came to a 
culmination. In support of our contention that the racial ordering based around the 
suburbs was weakening, from the 1970s the absolute exclusion of blacks from 
suburban locales ends and segregation declines rapidly. We turn to update the 
picture of segregation on a national scale. While there has been an ongoing and 
complex discussion over many decades about segregation we focus on the 
discussion that came with the release of the 2010 census figures as the most recent 
definitive set of figures. Our purpose here is not to explain all the changes that have 
taken place and it may be that the changes discussed are not linear over time or 
uniform across regions. Rather we want to draw out that there are new patterns 
distinct from the post-war period when the spatialization of race was an index of the 
seeing through of the racial project of a combined whiteness.  
Academic analysis of racial segregation using census data shows racial segregation 
increasing in the USA from 1890 until peak values in 1960 and 1970 (the figure for 
1970 is very similar to that of 1960).55 Since 1970, levels of segregation have 
decreased significantly. One important and widely used demographic measure used 
when looking at patterns of divisions is the “Dissimilarity Index”. This number 
measures “the proportion of either group that would have to change neighborhoods 
to be evenly distributed across the neighborhoods in the metropolitan area” 56 under 
consideration. The number is relative to the overall proportions in the population in a 
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metropolitan grouping and nationally is weighted by the numbers affected. In 1960 
and 1970, this number for blacks and their “dissimilarity” with non-Hispanic whites 
nationally was 79. In other words for neighbourhoods within a wider metropolitan 
area to have the same proportion of blacks and non-Hispanic whites, on average 79 
per cent of blacks would have to move out of their neighbourhoods (for this 
calculation meaning out of the census tracts where they lived) or else 79 per cent of 
non-Hispanic whites would have to disperse. By 1980 that number was reduced by 
about 6 points to 72.8%. By 1990 the index was reduced a further 6 points to 67.3 
per cent and, by 2000, a further 3 points to 63.8 per cent. The dissimilarity index 
from the 2010 census had decreased by a further 5 points from its level in 2000 to 
59.1 per cent. By 2010 according to estimates by Vigdor, using levels of black 
dissimilarity with non-blacks (which have been measured over a longer period of 
time than dissimilarity levels of blacks with non-Hispanic whites) levels of 
segregation had, by that measure at least, returned to values last seen in 1910.57 
One factor in this change, which accounts for about a quarter of the total,58 has been 
the inter-regional migration from Northern cities to the South. The “Sunbelt reversal” 
saw large numbers (of both blacks and whites) move for work to Southern states 
whose levels of segregation were lower than average national levels. In these areas 
blacks live in closer proximity to whites. This is largely for historical reasons as the 
movement of blacks to Southern cities, and thus the racial structuring of these cities, 
had taken place with Reconstruction and before the geographical suburban 
dispersion that came with the street car and later the motor car. Blacks and whites 
lived in closer proximity in the South and at least as measured by distance blacks 
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were more integrated into the division of labour. So roughly a quarter of the change 
in national averages came “[b]ecause Southern cities are less segregated” and so 
“the broad population movement from Rust Belt to Sun Belt since the 1960s has 
moved both blacks and whites away from a more segregated region towards a less-
segregated region.”59 
However, more broadly, previous barriers to movement decreased and many blacks 
have been able to take advantage of this. Vigdor sees the most important factor as 
being the introduction of the 1968 Fair Housing Act and the end to legalised 
discrimination in housing – citing the timing of the reversal as key. He argues that 
black suburbanisation developed after the legal changes in 1968 and that this has 
led to a great reduction in the number of all white census tracts; in 1960, 20 percent 
of census tracts had no blacks (the tracts then covering large cities and suburbs) but 
by 2010 only half a per cent of census tracts had no blacks at all (census tracts in 
the 2010 survey extended to all areas nationally).60 Logan, by contrast, sees 
“specific processes of neighborhood change” as being most important in reducing 
barriers to movement. He argues that “[a]ll-white neighborhoods are almost always 
first integrated by the entry of Hispanics and/or Asians, only then admitting blacks in 
substantial numbers”.61 Research by Logan and Zhang of neighborhood composition 
from 1980 to 2010 in the USA’s 20 most multi-ethnic metropolitan regions showed 
that white neighbourhoods attracting Asian and/or Hispanic migrants can 
subsequently attract blacks in numbers without the exodus of whites that would 
generally have occurred previously when blacks moved in to all-white areas. They 
argue that the presence of Asians and/or Hispanics acts as a “social buffer”” for 
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black entrants. The resulting area then becomes what is described as a “global 
neighborhood” – and importantly such neighbourhoods have been seen to be stable 
over time. Notably, by contrast, the entrance of whites to all minority 
neighbourhoods, whatever the composition, is much rarer. Thus some integration is 
facilitated by Asian and Hispanic immigration that increases from the 1980s.62 The 
two main authors in this debate facilitated by a symposium of the American 
Sociological Association, Vigdor and Logan, dispute how much the mechanisms 
each has identified explain the changes that have taken place. Vigdor argues that 
the numbers identified in multi-ethnic neighbourhood transitions amount to only 10 
per cent of the black population.63 Logan argues that the Fair Housing Act of 1968 
was weakly enforced and so “seems unlikely” to explain the changes identified.64 
While both views have merit as partial explanations, the opening up of suburban 
locations to blacks comes with broader changes in whiteness discussed above and 
is not merely a consequence of legal changes or a function of racial buffering in 
itself. 
However, despite the decrease, because of the massive levels of segregation large 
areas where blacks and whites live separate existences remain especially 
concentrated in cities outside the South. Despite their 2012 paper being called “The 
End of the Segregated Century”, Vigdor and Glaeser note that the decline in 
segregation “does not mean that segregation has disappeared: the typical urban 
African-American lives in a housing market where more than half the black 
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population would need to move in order to achieve complete integration”.65 Logan 
argues that the data from the 2010 census are “signs of incomplete and mixed 
progress in reducing racial barriers at the neighborhood level”.37 Notably cities in the 
North East and Mid-West remain highly segregated in what Logan calls the “Ghetto 
Belt”.38 
Additionally the broad figures on reduced segregation do not perhaps tell the whole 
story. There is also a question as to the quality of the main types of suburbs into 
which blacks have moved based on the facilities and amenities found there. Logan 
notes that segregation acts not simply at the level of divided communities but also 
needs to be measured by other factors such as resource availability. On average 
Blacks and Hispanics live in neighbourhoods with fewer resources than those 
available on average to whites. There remain questions of opportunity and 
substantial equality despite the opening up of locations for blacks. Tackling these 
issues is required otherwise despite suburban mobility the pattern may often be one 
of black poverty shifting to new locations. Imbroscio notes that many of the new 
suburban destinations that former poor residents move to are poor and are 
considered “at risk” – Ferguson, Missouri being one recently publicised example of 
one of these locations. He notes the dominant “Liberal Urban Policy” concentrates 
on people living in the wrong place rather than tackling the creation of better places. 
Ironically, he notes, there is an emphasis on dispersal just as there are the 
beginnings of something of an urban renaissance in many central cities.67 Imbroscio 
                                            
65
 Edward Galeser and Jacob Vigdor, “The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in 
America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010”, Civic Report No. 66, Manhattan Institute (January 2012). 
37
 Ibid., 161. 
38
 Logan, “The Persistence… ”, 162. 
67
 David Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy”, Journal of Urban Affairs, 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (2012): 13. 
260 
argues that there is an over emphasis on mobility and, when mobility does not seem 
to resolve problems, the policy response is for more mobility.  
The previous absolute barrier to black relocation in the suburbs was removed from 
the 1970s. Albeit over a forty year time span segregation has decreased significantly 
to levels last seen in 1910 or sixty years before the process started. This did not 
resolve the ghetto belt or all the divisions but 100 per cent all-white suburbs are 
increasingly a dead letter, as too is residential segregation enforced by violence and 
intimidation. While barriers to movement remain, in the cost of property for example, 
the hostility to movement that held sway previously has significantly diminished. This 
was at the same time as legal changes undermining racial discrimination but it 
happened as attitudes on race liberalised with the political changes noted above. 
Changes in segregation were not just the consequences of legal changes but rather 
a result of the greatly reduced need for racial distancing that had been at the heart of 
the whiteness developed in the twentieth century. 
It should be noted that the above discussion does not suggest that the separation of 
blacks and whites no longer exists. There are a whole raft of statistics on wealth, 
education, employment, intermarriage, health etc., that continue to show the division 
between blacks and others. The 59.1 per cent dissimilarity in the 2010 census index 
still means that on average nearly six out of every ten blacks (or alternatively of non-
Hispanic whites) would have to move out of their local area to match the wider 
region’s racial proportions. And, as this is the average, in many locales this number 
is much higher. Blacks all too often lead a separate existence from whites and have 
inferior local resources and opportunities.  
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The point being made here is not that the divisions are overcome. Rather the 
numbers reflect the playing out of the impetus for spatial separation which was a 
product of the incorporation of white ethnics. This political project culminated in the 
1970s and while many material and social divisions around race persist, the previous 
racial impetus is no longer the overarching factor that it was. We now turn to 
examine how factors related to the politics of space have complicated the picture 
and in many ways better describe contemporary politics.  
From Race to Place 
We have attempted to show the falling away of racial outlooks alongside the abolition 
of absolute barriers to black mobility that takes place from the 1970s based on our 
understanding of race. This brings into question the extent to which racial prejudice 
among whites accounts for Republican support especially over time. It also suggests 
the claim that the 2008 election tested these racial outlooks is questionable. We 
move on to consider two points that nonetheless support the perception that racial 
prejudices are indicated in voting patterns. The first is a continued political 
orientation towards a perceived white vote by the major political parties. The second 
is the way in which what might be called a “politics of space”39 has come to replace, 
and often seems confused with, racial outlooks, i.e. the “politics of race”. 
As Frymer argues, in an important work on how the major parties see race, party 
leaders have an orientation towards the perceived white median voter.40 Frymer 
makes the case that there is a fixed view of the electorate being applied. This fixed 
view has it that because of the racial outlook of whites, an orientation towards 
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fulfilling black interests would lose votes. Frymer looks at the way in which the 
political class, not merely Republicans, seems to rule black concerns out of 
consideration in general. Frymer questions default, abstract models of party 
competition that suggest that parties would compete for votes from all groups 
including those of blacks and so adjust policies accordingly. Rather black voters are 
“captured”, in that the party they support can take their vote for granted and the other 
party does not seem to want them. This is because the political calculus for the other 
party is that appealing for black support would lose more votes from whites than 
might be gained from blacks. Frymer notes that the perception of the views of the 
electorate as being racially motivated means that leaders in the main political parties 
are ready to promote what they see as white interests at the expense of blacks. This, 
he notes, does not necessarily reflect the views of white constituents. Frymer argues 
party leaders’ conception of the racial outlook of whites means that they “work 
actively and almost constantly to deny the salience of black interests.”41  
White voter outlook when it comes to race is seen as fixed while the relationship of 
the structure of the political system to the divisions around race goes unseen. In 
effect rather than the two party system providing space for competition for black 
support, Frymer argues that the result is that race has not become a point on the 
liberal/conservative division in politics.42 The two party system as classically 
understood in political theory might result in parties competing for constituencies. 
However, only when there has been the absence of party competition because of the 
overwhelming support for one party – with the Republicans in the 1850s and with the 
Democrats in the 1960s – have party leaders felt able to directly address black 
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concerns. For Frymer, “the two-party system legitimates an agenda reflecting the 
preferences of white voters, and it structures black interests outside party 
competition.”43  
In Frymer’s view there is a political class that fails to lead and falls back, instead, on 
a deterministic view of the electorate. The basis of Frymer’s argument is the fixed 
way in which voters are seen and the perception of racial motivation. This he argues 
is because party leaders have a “Downsian” notion of the voter where a fixed outlook 
on the part of a voter is assumed and the role of the parties is to appeal to that 
outlook. Consequently the parties attempt to match opinion, e.g. by making policy on 
the basis of following polling results, and so fail to assume political leadership.44 The 
widespread conception of white racial views as existing outside of politics, which we 
have noted several times, supports the contention that the political parties have 
followed a perceived racial division in effect giving shape to and extending those 
divisions that do exist. 
However, what seems to be the main confusion with the falling away of racial 
motivations is that it is somewhat obscured and confused by a “politics of space”. 
What complicates the picture is that alongside a politics of race is a politics based on 
location that remains as the old racial outlooks have lost their vigour. The suggestion 
is that economic differences rather than racial separation increasingly lies behind 
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suburban politics. While Tip O’ Neil has long maintained that “all politics is local”45, 
the small self-governing suburban enclaves made that a reality. Already by 1960 the 
USA had 91,186 local governments that, in most places, controlled education, public 
works, social services and zoning regulations.46 With self-contained services and 
self-government in suburbia, suburban politics and the material interests of 
suburbanites often militate against support for taxation and, for example, support for 
policies that might aid the urban poor including many blacks. From this standpoint it 
is difficult to completely disentangle the politics of race from the politics of space. For 
example, one might explain hostility to welfare provision on racial grounds (for 
example the point of view that blacks are lazy and that the money would be wasted) 
or else on the grounds of self-interest (taxation of suburbanites for services for 
others is not in the economic interests of suburban dwellers). 
Indeed, looking at the development of suburbs as discussed in the last chapter, the 
inward looking and exclusive orientation was why suburbs were created and why 
they attempted to establish political independence through being separate 
administrative groupings. In his important work on suburban politics Danielson 
argues that: 
Suburbia is essentially a political phenomenon. Political independence is the 
one thing the increasingly diversified settlements beyond the city limits have in 
common. Local autonomy means that suburban communities seek to control 
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their own destiny largely free from the need to adjust their interests to those of 
other local jurisdictions and residents of the metropolis.47 
Danielson covers in detail the attempts by suburban residents to keep undesirables 
out, to exclude subsidized housing and attempt to limit housing density. This comes, 
for example, in zoning and building codes that make housing expensive and attempt 
to maintain a community of residents that matches the existing demographics. 
Writing in 1976, Danielson argues that while the attempts at exclusion have been 
influenced by racial considerations, overall exclusion is connected to elements of 
status and lifestyle linked with material interests. As Danielson notes, “racial 
motivations are difficult to isolate from other factors which prompt exclusionary 
policies” and “certainly the fact that many middle-class black suburbanites resist 
subsidized housing indicates that racial prejudice is not the only element in the 
exclusion of lower-income blacks from the suburbs”.48 In many suburbs there has 
been an attempt at stopping any developments that might alter the types of residents 
allowed in that local area. Behind these restrictions is the fear that new entrants 
might mean an increase in levels of taxation required for local services.  
However, while ostensibly whites came together in a whole number of identical 
“cookie-cutter” suburban housing projects, especially over time there has been 
economic differentiation. Suburbs have “grown remarkably large and complex in the 
last several decades” with “many suburbs having greater age and racial diversity 
than their core cities”. For example, against the stereotype, more housing units in 
suburbia contain single adults than families.49 Increasingly, there is differentiated 
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suburban experience and new divisions in a fragmented suburban political 
landscape. The decline in residential segregation has come alongside differential 
impacts on suburban locations with many suburbs hit by recession, for example. 
Importantly, the politics of space does not simply replace the politics of race.  
One study to categorise different types of suburbs and map this to political 
orientation is particularly illuminating. The authors look at the top 50 metropolitan 
areas which contain over half of the US population. They classify the 416 census 
counties in these areas using data on “commuting patterns, land use and growth” to 
create an urban/suburban type. This is generally related to the distance from an 
urban core and overall relates to population density. There are five categories. 
“Core” counties have “at least half of the workers commute to (or remain in) the … 
major urban center in the metropolitan area” and have high population density 
(“1,000 housing units per square mile in 2000”). In “inner-suburban” counties again 
half or more of the workers commute to the urban centre and at least 90 per cent live 
in urban areas. Several represent suburbs annexed prior to World War Two and tend 
to immediately ring the urban core. “Mature-suburban” counties have at least 75 per 
cent living in urban areas and population growth above the national average but no 
more than 1.5 times that of the metropolitan area the county is in. In “emerging-
suburban” counties at least 25 per cent live in urban areas and at least 5 per cent 
commute to the major urban centres. These are, in general, growing faster than the 
mature-urban counties. Finally the “exurbs” have less than 25 per cent living in an 
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urban area and under 5 per cent commute to the urban centre. These may be areas 
at the beginning of experiencing large scale suburbanisation.50 
The authors then map the urban/suburban types to the voting record in several 
national elections from 2000 to 2006: the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 
and the House elections of 2002 and 2006. A summary of Democrat votes by 
urban/suburban type is shown in the table below: 
County type 2000 2004 Change 2002 2006 Change 
Core 66.8 68.2 1.4 73.0 74.6 1.6 
Inner suburb 53.3 54.9 1.6 50.8 55.5 4.7 
Mature suburb 57.7 52.7 -5.0 50.1 54.5 4.4 
Emerging suburb 46.4 40.0 -6.4 37.3 43.6 6.3 
Exurb 40.9 38.3 -2.6 32.9 41.8 8.9 
 
Table: Percentage Democrat Vote by County Type. For presidential elections in 
2000 and 2004 and for House elections in 2002 and 2006.51 
What the results table seems to show is that for both the presidential elections and 
the House elections, there is a pattern of votes for the Democrats related to the 
urban/suburban location of the voters roughly corresponding to connection with the 
city and urbanisation. The categorisation of locations reflects the connection to the 
core city, population change and the concentration of population. A stronger 
connection to the core urban centre and higher population density seems to be 
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positively correlated with the Democrat vote. This shows a complex picture of 
suburban voting not generally connected to race and the limits of seeing suburbia as 
a whole as Republican. These factors, as a politics of space, and the perceived 
connection to policy seem to say more about the electorate than perceived racial 
outlooks. In particular, one factor, reflected in the House election votes, is that 
exurbs and emerging suburbs – or the “suburban edge” – can show a fair degree of 
volatility in their connection to party support. While as of writing the authors have not 
produced figures for the 2008 election it seems clear that there are a wide range of 
factors outside of race that apply to these voters who represent a large section of the 
overall electorate. This is not to suggest that demography is destiny, but rather there 
may be important connections between political support and a complex range of 
changing suburban interests. The politics of space brings into question the 
perception of white racism as a central determinant for such voters.  
Several authors have noted the white vote did not go to Obama: Obama lost the 
white vote in 2008. The 2008 election results showed 55 per cent of whites voting for 
McCain (almost 60 per cent of men and 53 per cent of women) and “Obama won the 
white vote in only 19 of 50 states and the District of Columbia”.52 However, where 
issues of social mobility, tax and welfare are seen through a simple prism of white 
racial outlooks irrespective of content this means economic rationales and the 
complex politics of location can be ignored or buried and the politics growing out of 
these changes can go unnoticed.  
Dog Whistle Politics? 
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From our analysis, the idea that coded racial appeals, or “Dog Whistle” politics, has 
become important does not hold water. The idea of playing on underlying racial 
prejudice does not match a polity where racial politics have become much less vital. 
Instead it might be said that the argument that “Dog Whistle” politics lie behind 
Republican politics and various political stances becomes an attempt to dismiss 
political opponents as promoting racial prejudice and condemn the arguments being 
put forward by association. For example the recent book by Lόpez, has it that such 
coded appeals play on all our unconscious fears.53 In this reading rather than looking 
to winning political support for liberal ideas, Lόpez dismisses opposition as a product 
of subliminal brainwashing that taps into latent racism. Calling out racism when 
opponents make the case strongly that they are against racism seems disingenuous. 
Such “you are racist” name-calling seems to limit understanding and the possibility of 
dialogue. Our reading of race historically suggests a different reading of the racial 
stakes at play in the 2008 election. From our perspective there are clear grounds to 
question the claim of changes in political support based on racial prejudice.  
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Chapter 8: Identity Politics 
This chapter uses the concept of identity politics to attempt to explain the centrality of 
Obama’s racial identity to considerations of the meaning of the election. There are a 
variety of sources used in this chapter. On the theory of identity politics, Bell’s early 
theoretical analysis of affirmative action remains pertinent.1 This is shown using the 
recent substantial discussion on the subject by Fraser and Honneth.2 The main 
source for understanding why and how President Nixon’s instigated affirmative 
action is Yuill3 who is used to explain the way that Nixon dealt with race through 
bureaucratic means and the connection this had to the political difficulties of 
liberalism. Yuill’s analysis also usefully avoids getting caught up in the 
Democrat/Republican politics of the Nixon’s use of affirmative action. Lasch-Quinn is 
used in discussing the therapeutic form of the contemporary response to race. 
Although the approach used by Lasch-Quinn is in fitting with the points the thesis 
wants to make, the shifting forms of therapeutic intervention would suggest that there 
needs to be some updating of the work.4 Skrentny remains the key author on 
affirmative action and the work on racial realism shows he remains sensitive to 
changes in the management of race. In discussing Clinton, Kim’s work provided a 
clear analysis of the duplicity involved that was readily incorporated into the thesis.5  
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Obama’s racial identity was at the centre of the 2008 election. The main responses 
to problems of race in the election were framed through and seemingly fixated on 
racial representation. It seemed that race as discussed did not raise issues of 
equality for blacks per se, but rather centred on the candidate’s racial background 
and the presentation and reception of that background. That the candidate was black 
has been taken as an important motivation for his supporters and the enthusiasm 
shown in the election. As noted in the previous chapter that many non-black voters 
would support a black candidate might show that racially prejudiced outlooks no 
longer predominated. In addition the way in which Obama’s campaign consciously 
minimised references to his racial background was considered by many as an 
expression of a political approach that moved past race, an aspect of a “post-racial” 
politics – although, of course, his best-selling autobiography and the commentary on 
his racial background may have made up for some of these omissions. And much 
was made of the extent to which, or even whether, Obama should be considered as 
being black.  
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream was famously that a man would be judged not by 
the colour of his skin, but by the content of his character. In the 2008 election this 
clearly was not the case. Obama’s skin colour was part of how he was judged and 
how the election was judged through the reaction to his blackness. Even where 
notably skin colour went unmentioned this was considered important for not being 
made note of by the election’s competitors. At least in part it was not mentioned 
because of how sensitive matters of race were. But as Obama said of his racial 
background, the electorate had “probably noticed”.  
Demands for equality or for measures aimed at equality which in the past were 
raised by activists such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Martin Luther King, Jr. were, in 
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2008, noticeable by their absence. In contrast to the discussion of representation 
there was little in the way of a discussion of a programmatic response to the 
problems of racial inequality. It is by no means straightforward that the appropriate 
response to the material and other disadvantages faced by blacks was one of 
changed racial representation in the shape of (the body of) a black candidate. Given 
the relative disadvantages in wealth, employment and many other areas of life that 
the black population faces, it is unclear how the colour of the president’s skin might 
be considered to substantially address the racial divide. Rather, policy responses 
aimed at disadvantages in housing, employment and in the criminal justice system 
would seem more appropriate. This might, for example, include measures to 
encourage investment in the cities. The reaction to the difficulties of white European 
immigrants in the twentieth century came not in the shape of a president from a 
euro-ethnic background, but rather as a series of measures such as the GI Bill, 
infrastructure programmes, and federal support on housing. In the 2008 election 
Obama was at pains to make it clear that his programme included no specific policy 
responses aimed at the difficulties blacks face or at racial inequality. 
This chapter attempts to explain the focus on Obama’s race and on representation 
through the idea of “identity politics”. The term is, itself, controversial. Gosse, for 
example, argues that “identity politics” has “turned into a meaningless pejorative” 
and is better described as “democratic politics”. His argument is that identity politics 
describes, albeit in a way that is meant to disparage, a flowering of political 
involvement by disadvantaged groups. In his view: 
the coming forward of new political communities claiming their own social, 
cultural and political identities constitutes the birth of a new democratic order, 
273 
which in the early twenty-first century is reaching maturity after a generation 
defending the fragile egalitarianism catalysed by the New Left of 1955-756  
However, the contention of this chapter is that describing politics organised around 
identity as being democracy at work is inadequate. Identity politics deals with people 
not simply as members of the polity or of the demos – as individuals – but rather as 
persons of a particular identity (as black, as women, etc.). This is not simply 
democracy extended, but amounts to a qualitative change. Furthermore, in many 
ways identity politics marks a retreat from democratic politics – a point which is 
discussed later in the chapter. 
The concentration on matters of representation and recognition can be understood 
as arising out of the political difficulties of the 1960s and has expanded in scope from 
that period. In an attempt at ameliorating or diffusing problems, racial differences and 
racial groupings have been taken into account in political, legal, and institutional 
settings both by the state and the private sector and have become central for many 
political campaigners. This is a departure from previous attempts at dealing with race 
which in contrast attempted to bring equality by ensuring that differences such as 
racial identity played no part in how people were judged and treated, especially by 
institutions. The attempt to deal with, or perhaps manage, race divorced from a 
substantial programme to tackle material and social divisions expressly takes race 
into account. The regnant view of racism as in large part a psychological 
phenomenon has prompted interventions that attempt to deal with whiteness as an 
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identity and the problematic racial attitudes associated with it.7 Consequently, 
identity politics brings with it new forms of consciousness of and about race. To 
some extent it can be said to have renewed racial thinking in novel ways. As we will 
argue an important part of the meaning ascribed to Obama, as black presidential 
candidate, rests on the approach that matters of identity, representation and even 
recognition are what is at issue in racial politics today in contrast to approaches that 
might attempt to overcome and abolish racial difference and distinctions.  
The Strange Origins of Identity Politics 
Most commonly identity politics is understood as coming from the left. It has become 
associated with the Democrats and often painted as an aspect of liberatory politics. 
However, it is with Nixon in the late 1960s onwards that the taking into account of 
group differences is established. The connection between identity politics and Nixon 
is not introduced here as an attempt to establish guilt by association with a 
controversial right-wing president. Rather, it helps to bring out how the concentration 
on identity happens as a means of dealing with problems when old ideas of 
overcoming inequality do not seem plausible. In this period its connection with 
managing in what Yuill calls “an era of limits”8 can be brought out as opposed to the 
often assumed connection with liberation. In dealing with the collapse of the liberal 
project, a key strategy adopted by Nixon was to attempt to reorient politics as a 
mechanism to address group grievances. This, for example, made recognition of 
racial background part of federal policy. With Nixon came the first large-scale 
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programme of affirmative action and the framework and model for subsequent 
affirmative action programmes. 
The difficulties of liberal politics in the 1960s went well beyond the racial outlook of 
whites and a racial backlash to civil rights. In the space of a few short years there 
seemed to be the collapse of a political approach. At the start of the 1960s there was 
the search for problems to resolve, but by the decade’s end there seemed instead a 
series of intractable difficulties. In the early 1960s, JFK was casting around for 
domestic issues left to address. He asked Walter Heller, the Chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors: “I want to go beyond the things that have already been 
accomplished. Give me facts and figures on the things we still have to do. For 
example what about the poverty problem in the United States?”9 However, by the 
close of the decade the liberal agenda seemed exhausted. While the Civil Rights 
movement had pushed Jim Crow segregation to collapse in the South, the situation 
in the Northern cities seemed bleak and explosive, with widespread rioting a feature 
of the political calendar. Meanwhile the economy had slowed, Vietnam was a 
quagmire and youthful revolt eschewed the accommodations of liberal politicians and 
brought into question the moral compass and culpability of previous generations. 
Coming to power at the end of this tumultuous decade we can see that the problems 
that Nixon was addressing were not limited to building a base around racial 
prejudice, but rather more generally attempting to salvage something from the 
wreckage of the liberal collapse. As Matusow notes the Republicans had been 
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elected in 1968 “not to repeal social programs but to make them work”.10 As Yuill has 
it: “Nixon might fairly be viewed as the reluctant saviour of the postwar liberal 
order.”11 For example, this meant that Nixon, through the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), in three years built housing for 1.3 million lower income 
families which was “more than all previous administrations combined”.12 However, 
the problems Nixon faced could not simply be addressed by federal intervention. 
Attempts at tackling problems more broadly had been tried in the War on Poverty 
and failed partly because the measures did not match up to the problems and partly 
because of a lack of institutional backing such that they were often captured by 
existing political players.13 Further there seemed little possibility of rebalancing the 
effect of the decades where the most dynamic growth occurred around suburban 
locations. More broadly there was an ebbing away of support for liberal policies. 
Perhaps the feature of the period that best demonstrated the difficulties there were 
was that from the sons and daughters of the establishment, a New Left emerged on 
university campuses that rejected the approach of the political class on race, war, 
women’s rights and morality more generally. Kazin argues “the populism of what its 
adherents called, simply, the Movement was unique. Never before in the United 
States had a radical upsurge that sought to win power for the common folk sprung 
from within the dominant order itself.”14 One might question their connection to “the 
common folk” and Kazin’s inclusion of the New Left as part of the history of populist 
politics. However, that these rebels came out of the liberal order and its limitations 
was clear. Kazin cites a psychologist writing in 1968 who surveyed the New Left as 
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noting that their rebellion came with “no fundamental change in core values”.15 In 
taking up these liberal values the New Left was not simply motivated by an alienation 
from what were seen as unprincipled politicians but also from much of the white 
public. The alienation was such that a “counter culture” developed and the New Left 
looked to black militant politicking for a lead in its contrast to the comfort and 
bourgeois respectability of whites.16 Here the politics of identity as, for example, 
represented by Black Power seemed more possible than a politics of equality that 
would engage with whites more generally and reflected alienation from the 
“mainstream”, that is the “white” core of American identity. 
Initially Nixon’s approach to race was influenced by Johnson’s previous initiatives 
and by attempting to do something to quell the rioting in the ghettos of many 
Northern cities, to bring some sense of order. One measure taken was the 
Philadelphia Plan – based on a Johnson administration plan that was never 
implemented.17 This is considered to be the first major affirmative action programme. 
It was aimed at the inner-cities and at employment in construction and was followed 
by numerous “hometown” plans along the same lines in many American cities. 
However, this plan and its spin-offs were not particularly successful. They came with 
weak enforcement and were met with obstruction by the unions – one aspect of such 
plans that appealed to Nixon was undoubtedly that they potentially set two groups in 
the Democrat coalition, blacks and unions, against one another. The hammer blow to 
the approach was that just as it was implemented there was a marked slowdown in 
the construction industry.  
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It was subsequent to this, however, that Nixon’s main contribution to affirmative 
action took place and where Nixon essentially setup the framework through which 
subsequent programmes acted. By 1970 the rioting in the cities had subsided. With 
this quieting, Nixon’s approach shifted from attempts to do something about the 
ghetto to measures that might help develop the black middle class – as Nixon put it a 
shift from helping the “weak” to helping the “strong”.18 This was in part done because 
it was expected to be more successful and so would prevent attacks on the 
administration’s civil rights record. There were a number of measures that came 
together to form affirmative action. In Spring 1969, Executive Order 11246 – signed 
by Johnson for anti-discrimination measures in procurement in the shape of non-
discriminatory practices in hiring and employment for suppliers – was expanded to 
be understood as being for all those taking federal aid, loans or grants.19 In 
November 1969, Executive Order 11478 was put in place for federal managers – 
who previously worked on a strict merit system – to institute plans to combat 
discrimination through affirmative action hiring. This led to a large increase in 
minority hires among federal employees.20 Also, in 1969 money was earmarked for 
the Office of Minority Business Enterprise operating under the Small Business Act to 
give loans to minority owned enterprises. It started slowly but expanded rapidly: in 
1975 the agency gave out $651 million in loans.21 In October 1972 ostensibly to 
decentralise federal spending and reinvigorate local democracy Nixon put forward 
what he called a “New Federalism”. This was a system of block grants to the states, 
described as “revenue sharing”. It replaced monies which had previously been 
dispersed through federal agencies directly to various groups as part of the War on 
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Poverty. The block grants came with a newly centralised set of “nondiscrimination” 
clauses and auditing on minority employment. The consequence was to greatly 
expand the effect of EO 11246.22 This, says Yuill, partly because of the diffuse 
criteria on anti-discrimination, created a “self-interested affirmative action industry of 
experts and interpreters who in turn propagated affirmative action”.23  
Nixon had largely avoided legislative change, working instead through executive 
authority. He had also removed the onus on the federal authorities to be held to 
account for previously identified problems such as poverty or civil rights. This meant 
that what had been public issues were delegated and civil rights issues became the 
subject of negotiations on targets at the state level between officials. As Yuill notes 
the effect of auditing for equal opportunity requirements undercut civil rights activism 
and marked a shift from public campaigning to bureaucratic enforcement: 
New Federalism … removed civil rights issues from the public forum by setting 
them up as non-negotiable, formalized requirements attached to federal 
monies. In doing so it effectively froze the movement for civil rights reforms. 
Percentages would be negotiated away from the public eye and enforced 
quietly.24  
Nixon had pragmatic reasons to attempt to take the edge off black unrest and to be 
able to defend his record on civil rights. By adjusting federal hiring policies and 
attaching equal opportunity targets to federal monies he could ameliorate black 
anger at least by providing opportunities for middle class blacks. However, this was 
something quite different from a political response that campaigned for equality. 
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Rather these were bureaucratic measures which could be put in place without the 
need to win popular support.  
It should be noted that Nixon was not entirely cutting against the grain in promoting 
black identity. Nixon at times explicitly looked to a distinct black cultural awareness 
and identity as support and as a connection. In a well-known appeal for black 
support he said: 
What most of the militants are asking for is not separation, but to be included in 
– not as supplicants, but as owners, as entrepreneurs – to have a share of the 
wealth and a piece of the action. And this is precisely what the Federal central 
target of the new approach ought to be. It ought to be oriented toward more 
black ownership, for from this can flow the rest – black pride, black jobs, black 
opportunity and yes, black power…25  
Many commentators have taken this speech and associated approaches as an 
attempt to defuse political radicalism by channelling energies through black 
capitalism. This is no doubt true. But as Manning Marable, the eminent historian of 
civil rights, notes, there was already a “fundamentally pro-capitalist thrust of many 
Black Powerites.”26 Black Power “was not a coherent ideology”27 Rather it was the 
product of a confused time when “the black community stood as a conglomeration of 
often contradictory interests and directions, dubiously tied together by a common 
mood which combined centuries of anger with new hope, increasing desperation with 
new confidence.”28 Black Power stands in a tradition of the black community looking 
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to its own cultural and material resources in the face of the lack of opportunity – and 
lack of integration. Nixon’s interests dovetailed with that approach and he looked to 
harness these aspirations. 
In addition to developing the framework for affirmative action, it could also be argued 
that Nixon set the parameters for the right’s response to affirmative action through 
developing the idea of the “silent majority”. In grappling with the problems of liberal 
collapse Nixon was facing what Yuill calls, citing Habermas, a “crisis of legitimacy”. 
Here the politics that rested behind political leadership and state policy seemed 
exhausted. This was a problem for Nixon not just in establishing a base of support 
for future electoral success, but also in attempting to get whatever support he could 
for government authority. On 3 November 1969 in a televised address on Vietnam, 
Nixon called on the silent majority, as against the minority engaged in protests, to 
support his strategy for the “best way to end [the war].”29 The speech had an 
enormous resonance; letters flooded into the White House in support. However, that 
Nixon spoke of the silent majority reflected that this group had little in the way of a 
programme or active connection to existing political approaches. There was 
something fundamentally defensive about painting people in this way which reflected 
an inability to project values and provide leadership that inspired. As Yuill notes, this 
speech “made a virtue out of inaction, passivity, and disengagement, qualities that 
had been condemned as vices in prior decades.”30 Their existence did not signal 
active support but rather unease and frustration at developments. This was Nixon 
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innovating into existence, inventing, a constituency.31 Nixon’s response to the crisis 
of legitimacy could be seen, as Yuill argues, as an attempt to redefine the problem of 
economic slowdown and the inability to resolve the major problems the nation faced. 
Here political leadership might be replaced with a set of complaints, and here a new 
set of complainants and grievances, that could, perhaps, be addressed one by one 
and so made more manageable. Thus, Nixon was attempting to put in place a new 
set of relationships not just with blacks but also with citizens more generally.  
A “New Principle of Rights” 
Skrentny, perhaps the key writer on affirmative action, says that what compelled his 
interest in the subject was a point made by Daniel Bell in his 1973 book The Coming 
Post Industrial Society.32 Looking at affirmative action, Bell notes that “what is 
extraordinary about this change [to affirmative action] is that, without public debate 
an entirely new principle of rights has been introduced into the polity.”33 This was 
fascinating for Skrentny as, “It was an apparently anomalous policy victory for a 
group usually assumed to be far from the center of power. How did it happen? It 
seemed a fantastic sociological puzzle.”34  
Skrentny’s puzzle is partly solved in that the apparent policy victory is at best 
ambiguous. While there are material gains for some blacks, this is in the context of 
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managing race relations as an accommodation with racial divisions. As Bell argues 
there is a retreat from attempting to overcome discrimination and bring blacks fully 
into the American mainstream. There was an abandoning of an approach based on 
equality and substituted in its place the goal of representation and recognition, such 
that:  
the principle has changed from discrimination to representation. Women, 
blacks, and Chicanos are to be employed, as a matter of right, in proportion to 
their number, and the principle of professional qualification or individual 
achievement is subordinated to the new ascriptive principle of corporate 
identity.35 
The attempt to gain support for policies aimed at equality was bypassed. Legal 
mechanisms substituted for politics through the subversion of legal norms of 
equality. Identity politics and group differences became incorporated into the legal 
system and into the approach of the federal state.  
The approach of basing policy on group membership was a turnaround from 
previous attempts at tackling inequality and ran counter to the ideas behind those 
attempts. Bell’s views on this are worth quoting at length. Bell argues: 
The historic irony in the demand for representation on the basis of an ascriptive 
principle is its complete reversal of radical and humanist values. The liberal and 
radical attack on discrimination was based on its denial of a justly earned place 
to a person on the basis of an unjust group attribute. That person was not 
judged as an individual, but was judged—and excluded—because he was a 
member of a particular group. But now it is being demanded that one must 
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have a place primarily because one possesses a particular group attribute. The 
person himself has disappeared. Only attributes remain. The further irony is 
that according to the radical critique of contemporary society, an individual is 
treated not as a person but as a multiple of roles that divide and fragment him 
and reduce him to a single dominant attribute of the major role or function he or 
she plays in society. Yet in the reversal of principle we now find that a person is 
to be given preference by virtue of a role, his group membership, and the 
person is once again “reduced” to a single overriding attribute as the 
prerequisite for a place in the society.36  
The taking into account of group membership and status when dealing with 
individuals is no small matter. The idea of “equality before the law” or that “justice is 
blind” are not trifling precepts. Changing these relationships might in some ways be 
considered a philosophical matter, but it speaks to an altered, and in some ways 
diminished, relationship of the individual and of the political class to politics, to the 
state and to the social world.  
The introduction of politics based around racial groups albeit ostensibly with the aim 
of redressing historic injustice signalled a very different kind of politics from that 
associated with the Civil Rights movement. In this changed politics there are shifts in 
focus, sensitivities and understanding from individual to groups, from rights to 
representation, from public to private attributes, from political remedies to legal ones, 
from culture as incidental to being central, and from gaining democratic support to 
enacting bureaucratic measures. Individuals were to be considered at least partly on 
the basis of their pre-established, given group membership. Rather than political 
campaigning around racial equality, private litigation removed much of the need to 
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attempt to build political coalitions with others. Bureaucratic manoeuvring for 
resources could often become a stand-in for a democratic orientation that relied on 
getting support from others to effect change.  
The separation of powers in the USA, especially, allowed for an approach that 
bypassed the need to win popular support. In the US context, responsibility for 
controversial policy on race could be shifted away from representative bodies. Thus 
measures were taken through executive action and made subject to bureaucratic 
enforcement. Additionally much of civil rights legislation rested on private litigation 
and depended on judicial support. Fukuyama, in a broad critique of US governance, 
calls this the “judicialization of government” where the form of enforcement of civil 
rights was by an “explosion of opportunities for litigation [which] gave access and 
therefore power to many formerly excluded groups, beginning with African 
Americans.” 37 Often civil rights measures were done under the aegis of an activist 
judiciary rather than stemming from political leadership. The political parties could 
delegate controversial questions of civil rights to the courts as a way of distancing 
themselves from responsibility. There was no sense of campaigning for the support 
of whites for measures that might aid equality. To take one example, in 2003 a judge 
declared that affirmative action measures would remain in place for the next 25 
years. After 35 years of affirmative action the judge decreed that in a matter of 
another generation there would have been racial redress. This demonstrates how 
matters of civil rights in what should be political decisions had been farmed out to the 
judiciary.38 The argument for race conscious policy, it can be argued, has 
undermined those who believe in equality and undermined the idea of gaining broad 
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support for a politics that seeks to overcome racial divisions. Over time affirmative 
action has become something of an article of faith on the left and in liberal US 
circles.  
In passing we should note that the idea of recognition used in identity politics sets it 
against the normative principles of recognition found previously and which have 
been a feature of modern capitalist societies. Here we need to distinguish the idea of 
recognition found classically which relates to the individual and that based on group 
characteristics. As Axel Honneth argues in the debate with Nancy Fraser on the 
question of “Redistribution or Recognition?”, contemporary societies have it that it is 
“right” to give recognition to individuals through the three principles of: love (i.e. 
relationships such as the family); legal equality; and merit or esteem based on one’s 
part in co-operative labour. Honneth has it that even struggles for wealth or 
redistribution are, at base, about recognition. This is because any sense of injustice 
relates to the lack of recognition for one’s labour or one’s worth as a human being 
based on the contribution to society as one understands it. Honneth’s argument may 
perhaps collapse distinctions between economics and politics to which different rules 
apply. Nonetheless, his point that reactions to economic situations vary greatly with 
political and cultural outlooks has merit. (A sensitivity that he argues is part of a 
“properly ‘differentiated’ account of recognition.”)39 However, notably Honneth rejects 
the argument that there is a basis for a new principle of recognition based on group 
attributes. He argues that “the majority of identity-political demands can be 
meaningfully grasped only as expressions of an expanded struggle for legal 
                                            
39
 Nancy Fraser, “Distorted Beyond All Recognition: A Rejoinder to Axel Honneth” in Nancy Fraser 
and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 
2003),199 
287 
recognition”40 linked as it is in his view to the idea of legal equality. Honneth argues 
that where claims for recognition are based on ascribed group identities that these 
just do not make sense. However, Honneth misses – or at least turns a blind eye 
towards – how, outside his categories, there has been a decline in demands for 
equality and rather claims made based on novel criteria based on the rejection of the 
legal equality of individuals based on group characteristics. Ultimately in this new 
recognition there is an undermining of subject formation, with individuals limited to 
such group characteristics, and a diminished interaction with others based on the 
fixed character of identities and the difficulties in communication supposedly 
between different groups. The particular group identities lined up for recognition are 
set up in contradistinction to possible universal communication or outlooks. 
Initially, opposition to affirmative action came from several sources. Deslippe notes 
that it was labour unions and “colorblind” liberals, not “colorblind” conservatives, 
which led early opposition to affirmative action. These groups filed lawsuits, lobbied 
and campaigned to limit affirmative action. He argues that such groups cannot be 
dismissed as defending white privilege as they had a number of motivations to 
oppose “reverse discrimination” including the desire for wider changes that might 
bring equality.41 Deslippe makes the case that the decline of such groups was 
because they were unable to “gain a foothold in a Democratic Party” as the 
Democrats moved away from “ambitious legislative spirit characteristic of the New 
Deal and Great Society years”42 
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Over time as opposition to affirmative action from the left and from liberals fell away, 
the clearest opposition came from the right. Nixon had set the blueprint for a white 
constituency seen to be victimized by change. It was a short step to setup affirmative 
action as a slight to such whites. The reaction from the right was not because 
primarily it undermined the individualism of the Constitution or undermined ideas of 
equality or equal opportunity. Rather the predominant reaction from the right to 
programmes such as affirmative action was cultural. As Skrentny puts it:  
The Right’s resistance … is rooted not in a plain belief in equal opportunity over 
equal rights nor in a more sound Constitutional ground, but in the peculiar 
cultural logic of an American moral model.43  
In other words affirmative action has been opposed on the right largely because it 
runs counter to the idea that hard work should be the measure of success, a cultural 
norm, rather than because it was at odds with individual liberty. The opposition was 
based not on the general idea of unfairness, though elements of this argument 
appear, but on the perceived weakening of the link between work and rewards. As 
Deslippe argues this view “emphasized market forces and meritocracy”44 and 
“refused to accept the proposition that underlying structures of inequality had 
persisted in a significant way after the demise of Jim Crow”45 The reaction to 
affirmative action took the form not of a demand for equality but of the argument that 
whites were victimised by affirmative action measures. Here such “hard-working” 
families were identified as a constituency in the mould of Nixon’s silent majority. 
Thus, the normative cultural associations of hard work rather than universal 
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approaches such as equality were brought to the fore. It thus became a sectional 
complaint rather than support for a universal question of principle. 
Clinton Figuring as the First Black President 
To give a sense of how powerful a representational politics around identity became 
the chequered history of Bill Clinton on race is instructive. Clinton’s campaigning and 
subsequent presidency provides something of a case study on the workings of 
identity politics. Clinton both engaged in racial signalling on black crime and enacted 
legislation which seemed against black interests. Clinton made a series of what 
would be described as racial appeals, put through legislation hostile to those on 
welfare many of who were black urban residents, and instituted a law and order 
crackdown which contributed to, and the legacy of which has been, the mass 
incarceration of young black males. However, despite this record through largely 
symbolic measures that linked with and impacted on the recognition and 
representation of blacks, he was, by the end of his second term, able to present 
himself in such a way that he gained enormous popularity among blacks and was 
considered, by Toni Morrison for example, as “the first black president”.  
Kim charts the way in which Clinton attempted to maximise his appeal to blacks and 
whites and how it changed over time. She notes that Clinton had:  
first, an initial electoral strategy of courting white support, in part through the 
symbolic rejection of blacks; and second, an adjusted governing/reelection 
strategy of pleasing whites with substantive action on racial policy issues and 
placating blacks with largely symbolic gestures of support.46  
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In his first presidential campaign Clinton was keen to avoid the way in which 
Dukakis’ campaign had been undermined by race in 1988. An infamous election ad 
which used the image of a black convict, Willie Horton, who committed crimes while 
on a weekend furlough pass from jail, was used to link Dukakis to the image of black 
criminality. This painted Dukakis as weak on law and order and was seen to cause 
significant problems for his campaign. Subsequently, on race Clinton was “in certain 
respects to the right of Bush on racial policy throughout his campaign.”47 The 
Clinton/Gore manifesto was the first Democrat manifesto for 30 years not to raise the 
issue of black inequality – although it did find space to denounce “racial quotas”. 
Additionally in January 1992 Clinton took time out from a busy campaign to sign the 
death warrant of Rickey Ray Rector a mentally impaired black man convicted of 
killing a police officer several years earlier. In March he had his picture taken with 
Senator Sam Nunn in Georgia in front of a group of mostly black convicts. In April 
1992 with the Los Angeles riots, Clinton’s response highlighted the failings of the 
“urban underclass” while taking the opportunity to denounce the relatively unknown 
rapper Sister Souljah for her anti-white comments. 
In addition to racial signalling, Clinton put through legislation that had particularly 
onerous effects on blacks. Once in office Clinton enacted measures cutting back on 
welfare and cracking down on crime. The 1994 crime bill in particular led to 
increasing incarceration of blacks by mandatory sentences and “three strikes” rules. 
The legislation which Clinton supported turned the decimation surrounding the use of 
crack cocaine visited on the inner cities into longer term damage inflicted on 
communities whose young men were removed with Draconian sentencing laws. 
Additionally, the 1996 welfare bill put strict limits on welfare and delegated provision 
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to the states. This included, for example, a lifetime maximum of five years welfare 
provision. 
Nonetheless, throughout the Clinton presidency work was done to shore up black 
turnout through a series of symbolic measures. The need to do something to get out 
the black vote would have been a lesson learnt from the Dukakis campaign: the 
reward for ignoring blacks almost completely for Dukakis was a black turnout of just 
44 per cent in the general election.48 The symbolic measures included taking a stand 
on the arson of Southern black churches in 1996 and in appointing a record number 
of blacks to positions in the administration. And in 1995 Clinton backed affirmative 
action though stressing the need to reform it. Like many of Clinton’s initiatives, this 
can be understood as being led by polling: a poll in 1995 showed this approach 
matched 61 per cent of public opinion.49 In his second term Clinton made further 
moves to shore up black support through largely symbolic gestures. This included in 
1997 apologising for the Tuskegee experiment and visiting several African nations in 
1998 where in Uganda he apologised for slavery.50 Most importantly, in 1997 he 
announced a commission on race: “One America in the 21st Century”. The 
commission was heavily stage-managed by the administration with even potential 
findings closely polled for public reaction. The final report was researched and 
written by White House staff. It focused on historic injustices, was mute on 
unemployment and housing, and featured an anodyne call for the need for 
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dialogue.51 Nonetheless Clinton’s approval on race shot up and an autumn 1998 
CNN poll showed a 90 per cent approval rate among blacks.52  
Clinton’s symbolic recognition of blacks proved overwhelmingly successful and 
consequently black public opinion and various black luminaries provided a bulwark of 
support during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Jessie Jackson, for example, visited 
the White House “to offer spiritual counselling and moral support”.53 One black 
university professor even drew parallels between the move to impeachment and the 
atmosphere that created the mass lynchings of blacks that took place in the Red 
Summer of 1919.54 Perhaps not all black support can be attributed to what Marable 
calls “Clinton’s platitudes favouring racial advancement”, as the economic expansion 
from 1995-2000 had helped the black middle class and blacks working in 
manufacturing.55 However, such was the strength of the appeal of racial recognition 
that as the Lewinsky scandal developed author Ismael Reed could describe Clinton 
as a “white soul brother” and Nobel prize-winner, Toni Morrison, could state of 
Clinton that “white skin notwithstanding, this is our first Black president.”56 
Clinton’s shadowing of public opinion abrogated leadership. It seemed more often 
than not the “Third Way” was little more than a triangulation between Democrat and 
Republican positions informed by close polling. Clinton’s cynical approach was 
based on an accommodation to presumed white racial support and the acceptance 
of and pandering to racial fears. Yet by skilfully manipulating the symbolic appeals to 
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blacks he could be known as “the first black president”. This perhaps spoke to the 
desperation of blacks and was in part influenced by the effects of economic growth, 
but it also showed the how powerful the politics of identity had become.  
The Development of Racial Management  
The idea of the need to manage race did not just develop at the presidential level. A 
feature of the 1960s was that the personal became political.57 Lasch-Quinn argues 
that one consequence was that a tranche of “race experts moved in to fill a void 
created by the collapse of the civil rights coalition and the loss of the clarity of the 
early movement”.58 Rather than look to politics, these “social engineers” in the “Me 
Decade” saw race as the “entrenched bigotry” of America and attempted 
psychological interventions orientated to manage inter-personal interactions. The 
idea was that a new racial etiquette was required for the interactions between racial 
groups. The entrepreneurs developed forms of racial etiquette which Lasch-Quinn 
argues helped nurture a hypersensitivity on matters of race in inter-personal 
interactions. For example the idea that blacks are hyper-sensitive to potential racial 
slurs sets a formulaic response that undermines real communication between those 
of different races. 
This therapeutic orientation towards social problems was “a new lens through which 
Americans increasingly came to see racial matters.” According to Lasch-Quinn: 
Convinced of the entrenched bigotry of middle America and of their role in its 
exposure and enlightenment, experts carved out niches for themselves in 
established fields, like teaching, social work, and psychiatry, and created 
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altogether new professional roles, such as those of interracial etiquette advisers 
and diversity trainers. Those who aimed their attention at whites sought to 
combat racism, as manifested in stereotypes and incorrect behaviour. Those 
who aimed their attention at blacks sought to combat so-called internalized 
oppression by rooting out the benighted mental habits of racial inferiority as 
manifested in low self-esteem and identification with mainstream, ‘white’ 
norms.59  
While the various schools of psychology might be seen as fads that ebbed and 
flowed over time the overall impact was important. In the private sector and in 
education the therapeutic approach has become particularly influential. This led to a 
situation where diversity training, argues Lasch-Quinn writing in 2001, “has quietly 
become the “the most important movement related to race in the 1990s.”60 By the 
mid-1990s identity politics had become a divisive force. Gitlin’s broadside against 
identity politics identified how cultural issues had become a battleground for groups 
attempting recognition especially in education.61  
One key way in which the use of identity has evolved in recent years is a move away 
from its original justification. Identity politics has in the past been justified as a means 
to promote equality. In part as a response to criticisms of affirmative action, in an 
institutional context at least, this is now much less the case. In a comprehensive 
survey of the post-Civil Rights picture and how race is dealt with, Skrentny argues 
that there has been a new approach added to how race is managed and viewed: 
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racial realism. According to Skrentny racial realism “joins but does not supplant, 
classical liberalism and affirmative-action liberalism” as a de facto form of racial 
management. The racial realist approach is widespread but has not been fully 
digested and consequently is “outside our normal thinking about race and work”.62 
Skrentny describes the three strategies used for dealing with race in the post-civil 
rights era by how useful they see race is as a concept and by their relationship to 
justice. In the first strategy, “classical liberalism”, race is seen as neither significant 
nor useful. In this view race is discounted and organisations should be “colour blind” 
in the interests of justice. With the “affirmative-action liberalism” approach, race is to 
be considered as significant in the interests of justice. Outside of being a strategy to 
increase fairness by addressing injustices race is considered to have no utility. 
However, in the third increasingly used strategy, “racial realism”, racial difference is 
seen as something that should be taken into account in its utility for businesses and 
other organisations. Racial realism differs from the other two strategies in that its 
goal is not justice. Rather it aims at improved organisational effectiveness. This 
effectiveness is seen to work in two ways. Through “racial abilities”, racial realism is 
said to describe the effectiveness of taking racial background into consideration 
when hiring. This is said to help in dealing with same race clients or markets and 
also in bringing in novel perspectives, insights and attitudes, even to the extent of 
particular working habits, to an organisation. The second way that racial realism is 
said to improve organisational effectiveness is through “racial signalling”. A racial 
realist approach has it that racial diversity can be used to signal both that an 
organisation cares and is “modern”.63  
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There are several reasons for the adoption of this new approach. Skrentny sees 
some of this new approach as coming from the economic imperative for cheap 
labour and the drive to exploit the immigrant workforce that came with the opening 
up of immigration from the mid-1960s i.e. to “find the best worker for the cheapest 
price”. However, when it comes to the highly skilled and professional workforce he 
sees racial realism as in large part a reaction to Reagan’s attempts to limit 
affirmative action laws. With Reagan came a “relaxing of the enforcement of Title VII 
and affirmative-action regulations”. Consequently,  
personnel and human resources professionals in large companies – many of 
whom worked in ‘equal employment opportunity’ (EEO) offices created to 
coordinate legal compliance – developed a rationale for their role that no longer 
hinged on federal enforcement efforts. By the late 1980s, along with 
consultants and academics, they developed the theory of ‘diversity 
management,’ which held that racial, gender, and other forms of diversity could 
be a net positive for an organization if correctly managed.64 
In other words a racial realist approach in professional employment has become the 
way in which racial management is justified often in the face of criticisms of the 
fairness of affirmative action practices and in some cases legal challenges. Notably, 
argues Skrentny, despite attempts to find support through academic research there 
is little evidence that racial realist strategies do affect productivity. Skrentny’s point is 
reinforced by Lynch who notes that despite its use, especially by major corporations, 
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diversity management is not considered a crucial business issue – and suggests, 
perhaps, that racial signalling is the most important factor at issue.65  
Skrentny notes that there is little formally in law to support many of the practices 
associated with racial realism. Indeed many of the practices associated with racial 
realism – for example targeting particular immigrant groups – may be illegal and 
simply amount to discriminatory hiring practices. Importantly neither the Democrats 
nor the Republicans have “offered policy leadership on the issue [of racial diversity] 
in effect ceding the whole issue to the courts”.66 And where right-wing legal activists 
have challenged the use of racial criteria in hiring, they have concentrated on the 
legal questioning of affirmative action which has been partly curtailed. As an aside, 
Skrentny argues that the Republican Party – despite Reagan’s loosening of 
enforcement – “other than practicing a rhetorical politics of racial resentment…have 
taken little action to retrench civil rights policies, primarily due to a fear of appearing 
racist and alienating moderate voters”.67 Where a limited number of cases have gone 
to the Supreme Court testing racial realism, the court has supported the practice. It 
has supported recruitment policies aimed at increasing the number of minorities 
working for the police in the interests of curtailing social unrest; racial hiring in 
casting as an aspect of freedom of expression; and, indirectly, via allowing word of 
mouth recruitment practices that might reinforce a racial profile in the workplace. 
Racial realist justifications are not used solely in the workplace. Skrentny notes that 
within political organisations racial realist justifications for nominating and electing 
representatives on the basis of racial background have become important. Having 
diversity within political leadership is seen as helping an organisation be sensitive to 
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minority interests and to signal to the electorate that it mirrors its constituents and is 
modern and not prejudiced.  
Hollinger argues that “the Obama candidacy was a far-reaching challenge to identity 
politics”. This was he says reported through two aspects of his presidential 
campaign: the first “his self-presentation with minimal references to his color”68 in 
contrast to previous black candidates, and the second in the support he gained from 
millions of white voters. However, it seems rather that these two areas point to a 
sensitivity towards identity and so its continued relevance. What seems to have 
changed is that such representation is shorn from much of its connection with 
equality. Not the problem of the unequal situation of blacks, but rather the outlook 
and psychological disposition of the various groups of voters seems to what is 
increasingly at issue.  
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Chapter 9: Changing Whiteness 
In this chapter we look at the idea of whiteness. Race in the 2008 election was rarely 
understood directly through the idea of whiteness. However, a key factor connected 
with the Obama victory was that previous forms of white identity had been brought 
into question. Examining this allows us to understand important aspects of how race 
has changed. In particular we examine how there is was an assumption in the 
election that Obama’s candidacy (and then victory) signified the future where whites 
were to be a minority of the electorate. Further, within our arguments there is an 
implicit critique of a major aspect of much of the whiteness studies literature. Here 
we attempt to flesh out this critique.  
A note on sources can be made here. A full critique of whiteness is outside the 
scope of our investigation. However works covering whiteness intersect with the 
thesis. The thesis has already made use of specific historical works on the 
development of whiteness: for example when looking at the bid for whiteness on the 
part of the Irish in the 1850s and in examining the difficulties faced by the waves of 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe from the 1890s. We leave aside 
these as specific investigations here. Rather this chapter engages with more general 
attempts to deploy the idea of whiteness and the politics that emerges out of 
opposition to whiteness in the form of what is called white privilege. In the main we 
have concentrated on several works that attempt to deal with the difficulty of having 
large racial divisions between blacks and whites and yet also a general hostility 
towards racism on the part of whites. It has been in attempting to explain this 
seeming contradiction that several authors have developed ideas such as colour 
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blind racism and the idea of white privilege which seek to make whiteness something 
of a general explanation for race.  
 
This thesis has made a great deal of use of the idea of whiteness. However we have 
used whiteness in specific ways connected with specific historical periods. The main 
use of whiteness has been in attempting to show how the creation of a combined 
whiteness was the mechanism used to attempt to overcome divisions of class, 
nationality and ethnicity in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century. Notably this 
is not necessarily the whiteness discussed by the whiteness studies school. It was 
not whiteness in general but particular attempts at establishing whiteness in common 
between white ethnics and white “natives” through a particular set of means that the 
thesis has made use of. 
It might be seen that whiteness is a useful concept in general because it brings into 
question a racial category. In the past whiteness has been seen as a norm which 
has not been contested or interrogated. With this idea people are simply seen as 
being white, as recognisably white. White could be taken as having no values 
attached as simply being the norm, as being American. Thus for example, African-
American or Asian-American are used to describe people but white-American or 
Euro-American are very rarely used. Or, for example, there is also a role for white 
ethnicity or national background in the idea of Irish American or Italian American, but 
the developed, rich types of cultural background that comes with such designations 
could not be usefully applied to white-American or Euro-American. Whiteness was 
seen as having no cultural background, perhaps linked with the mass production of 
consumer commodities which were the product of the development of US capitalism, 
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or else as being the norm. Opening up the idea of whiteness for discussion allowed 
social scientists to see how what seems to be a natural category is rather 
constructed, is artificial and historically contingent. Whiteness is not a natural state, 
but rather a particular construction, or rather a series of constructions, with a history. 
With the opening up of the idea of whiteness to study from the 1980s comes new 
ways of looking at events. 
Ahistorical whiteness 
With whiteness comes the investigation of a concept that was taken as given, but 
this can be conducted in different ways. The use of whiteness in this thesis has been 
done to understand race historically and with sensitivity to the specific uses and 
meanings of whiteness in particular eras. However, the same cannot be said for its 
use within the bulk of whiteness studies. While undoubtedly whiteness provides a 
powerful way of thinking about historical developments, the overuse and 
generalisations made with the concept have also tended to undercut historical 
specificity. One pattern for how this works is to establish how whiteness is 
developed, is created, but with this development complete the description of 
historical construction comes to an end and then whiteness becomes self-acting: in 
its essence whiteness remains constant.1 Once whiteness is established, even 
should that construction take a considerable period of time, it becomes an ahistorical 
norm, a force acting outside of historical developments.  
While whiteness might be understood as a historical construct, in the development of 
the idea in whiteness studies this historical element has been undermined. The idea 
of whiteness has been seen as being so powerful and having operated essentially 
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unchanged over such a large number of years that it has been understood 
ahistorically. As Kolchin, writing in 2002 in an early review of whiteness literature, 
notes, “evident in the work of the best whiteness studies authors” is the treatment of 
whiteness as “omnipresent and unchanging, deserving attention as an independent 
force”.2 For example, one author, contends that race in the USA should be described 
through the idea of a “white racial frame”, generally invisible because of assumptions 
of privilege and superiority, that has been at work for approximately the last 350 
years in the USA – from the early days of slavery onwards.3 The whiteness 
discussed in general is a free-floating phenomenon. In what Kolchin calls a “dualism” 
within whiteness studies, the idea and power of whiteness is also unmoored from its 
historical and political context.4 What started as an attempt to unmask the ideological 
character of whiteness has impugned elements of whiteness as having a supra-
historical character.  
The ahistorical view that lays at the centre of whiteness studies might be seen to be 
connected with one of the key difficulties for those attempting to understand race in 
recent years. The seeming contradiction for those studying race in the USA is the 
combination of a population that decries racism and the continued racial divisions in 
US society. Whites in poll after poll reject racism. Politics and cultural beliefs suggest 
that there is a broad, quite intense, and genuine rejection of racial politics. However, 
the deficit in life chances for blacks as against whites seems to continue unabated. 
There seems to be a paradox in the combination of on the one hand of a plethora of 
statistics showing how blacks systematically lag economically and socially, from 
                                            
2
 Peter Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America”, The Journal of American 
History, Vol. 89, No. 1 (2002): 160. 
3
 Joe R. Feagin, The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-Framing (New 
York: Routledge, 2010).  
4
 Ibid. 
303 
employment, to incarceration, to education etc., with, on the other, the almost 
universal protestation of opposition to racism on the part of whites. One, author for 
example, pithily describes this disparity as “racism without racists”.5  
Whiteness as explanation for racism 
To explain this seeming contradiction whiteness has been employed to fill the gap. In 
effect whiteness itself comes to be seen as the explanation for racial division. 
Whiteness in several forms in and of itself has been put forward as an explanation 
for US racism in the last few years. These interpretations have tended to present 
whiteness as a powerful ideological framework that lies behind networks of white 
privilege in such a way that the prejudice is rendered normal and invisible because of 
its ubiquity. One way this is discussed is as “color blind” racism.6 Here belief in 
equality and equal treatment in the context of the normality of white domination is 
supposedly such that acceptance of being colour blind i.e. of formal equality, 
becomes the contemporary form of racial domination. Whiteness in recent years has 
been seen to consist of the automatic gifting of privileges to whites because they are 
white. Essentially the idea seems to be similar to being a member of an “old school 
tie network” where white skin stands in for the old school tie and confers advantages. 
Further, in this understanding these advantages are taken without conscious 
reflection. As one author describes this view “white subjectivities function as anchors 
and relay points for the exercise of racist power that they may neither condone nor 
even recognize”.7  
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A key idea in this view of whiteness is the idea of privilege. Here it is argued that 
racial privilege is the motivation for the taking up of whiteness even though this may 
happen subconsciously. Importantly, this differs from earlier ways of understanding 
and discussing race in terms of racial discrimination. Discrimination can only be 
understood alongside the idea of equality. Equality is the norm against which 
discrimination can be considered and measured. The idea of equal rights and the 
exercise of these rights might be set against structures and groups that would seek 
to discriminate i.e. to oppress by denying these rights. In the reading of white 
privilege, in contrast, the idea of equality is discarded. This is seen to be important 
because the idea of equality is seen as a mask or cover for injustice. In other words, 
even as they maintain they are colour-blind, whites make the subtle, subconscious 
choices that establish white privilege through the passive acceptance of the status 
quo of white domination. Equality is seen to be the way that “hidden in plain sight”, 
the privileges of being white are enacted. Equality is, in this view, ideological. 
As we have discussed, race in the Obama election was disconnected from the idea 
of equality. We argued that with the collapse of the civil rights movement, identity 
politics fills the vacuum and severs the connection of race with equality through the 
acceptance of racial categories as a means of making claims for resources from the 
state. The idea of whiteness in its contemporary ahistorical form is also at odds with 
equality such that where race is discussed it is in the form of a discussion of white 
privilege where equality does not feature in a positive sense. While the application of 
this concept of whiteness has not had the broad influence of identity politics with, for 
example, its application in affirmative action, the vocabulary of privilege has become 
increasingly common on the left and has been taken up more widely, for example in 
online discussion where memes that put your opponent on the defensive are at a 
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premium, opponents are told to “check your privilege”. The concept of white privilege 
that developed out of whiteness studies is about the identification of racial identities, 
dismisses the idea of equality and revolves around individual behaviour; clearly the 
connections are here to see this viewpoint as a contemporary adjunct to and 
development of the politics of identity. 
Alongside the dismissal of equality, the idea of white privilege can be seen as a 
distancing from, if not a rejection of, the possibility of solidarity across racial lines. 
Such is the supposed power of white privilege that benefits accrue to all whites. With 
these benefits for all whites there is an implicit dismissal of solidarity because whites 
systematically gain from such privileges and, however silently and unconsciously 
accept them. The lack of political activism attempting to breach the colour divide 
becomes, in this reading, a feature and consequence of the ideology of whiteness 
and its power over whites.  
It can be noted here that the change from “discrimination” to “privilege” is part of a 
broader in the vocabulary of contemporary left political activism which has adopted 
ideas such as “white privilege”. One author provides an interesting comparison of the 
vocabulary of the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s with what he calls the “post-New 
Left”, or the “post-1990 activist”, given that this was the period that such changes 
became pronounced.8 He argues that the change in vocabulary is the product of 
shifts in priorities, focus and emphasis. This post New Left has moved from the 
previous priority of “ultimate victory” to that of “challenging everyday impacts”; has 
moved from a focus on systems to “analysing interpersonal dynamics”; and has 
rejected the emphasis on “commonality among social groups” and instead 
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emphasises specific experience marking “a loss in confidence in the capacity of 
people to learn about, understand and oppose forms of inequality that do not 
adversely impact them, as individuals”. This change in vocabulary reflects important 
moves away from the goal of fundamental change and a shift towards identity politics 
and the semi-therapeutic targeting of the relationships between individuals and 
groups, done as activism, that we discussed in the previous chapter. 
One key difficulty with the idea of white privilege should be considered. The 
differentiated experience of whites in the USA should give pause to the idea that all 
whites benefit in a significant way from their cultural standing. Rather than a 
combined experience of “white” success as, for example Murray argues, the uniform 
experience of middle class white progress in the USA has long since passed. There 
are major differences and major divisions within the white experience of 
contemporary America.9  
It should be noted, however, that the discussion of white privilege does not focus in 
the main on major economic factors such as assets or employment. Where such 
privileges are outlined they become examples of awkward cultural interactions, 
interpersonal difficulties, and the making of racial generalisations. Peggy McIntosh’s 
widely cited article lists fifty examples of what she considers aspects of white 
privilege that she receives – what she calls an “invisible knapsack of white privilege”. 
McIntosh’s list is based on her self-reporting on parts of her life that she considers 
privileges which she would normally be able to take for granted because she is white 
that may not be available if she were black or in an ethnic minority. The list is 
dominated by two types of “privilege” which account for roughly 20 of the 50 reported 
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privileges, although they overlap to a degree. These two types are in the areas of 
interpersonal relations and of cultural space.10 With questions of interpersonal 
relations McIntosh identifies ways in which whites can take for granted that they are 
not being judged as representative members of their race or as spokesmen or 
women for their race. Consequently, she considers herself, as white, to face much 
less chance of being involved in awkward or potentially hostile misunderstandings. 
With questions of cultural space, McIntosh uses examples of where she can assume 
that as white her cultural identity will be catered for, reflected and taken seriously in 
the cultural spaces she sees around her. Other types of white privilege McIntosh are 
connected with low level prejudice or else generalisations about economic standing.  
All too often the discussions of white privilege seem like exercises in desperately 
scouring society and social research for whatever advantages might be found or 
inferred in any sphere, done in an attempt to fill the distance between the scale of 
these advantages and the scale of the disparity between black and white lives that 
these advantages are supposed to explain. However, this is not to say that there are 
some matters of substantial difficulties and divisions when it comes to racial 
discrimination which are highlighted in this approach. The most substantial is the 
passing down of assets through generations to white families. This is a function of 
accumulated wealth in housing assets from the past being deployed today. Wise’s 
argument has merit that assets accumulated by the baby boomer generation of 
whites, based in large part on their experience of the post-war boom and their 
access to cheap mortgages, continues to help many young whites today. This can 
help, for  example, in their access to higher education. However, this is by no means 
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universal and represents assets that will be drawn down over time for a great 
number of white families whenever one of these new generations struggle.11 For 
blacks who struggle to get opportunities, it is not only the lack of comparative assets 
of their own to draw on, it is also the lack of contemporary economic dynamic that 
causes difficulties. Social mobility as measured since the 1970s remains lower in the 
USA that in Europe, for example. It has been widely noted that there has been 
especial difficulty for those with few academic qualifications.12 
One might argue that difficulties of interpersonal contact and of cultural recognition 
which are the mainstay of lists of white advantage seem to be heightened by the 
politicisation of racial identities. There is a case to be made that the therapeutic 
interventions mean that communication can be accompanied by a heightened 
sensitivity that comes in the self-interested interventions of the race industry. It 
should also be noted that the idea that whiteness explains contemporary racism 
retains the focus on the psychology of whites although this has shifted from an 
examination of conscious reactions to the subconscious.  
It seems difficult to match up the privileges under discussion with the enormous 
disparities in opportunity which accord to different racial groups. The poor facilities in 
education, lack of job opportunities and poor neighbourhoods that have enormous 
impacts that might be addressed by public policy do not meaningfully feature on lists 
of the possibilities of imagined cultural faux pas and interpersonal sleights. Rather 
than explaining race many of the concerns being discussed seem related to the 
politics and concerns of establishing racial identities or racialised culture. There is a 
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politicisation of cultural spaces that means they become locations for grievances 
connected with hyper-sensitivity when it comes to matters of race. To see the causes 
of the racial divide in the psychology of whites, albeit the subconscious psychology, 
does not explain or address the significant divisions there are. Rather as we will go 
on to discuss, the resonance for whiteness and “white privilege” might better be 
understood as arising out of, and being a weapon deployed in the culture wars that 
have been a feature of US politics since the 1990s. 
A historical reading of whiteness 
We have examined the general discussion about whiteness and now turn to look at 
whiteness historically in an attempt to show how it has changed and with those 
changes comes a changed meaning. In our analysis of the shifting meaning of race, 
part of the argument is that whiteness has also shifted. In applying a historical and 
political analysis to the importance race came to have in the USA we have used the 
concept of whiteness as being central. However, we have attempted to make the 
case that this is not a timeless category. There are certainly elements of continuity in 
the use of the idea of whiteness. On the surface the idea of whiteness as a norm or 
the idea of white superiority has a long history. However, on closer inspection there 
is a making and remaking of whiteness that brings into question the surface 
continuity.  
For example, we might see distinct periods in creating whiteness in the USA: the 
campaign to establish whiteness as against black slaves, the campaign by the Irish 
to become white from the 1850s, and lastly the attempt at incorporating immigrants 
in a combined white race that developed from the immigration act of 1924 until its 
culmination i.e. success by the 1970s. We have developed these points in earlier 
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chapters but they are summarised here for clarity. In the 1700s, as superbly 
documented by Allen in The Invention of the White Race13, whiteness was created in 
response to slave revolts that included both whites and blacks. This whiteness took 
the form of a series of laws to establish the separation of blacks and whites. In the 
1850s, the whiteness of immigrants from the Irish famine was brought into question. 
Cartoons of the period, for example, show how the Irish were racialised, i.e. they 
were attributed negative characteristics based on their racial background.14 While 
initially in the 1840s there were some attempts at solidarity with blacks this approach 
was abandoned. This required distancing from blacks which was done through, for 
example, rioting on the New York waterfront to expel blacks that had worked 
alongside the Irish. This ultra-loyalty as white brought with it political benefits and a 
policing role / assimilation role for subsequent waves of white Catholic ethnics. From 
the 1890s to the 1920s there was a huge influx of white immigration which similarly 
did not simply fit into being white. The reaction to these immigrants was through 
nativism. Nativism was only overcome in 1924 with the Immigration Act which again 
established a combined whiteness and linked that to being American. This did not 
erase the distinctions between different groups of whites but it was an important 
start. It was the process of creating white only suburbs that was the main way of 
destroying the distinctions between whites. Only by the 1970s was there a 
consolidated white American population. These historical shifts it should be 
considered are not a feature of subconscious white reactions or interpersonal 
conflict. Further they suggest that whiteness is a flexible set of ideas that can change 
over time.  
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At this stage, however, we can identify where there is a further major change, central 
for our purposes, in how whiteness is understood. Until the 1960s as we have 
described there were campaigns in place to consolidate whiteness. However, 
towards the end of this period we can also identify a growing critique and even a 
hostility to whiteness. From the 1960s there was beginning of a rejection of 
whiteness as a model of the citizen. This was a rejection of the Cold War conformity 
associated with whiteness which initially took the form of the counter culture. Already 
by the 1960s for young people the idea of citizenship connected with whiteness was 
being replaced with identity politics. For Gitlin, identity politics triumphed because 
“there was no really compelling alternative to it”. According to Gitlin, “people felt they 
were more acutely black, or female, or eventually, homosexual or some kind of 
ethnicity. They felt those identities more acutely than they did citizenship”.15 In other 
words the positive identification for that new generation with previous ideas of 
citizenship often associated with whiteness was withering away. Later this developed 
into alienation and then hostility towards what was seen as the backwardness and 
conformity of the whiteness that came with the Cold War and the Post-War boom.  
The 1960s saw the widespread rejection of the politics of the Cold War whiteness. 
Hostility to mainstream white culture has been a feature of elements of the left from 
at least the 1950s. Subsequently the development of identity politics should also be 
seen in relationship to a distancing from what is seen as white culture. This is 
reflected, for example, in the defensiveness – and victim status – of Nixon’s silent 
majority. This might also be seen, for example, in the attempts to revive white ethnic 
                                            
15
 Todd Gitlin, "The Eve of Youthful Destruction", Spiked-Online, July 2016, accessed 1 August 2016, 
http://www.spiked-online.com/spiked-review/article/the-eve-of-youthful-destruction-todd-gitlin-the-
sixties/18503  
312 
forms of identity as against the white mainstream that came in the early 1970s which 
we discussed in Chapter 7.16 
It was with the early 1990s that this developed further in the form of the culture war. 
The culture wars describe the way in which identities come to be given political 
meaning. In developing distinct politicised identities connected to membership of 
groups connected with gender, race, and sexuality, there is a reaction to white 
identities which, for example, took the form of hostility towards the “dead white 
males” whose work was taught in universities. As we have discussed the way in 
which race is seen targets/identifies white racial identities as complicit and involved 
in the creation of racial division. Consequently such racial identities as white have 
been seen as problematic. There is a hostility towards whiteness which is seen as 
acting to oppress.  
The timing of this change be seen in connection with the arrival in academia and 
other professional locations of what we might call the post-New Left following its long 
march through the institutions begun in the 1960s. However, it might also be seen in 
connection with the weakening of the old left undermined by the end of the Cold War 
and the bringing into question of the old stabilising categories of left and right. By the 
early 1990s, Gitlin sees in the culture wars especially in education the result of this 
changing of personnel and the growing challenge to “white” views such as, for 
example, are seen in the questioning of the Western canon. What were the 
conveyors of the heights of knowledge became tainted by the racial and imperial 
context of the societies within which they lived, even, for example, by their domestic 
arrangements. Gitlin discusses how white views more broadly which previously were 
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credited as positive, by the 1990s had become subject to criticism for their 
backwardness:  
Not so long ago…the straight white male was the American norm. Everyone 
else was measured, and usually found wanting, by virtue, or vice, of deviance 
from that norm….Today, the straight white male frequently finds himself on the 
defensive. He is, like everyone else, a member of a category, the oppressor 
category at that, scrambling for cultural space while his own prospects seem 
less than luminous. His intentions with respect to minorities and women may or 
may not be noble, but he is tempted to declare himself a victim like the victims 
he deplores.17 
While at the height of the Cold War, whiteness had a solidity and might be connected 
with a forward-looking population and optimism, this is in strong contrast to how 
whiteness has increasingly been seen since the 1990s. There is a broad critique of 
backwardness of many whites especially in regard to their inner racial prejudice. 
Rather than see continuity in whiteness, there has been a distancing from previous 
mainstream “white” views.  
Indeed, the whiteness studies view of history has become popular in recent years 
and the key explanation for this might be seen in its connection, at least in its 
ahistorical formulation, with important political and ideological currents that see 
themselves as hostile to “white culture”. Consequently whiteness studies can often 
be found as positioned in contemporary politics on one side of the culture wars. 
Whiteness studies overlaps with the culture wars in particular with its critique of white 
culture which is often presented as shallow, inorganic, empty and imbued with racial 
privilege. Notably the culture wars did not feature explicitly in 2008. Indeed the 
culture wars – perhaps because they rest on the shifting sands/uncertain terrain of 
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culture – seem to come and go, and perhaps were on hold given the amount of 
cultural attention being paid to the Obama campaign and race more generally. 
However, the questioning of white outlooks taking place in the election might be 
seen as how the culture wars manifested themselves in 2008 and connected with 
some of the main themes of the culture wars. In essence by testing mainstream 
white views for whether they fell in line with what might be called liberal 
cosmopolitanism, the Obama election might be seen as a skirmish in the culture 
wars. In a rare unguarded moment on the campaign trail, Obama his suspicions of 
white culture, and whites, explicit: “They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or 
antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade 
sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.”18 
We should note that in the critique of whiteness, it should be noted, there is a fine 
line between critiquing white culture and attacking whites. It is unclear, for example, 
how the whites under question are supposed to simply adopt a different culture or 
what culture whites are supposed to adopt.19 Frankenberg’s illuminating interviews 
with white women show the difficulties many whites face in this cultural critique. As 
she notes of whites in comparison to those with other racial identities: “there’s still a 
majority of the country that can't say they are proud of anything”20 She notes that for 
white women the “cultural and ethnic belonging in these women's conceptualization 
[of white culture] occupied a narrow sphere, remaining rather abstract as signifiers of 
identity” in comparison to that of others.21 Whiteness as experienced by these 
women vacillated from “‘no culture’ to ‘normal culture’ to ‘bad culture’ and back 
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again.”22 As one author discussing the use of whiteness in a pedagogic context 
notes, there is a nod to the fluidity of culture but nonetheless a fixing of racial cultural 
types in the discussion of them. This means that “it’s difficult not to equate the word 
‘whiteness’ – and, by extension, the negative qualities it seems to imply – with ‘white’ 
people.”23 Other authors, again in education, when introducing the idea of whiteness 
to young white people, note that there is what amounts to a “white identity crisis” that 
comes with the “racialization of white identity” and which leads to “guilt” and “shame” 
on the part of some whites or else racial anxieties along right-wing lines with 
others.24 
Olson, a whiteness studies author, also identifies that there has been a major 
change in whiteness. His argument is that this is in the change from “standing” to 
being a “norm” and is a consequence of the withdrawal of backing by the state i.e. 
the removal of “official recogni[tion]”/“state sanction.”25 Whiteness is transformed 
from the attribution of social standing (associated with Jim Crow segregation) to 
being a norm which is associated with a colour-blind approach on the part of the 
state. This norm is “natural” in that it operates in a “pre-political” way i.e. the 
assumptions of privilege that whites make are made outside of political decisions as 
the “background of social life” and so does not seem to contradict a colour-blind 
approach. It is with the unearned advantages of being white that do not seem to 
contradict a belief in equality – indeed which are often unacknowledged privileges.26 
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However Olson misses some key changes. Rather than a colour-blind state, as we 
argued in Chapter 7, the development of identity politics had a view that undermined 
formal equality. The attachment to particular racial groupings was made part of how 
the state operated – and this was done not in support of whiteness but in supporting 
black identity politics. Further, the norm of whiteness does not come any longer with 
the attribution of positive characteristics or of the universality of the post-war years. 
The background of social life does not treat the “norm” of whiteness kindly. 
In previous years, the questioning of the white mainstream that might have had 
radical purpose given the racial ordering that was taking place. Today, however, this 
critique seems to act as an expression of anti-democratic sensibilities, in particular 
by dismissing the possibility of whites being able to support reform. Even whites who 
argue for equality and oppose racial privilege are discounted from having an active 
role to play: in the vocabulary of contemporary activism they become “allies” that at 
best cheer on “people of colour” from the sidelines. As Frankenberg argues 
“whiteness is conceived as axiomatically tied to dominance, to economics, to political 
structures. In this process, both whiteness and nonwhiteness are reified, made into 
objects rather than processes, and robbed of historical context and human 
agency.”27  
The trajectory towards a politics hostile to previous white mainstream outlooks is 
clearer today, perhaps. At certain times since the 1960s it might have seemed 
plausible that hostility to white culture might be part of opposing the attempted re-
establishing of white dominance. For example, in the 1980s it sometimes seemed 
less than clear whether there might be a revival of “white” bourgeois values. With 
Reagan the idea that the American dream as it was previously understood might be 
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renewed seemed to have some weight behind it. Reagan’s status on the right might 
be explained in how he seemed able to articulate “white” views as positive. Gitlin 
writing after the fact suggests that Reagan was selling something of a mirage, in that 
there was no material or political basis for US renewal. Indeed the military 
Keynesianism practised by Reagan was owed to the US position internationally 
rather than being linked to internal moral or economic re-establishment.28  
Whiteness declined but more important? 
At this point, we should note a seeming contradiction: the whiteness we argue is 
weakened seems nonetheless to continue to be a key point at issue in the 
discussions of race, for example. In the thesis we have made the case that 
whiteness comes a culmination in the 1970s. The drive and power of the idea of 
whiteness attached to the idea of racial positioning subsequently diminishes. The 
confidence of whiteness as an identity connected with post-war success is 
undermined. The idea of whiteness is attacked and culturally it is increasingly 
dismissed. Nonetheless it seems that in recent years whiteness has retained its 
importance as a point of reference in discussions of race and as an identity that 
many retain, or perhaps as Obama might have it “cling to”. If whiteness had become 
less important – was increasingly a veneer – then how do we account for it seeming 
to retain its importance? 
One way this can be explained is that in fixing/establishing a host of racial identities 
there is a mirrored construction of whiteness as an identity. Whiteness is given more 
coherence in the culture wars as part of the creation of racial identities which have a 
strong connection with previous victimisation and so which need whiteness as part of 
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their justification. Today this is the creation of whiteness not as the norm of the Cold 
War period, but rather as the racially prejudiced “Other”. While there has been a long 
discussion of the ideas of minorities being the “other” to Western norms – we might 
consider that in short space of time it has become possible for whiteness to act as 
the “other” to acceptable racial identities. In attempting to mark out cultural space, 
whiteness still retains sufficient solidity, cachet or meaning, to set oneself in 
contradistinction to. In the culture wars a diminished whiteness can still act as “bad 
culture”. Identities linked to membership of ascriptive groups are partly tied together 
by the “other” of oppressive whiteness.29 Maintaining racialised cultures it seems 
means existing in a relationship with white culture seen as causing oppression. 
Another reason that explains how whiteness continues to seem to have some solidity 
is that for many it is by no means straightforward to replace it partly because it is 
unclear what to replace it with. There is the end of the idea of whiteness as a cultural 
norm connected with progress and a positive social standing attached that was 
associated with the post-war period. However, this is not to say that there has been 
the replacement of whiteness as a cultural norm per se. Rather it persists as a norm 
but is increasingly unconnected with positive traits or dynamics. It is not 
straightforward for whites to simply adopt a different culture. Further, the adoption of 
alternatives  - of a more politically correct variety – would seem ill-fitting for many. 
Whiteness then might seem to have more coherence than expected because the 
alternative of racial/gender/age based cultural identity has little to offer for many.  
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This does not mean that it is possible to champion the idea of whiteness as some 
sort of revival of the post-war progress. We would suggest that whiteness has 
elements of instability: it moves from a norm, to no culture to bad culture, as 
Frankenberg puts it. Calls for black pride might be seen as plausible strategies for 
social gain and cultural standing. However, calls for white pride definitively are not. 
Many whites have been able to take on, perhaps drift into or attempt, something of a 
cosmopolitan or rootless outlook backed by patterns of consumption. Unfortunately, 
for some pressed on their “whiteness” one reaction can be the adoption of a thin-
skinned victimhood of whiteness of the type that Donald Trump seems to exhibit.30 
Crisis of liberal politics 
The thesis wanted to approach the problem from a US perspective and in particular 
look at the particular developments of race in the US perspective. The historical 
twists and turns of US politics when it comes to race have no parallel. The thesis has 
concentrated on the changes that have taken place in the USA. However another 
angle which the thesis connects to is the broader changes that came with what 
seemed to be a collapse in liberal politics. In particular, the thesis did not attempt to 
explain fully the rejection of mainstream values shown by the New Left and in the 
culture wars. We noted that for some in younger generations the concerns of race 
that impinged on previous generations no longer applied and so this new generation 
found racial politics morally indefensible. We also noted that liberal politics seemed 
to offer no programmatic solutions and had become alienated from its base. 
However, the reason behind the broad rejection of liberal politics remains something 
not fully explored in the thesis. While comprehensively analysing wider 
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developments is beyond the scope of our analysis, we might a few words here to 
tentatively suggest why these rejections of previous liberal values have taken place. 
The difficulties for liberal politics found here suggest ways to understand how there is 
a rejection of progress and meaning associated with Cold War whiteness and then 
the taking up of identity politics rather than a more universalist support for progress 
shorn of its connection to white racial identity and the limitations of cold War 
orthodoxies. 
One way of approaching the rejection of the liberal politics of the post-war period can 
be seen in the changes that came with the 1980s and accelerated with the end of the 
Cold War. Zygmunt Bauman, writing in 2001, noted that the 1980s came with a slew 
of new theories that suggested politics had changed. For Bauman, ideas such as 
post-modernity, the end of history, second modernity and surmodernity – 
“articulate[d] the intuition of a radical change in the arrangement of human 
cohabitation and in social conditions under which life-politics is nowadays 
conducted”31. These ideas brought into question the ideas of modernity, progress 
and support for liberal ideas that were at the core of Western society. It may be the 
Cold War held such ideas together artificially as the Cold War acted to cohere 
meaning and purpose under threat of extinction, thus partly energising otherwise 
exhausted institutions.32 With the left and right losing coherence following the end of 
the Cold War, the meaning associated with liberal institutions was further 
undermined.  
A connected way of approaching the difficulties of liberal politics is the way in which 
the elites seems to be increasingly alienated from the population in general. 
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Alienation from the mainstream might also be interpreted as a rejection of 
leadership. In 1995 Christopher Lasch, for example, made the case that there had 
been a “revolt of the elites and the betrayal of democracy.”33 Or as Peter Mair put it 
in his posthumous work, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy34, 
there has been a “withdrawal of the elites” and a growing indifference to democracy 
throughout the West. Rather than attempt to lead, elites had positioned themselves 
as largely hostile to mainstream culture and have where possibly physically 
separated themselves in gated communities. For Murray the elites were gated off 
and distanced from the difficulties that a previously stable white middle class were 
experiencing.35 Furedi argues Murray is describing how the elite “lacks [the] ambition 
to lead society” and that “one is struck by the calculating and instrumental orientation 
of this group towards moral norms. It depends on formulaic speech codes, codes of 
conduct, values and mission statements and ethics committees to regulate its 
behaviour. Its reliance on process and procedures betrays an absence of trust even 
amongst its own kind.”36 In other words they lacked the political and intellectual 
resources, or will, to lead or to attempt to overcome material and moral difficulties. 
Furedi, in another work, argues that the difficulties of elite leadership and connection 
with mainstream society shown in the 1960s were echoes of the interwar period 
where the possibility of a positive support for the market and for bourgeois values 
were never resolved in the wake of the First World War.37  
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The demographics of whiteness 
We now move on to look at an important way that whiteness became part of the 
discussion of the 2008 election: through demographics. Obama’s candidacy was 
continuously referenced with the idea that whites were becoming a minority in the 
USA. Black and ethnic minority voters had become a significant proportion of the 
electorate. Feagin notes that in 2008 “voters of color” accounted for 26 per cent of 
the electorate. Obama won a significant majority of the black and ethnic minority 
vote. In 2008, Obama gained the votes of 95 per cent of blacks, 67 per cent of 
Latinos and 62 per cent of Asians. This might be compared to 43 per cent of 
whites.38 Further the number of Latinos and to a lesser extent Asians was rising at a 
much faster rate than the rest of the population. While in 2008 the proportion of non-
whites will be 26 per cent, by 2042 because of immigration and different rates of 
childbirth it is estimated that this number will be over 50 per cent of the population 
and whites as presently constituted will be less than half of the population. The bulk 
of that increase is with Latinos (from 15 to 30%) and some growth from Asians (5 to 
9%). Numbers of blacks will roughly stay the same at 13 per cent of the population. 
39 This is why one name used for the change has been the “browning” of America. 
As early as 2002, Ruy Teixeira and John B. Judis predicted these trends in a book 
called the The Emerging Democratic Majority mirroring the earlier Kevin Philips book 
The Emerging Republican Majority.40 There is a great deal of complexity in the 
numbers, turnout rates, political support, urban concentration etc. However the 
                                            
38
 Joe Feagin, “A Racially Polarized Country: White Men Lose One”, Racism Review blog, 8 
November 2012, http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2012/11/08/a-racially-polarized-country-white-
men-lose-one/ 
39
 Ruy Teixeira, “is there (still) an emerging progressive majority in the United States”, 19 January 
2010, accessed 1 August 2016, http://sens-public.org/article.php3?id_article=723&lang=en  
40
 Ruy Teixeira and John B. Judis The Emerging Democratic Majority (Lisa Drew: New York, 2002) 
323 
argument, because of the large numbers involved, boils down to the point that over 
the next two or three decades because of immigration and because of different 
family sizes that Republicans will find it increasingly difficult to win political 
campaigns unless they manage to get ethnic minorities to support them. Whites 
used to being the majority it seems, at the level of the numbers at least, will have to 
adapt to a situation where their interests are not the default. 
Obama’s particular racial background seems to fit well with this perceived process of 
change. It is not that Obama is black, rather it is that Obama is mixed race. The idea 
is that the USA will move to a white minority and that the binary division of race will 
be replaced with a “hybrid” future:  
“Obama’s personal family history has raised the recognition of the mixed or 
hybrid character of American history to a new level. In less than forty years the 
United States will be roughly equally divided between Whites and people of 
color.”41 
While the longer term trends away from a white majority are clear. The shorter term 
trends have not been so straightforward as initially thought. One of the co-authors of 
The Emerging Democratic Majority book has questioned some of its conclusions as 
being too definitive.  Judis notes that there for the House and the Senate there was 
low turnout among non-white voters for mid-term elections, that too many of the 
Democrat supporters were urban when both House and Senate underrepresent 
these constituencies, and lastly that the Democrats have lost the support of some of 
the weaker members of their constituency i.e. poor whites from particular regions. 
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For Judis the arithmetic remains complex and elections remain “open”.42 Such is the 
concern about these demographic trends that even this relatively short-term 
qualification43 to the demographic effects has been treated as of great importance. 
Such is the worry ascribed to the demographic trends that the partial recanting by 
one of the authors John Judis, led to what Chait calls “giddy responses” from a 
number of important conservative commentators and an “outpouring of conservative 
celebration”.44 Given the general lack of attempts by the mainstream on the right to 
do anything about increasing numbers of immigrants there is quite a fatalistic 
response to these demographic trends.  
Though there is scope to mobilise popular opposition to the current trends in 
immigration, however there is only a few on the right who are currently arguing 
something must be done. Perhaps surprisingly there is little made of this by 
mainstream Republicans given the voting implications. However this suggests the 
elite consensus on this issue and how, despite what whiteness studies authors 
argue, there is no real cultural weight behind whiteness today. 
In a pale echo to nativism there is a minor current in US politics that is attempting to 
tackle immigration. Ann Coulter’s 2015 book, ¡Adios, America!: The Left’s Plan to 
Turn Our Country into a Third World Hellhole,45 has become influential in identifying 
immigration as a vital question for the Republicans. Coulter seems to be something 
of a one woman campaign on the topic, to the extent that she has been able to insert 
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herself onto the 2016 campaign through her polemics. As of 2015 Donald Trump had 
adopted, if sometimes quite crudely, many of the arguments in the book.46   
For Coulter, immigration is not an important question. It is the only question. If the 
right loses on immigration everything is lost because the America they love will be 
destroyed. Coulter’s argument is that large scale immigration has been adopted by 
Democrats because of their inability to get support from the existing, largely white, 
American public. For Coulter this meant that unable to change the minds of the 
voters, Democrats decided to changes the voters:  
“Liberals had tried convincing Americans to vote for them, but that kept ending 
badly. Except for Lyndon Johnson’s aberrational 1964 landslide, Democrats 
have not been able to get a majority of white people to vote for them in 
any presidential election since 1948. Their only hope was to bring in new 
voters. Okay, fine. You won’t vote for us, America? We tried this the easy way, 
but you give us no choice. We’re going to overwhelm you with new voters from 
the Third World.”47 
Further, millions of illegal immigrants from Mexico are awaiting an amnesty to swell 
the numbers. 
For Coulter, Teddy Kennedy, the Bête Noire of the right, was misleading the country 
if not himself when brought forward the 1965 bill that revived large-scale immigration. 
                                            
46
 Donald Trump made use of Coulter’s book. Trump called the book a “great read” and according to 
Coulter he read it cover to cover. Carlos Lozada, "Did Ann Coulter’s new book help inspire Trump’s 
Mexican ‘rapists’ comments?", Washington Post, 3 August 2015,   
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2015/08/03/did-ann-coulters-new-book-inspire-
donald-trumps-mexican-rapists-comment/ Peter Beinart, “The Republican Party’s White Strategy”, 
The Atlantic, July/August 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/the-white-
strategy/485612/    
47
 Ann Coulter. ¡Adios, America!: The Left’s Plan to Turn Our Country into a Third World Hellhole. 
(Regnery: New York, 2015), ebook, chapter 1 
326 
Kennedy stated the new law “will not inundate America with immigrants from any one 
country or area, or the most populated and deprived nations of Africa and Asia.” 
America, he said, would continue to have the same “ethnic mix,” and “the ethnic 
pattern of immigration under the proposed measure is not expected to change as 
sharply as the critics seem to think.” One key change that Kennedy did not 
anticipate, however, is that relatives of immigrants would be allowed into the country. 
It was this change that brought the numbers seen today and that is changing the 
racial composition of the electorate.  
Coulter makes the case that this change is now clearly a conscious one. She cites 
the Democratic consultant Patrick Reddy writing in 1998 who argues that 
immigration is the lasting contribution of the Kennedys to the Democrats. Reddy 
states that this bill “has resulted in a wave of immigration from the Third World that 
should shift the nation in a more liberal direction within a generation. It will go down 
as the Kennedy family’s greatest gift to the Democratic Party.”48 For Coulter this is 
one of the rare cases where the Democrats are honest in stating what they are trying 
to achieve through mass immigration. She notes that Democrats pick up votes from 
such immigrants at a rate of at least 2 to 1and as much as 4 to 1.49 Coulter reckons 
that future offspring of immigrants – a few generations down the line – might become 
Republicans but by that stage changes in the politics and the character of the 
country will be irreversible. She argues that with large scale immigration from third-
world countries there that the backward prejudices of “peasant societies” will replace 
the liberal values the US exhibits today.  
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For Coulter, the Democrats in bringing in mass migration of unskilled labour, and 
allowing similar illegal immigration to go unchecked, that competes with the sections 
of the working class which have had it most hard in recent decades have turned their 
back on the working class: “Back when Democrats still claimed to represent working 
Americans, they opposed illegal immigration. Since being taken over by the Far Left, 
all that matters to them is changing the electorate to one that doesn’t mind liberal 
insanity.”50 Further she connects the difficulties that young black men have in getting 
jobs to having to compete with this influx. She notes the children of the elites in the 
work they do face no such competition from unskilled migrants. 
Overall there is nothing that might be called a nativist movement today in 
comparison with that of the past. From 1890 to 1924, there was continual political 
campaigning to restrict immigration. There was the sense that the new white 
immigrants were alien to the existing “native” population. Against such campaigners 
were the interests of business. Business wanted to continue importing cheap labour 
to enable continued economic expansion. Eventually the political dislocation was 
such that business was forced to retreat. While in that period the Republicans were 
the party of big business, today business funds both political parties. The opposition 
to immigration might be widespread but the population finds this difficult to get 
representation in the form of political leadership. It seems that Republicans seem 
resigned to bringing in the immigration that seems likely to undermine their electoral 
position such it seems is their concern about stoking a racial backlash or in being 
seen to be racist.  
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The role of the elite can also be seen in attempting to get support for immigration 
done through journalism. Coulter uses case studies from journalism to make the 
case that there is the playing out of a culture war. Coulter uses numerous examples 
of the reporting of rapes and physical attacks by immigrants and illegal immigrants 
where the reporters goes to lengths to not report the national origins or background 
of those alleged or convicted of rape or serious assaults. The journalists end up 
reporting “police hunting man, 34” etc. These journalists have taken it upon 
themselves to avoid giving the public information because they are worried about 
what the public will do with it. What Coulter seems to identify here is the lack of trust 
in display in way in which the elite have no sense of the need to discuss immigration, 
to raise the issues with the public and get support for the change that is happening. 
While US politics has seen the development of a post-racial outlook where it comes 
to the racial politics of the twentieth century, it might be expected that immigration 
will re-raise race in the next few years despite, or perhaps because, of the lack of 
substantial discussion on immigration. 
Whiteness as a political question 
One reason given that Coulter should not be so worried about whites becoming a 
minority is that it is possible for “brown” immigrants to become white. We have seen 
how for a number of groups starting with the Irish in the 1950s there has been a 
process of racial inclusion that made these ethnic groups part of the expanding and 
ultimately singular white race. Whiteness studies authors such as Olson and 
Roediger make this case for current immigrants. They argue that a group becomes 
part of the white race is a political question not a biological/demographic one. 
Roediger argues that the mixed raced Americans of future years may or may not 
become white and that decision cannot be simply predicted: “No-one knows what the 
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racial identification of Latino mixed-race people, the largest single category 
projected, will be in 2100. It is entirely possible to imagine a white majority continuing 
for centuries based on choices that mixed-race people make”.51 Olson is more 
definitive arguing that immigrants assimilate by showing they are more successful 
than blacks and ultimately that they share the sense of superiority to and hostility to 
blacks. He argues that “A bipolar order will persist as the white category expands to 
include Asians and Latinos (even if they prefer not to be referred to as “white” 
specifically), while Blackness remains the touchstone against which full assimilation 
is measured.”52 
Another point must be considered here, however. The assimilation of white ethnics in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century took place with the native protestant whites. 
This group was at the centre of society, was understood to have positive attributes 
and had a sense of its superiority, of white superiority. Thus, it made sense for 
Catholic white ethnics from Southern and Eastern Europe to want to merge with this 
grouping and accrue the benefits of being part of the ruling group as part of a cross 
class alliance of being white. Whites today, however, are very different. 
Contemporary whites doubt themselves and mainstream white culture is broadly 
criticised and seen as backward. The positive attributes of whiteness are noticeable 
by their absence.  
Rather than see a new nativist movement or basis for one, the suggestion here is 
that white elites will attempt to work with immigrant groups retaining racial identities 
in a multi-cultural framework – for example through the Republicans attempting to 
gain support from Latinos – rather than attempting an alliance with the white 
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working/middle class. Notably this could happen alongside something of a racial 
division of labour that new immigrants take on.53 The lack of concern about the 
“browning” of America might be taken as a sign that there is little support among 
elites for maintaining whiteness. The difference between the worries about “race 
suicide” for Protestant whites facing competition with Catholic white immigrants 
stated at the presidential level in the early part of the twentieth century54 and the lack 
of concern today could not be more stark. The main concern among elites as shown 
in the Obama election is not in the number of non-white immigrants, but rather in the 
backward response to immigration by many whites. The lack of concern for 
whiteness should give some indication of how little weight such racial attachments 
have for mainstream political leaders today. Obama’s campaign has been 
continuously linked to the USA becoming a country where the majority are from 
minorities – in that sense we might also consider that, as one commentator noted, 
post-racial is at the same time post-white.55 
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Conclusion 
The main question the thesis aimed to answer is what function race played in the 
election. As secondary questions we wanted to account for the enthusiasm shown in 
the election, to understand why race was discussed in the election without reference 
to equality, and to understand how race had changed in the twentieth century. 
Accounting for the enthusiasm that came with the Obama campaign 
This thesis has developed the argument that only the issue of race can adequately 
explain the energy unleashed in the 2008 election. This is despite the downplaying of 
race by Obama and by the various campaigns.56 The thesis examined possible 
alternative explanations – of the power of “hope”/“change” and of the importance of 
online campaigning – and found them secondary or connected to race in their 
importance. The political enthusiasm shown in the 2008 election must be seen as 
stemming from race. Renouncing race raised the expectations and excitement of 
millions, filled campaign coffers with online donations, got out the volunteers, the 
caucus goers and voters. The intensity of Obama’s support surprised commentators 
and candidates alike. The Obama election marked an upwelling of enthusiasm, 
excitement and creativity57, something all too rare in contemporary political life. It 
seems clear that many millions were unhappy with the situation on race as was and 
desired change.  
We made the case that without historical or political explanation, the default 
explanation for race has been in the attitudes and psychology of whites. Given our 
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argument has been that there has been a falling away of racial politics yet whites 
have been identified with racism, many whites undoubtedly considered the 2008 
election as an opportunity to make the case that they were not racist. Part of the 
reason for excitement, emotion and activity surrounding the Obama campaign 
should be in understanding how many whites wanted to dissociate themselves from 
a racial stance and were attracted to the politics of “hope” expressed in the idea that 
a black man could make it to the top in America. This might even be taken more 
broadly as a “chance for national redemption”.58 The limited way in which race was 
understood meant many whites wanted to set the record straight on their political 
views or cultural outlook as a counterweight to the way in which, as whites, they 
have been connected with racial politics. 
The desire of many whites to distance themselves from the racial past was 
heightened through the connections Obama’s campaign made with history. Obama’s 
campaign played to the idea that history was at stake in the election and leant on 
historical narratives. An important aspect of Obama’s appeal was the connection 
made between his presidential bid and important events and personalities from US 
history. Obama announced his presidential bid where another tall, gangly lawyer 
from Chicago, Lincoln, started his political career – in Springfield, Illinois – with a 
speech that echoed Lincoln’s against slavery.59 Obama used the powerful rhetorical 
forms and devices of Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. Connections were made 
with tropes that are part of every US child’s history class and these were picked up 
and developed journalistically in the media. As discussed previously, through the 
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idea of “hope”, Obama reworked freedom struggles of the American past as a 
vindication of the US ideal in a way that directly linked to his own person. This 
connection with history contrasted with the disillusionment with contemporary politics 
– expressed as the need for “change” – but did so in such a way that the cynical 
aspects of “change” were masked. In the election this might be seen as something of 
a conjuring trick. With few explicit promises being made the past was plundered to 
raise expectations.  
One result of this was that those genuinely wanting to move beyond race had a 
common goal: the election of Obama. Thus the election, especially for Obama’s 
supporters, was something of a stand-in for all concerns related to race. The office of 
the president is meant to bring the nation together at least symbolically. E pluribus 
unum (“out of many, one”) is an unofficial motto of the USA, and this function is 
captured in many ways in the idea behind the office of the presidency. This in the 
form of the election of a black president, however, became a recipe for a passive 
form of engagement – the role of the body politic was to provide change simply in the 
form of a president with a different shade of skin. Putting Obama in office became in 
many ways the endpoint of the change and hope discussed in the campaign. The 
idea of attempting to do something about the often constrained life-chances on 
display among the black population seemed off the table. There was a profoundly 
limited sense of ambition available. Doing something about race had been reduced 
to a change in the racial background of the president. A political approach might 
have had it that there were ways of approaching the difficulties that blacks and many 
whites had together. There was no sense of attempting to create political solidarity or 
suggestions of campaigns or measures to overcome problems in employment, in 
housing, in education, or in the strained relations with law enforcement, for example. 
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Obama’s emphasis on hope gave hope to all Americans because of the narrative of 
a black man rising above these depressing aspects of black life to become the most 
powerful man in the world. Perhaps the spontaneous upsurge might even have been 
taken somewhere after the Obama victory. Certainly there was a case to be made 
that there was a mismatch between what was on offer, the historical symbol of a 
black president, and the seeming desire of seeing an end to racial divisions and 
discrimination. But there was no political vehicle to harness such desires or 
programme to direct it. Subsequently, support for the Democrat candidate has 
ebbed. The 2012 election saw at best a pale shadow of the enthusiasm shown in 
2008. With only a few years having passed, the description of Obama’s support as 
“Obama-mania” began to suggest that something akin to collective insanity had 
taken hold, and subsequently some have become embarrassed at their enthusiasm. 
This has led to some disillusionment and a questioning of the collective madness 
that seemed to grip the electorate. For example the historian Andrew Bacevich noted 
that:  
In retrospect, it’s embarrassing to recall the “Yes, We Can!” jive that marked 
Obama’s ascent to the presidency. Of course, the media are partly to blame… 
But ultimately, it’s the American people who are at fault. We are the ones who 
indulge the fantasy that installing the right person in the White House will “fix” 
things. It won’t. There are some things—a lot of things really—that just can’t be 
fixed.60  
As we noted in the introduction, the enthusiasm for Obama on race was not because 
of attempts to overcome the racial divide. The racial divide was barely acknowledged 
and in policy Obama made no attempt at addressing racial divisions. Rather where 
Obama received support on the basis of race this should be seen in terms of identity. 
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Obama’s attraction when it comes to overcoming racial divisions is singularly 
because of the change in representation based on racial identity. This was 
connected with the personal sense of many that they wished to distance themselves 
from racial politics; that they had moved past race themselves.  
A historical-political view of race in twentieth century America 
We have made the case in several places in this thesis that an understanding of race 
cannot be derived from the consciousness of the electorate or of whites and that we 
needed to establish a historical-political analysis of race. The foundation upon which 
the Obama phenomenon and victory was built was a “turnaround” on race. The racial 
politics that were a powerful force for much of the twentieth century have 
increasingly become less important. To understand the Obama election we needed 
to try to explain why this was the case. The thesis wanted to try to explain why race 
had been so entrenched for most of the twentieth century and why subsequently the 
power behind that racial movement dissipated. 
It was felt that without the thesis being able to present a sustained narrative that 
brought out the importance of race for US politics that the 2008 election could not 
itself be understood. Subsequently a major part of this thesis became an attempt to 
bring race into history – no matter how much race was perhaps misunderstood, or at 
least considered as a matter of identity, disconnected from matters of equality, in the 
election itself. The thesis looked to produce a consistent historical narrative that 
would be able to establish race’s part in historical development in such a way that 
did not rest on psychological explanations or on the legacy of past racial formations 
in the South such as slavery or Jim Crow.  
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Initially, in seeking to bring race into history, the research looked at the physical 
divisions between blacks and whites that had been described in the early 1990s as 
American Apartheid.61 The patterns of post-war suburbanisation where whites from 
various national and ethnic backgrounds decamped from the cities to locales from 
which blacks were excluded underpinned the Apartheid discussed in the 1990s and 
clearly illuminates the racial divide. This focus has the merit of looking at the USA on 
a national basis rather than being limited to racial patterns in the South. Indeed, the 
narrative of Southern Civil Rights success against Jim Crow has been stressed to 
such an extent that the mainstream racial divisions outside the South came to be 
obscured over time. The incredible levels of physical separation outside Southern 
states had been downplayed despite the enormous numbers involved and despite 
the involvement of the federal state in incentivising and sometimes directly 
establishing the coming together of whites and the related separation from blacks.  
What became clear when attempting to use this mass internal migration on a racial 
basis to draw out how race worked was that it had, in key ways, still to be explained. 
There was a racial outlook that fed into federal policy supporting all-white 
suburbanisation, with broad support among whites. However, what remained unclear 
was the reason for the racial prejudice on display. The racial outlook shown by 
policymakers and property developers was supplemented by a racial outlook in the 
population more generally. This was to the extent that there was little in the way of a 
debate or questioning of these divisions at the time. All-white suburbs, which had 
begun from the early twentieth century, became a political issue only into the 1960s. 
There was a need to explain the racial viewpoints behind these initiatives and the 
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level of support they had. Otherwise, the only explanation on offer was that whites 
were racist. And, this does not, as we have argued, in historical terms amount to an 
explanation.  
In working back through history it increasingly became clear that starting in the late 
nineteenth century there were a number of political currents and campaigns that 
taken together developed what might be called a period of reaction. The politics of 
race can be seen as growing out of the conflicts of the late-nineteenth century – and 
ultimately became a means to deal with these conflicts. Problems of class and of 
nationality were to be negotiated in large part through means of racial identification 
as white and this racial ordering seen through via the physical distancing of whites 
from blacks most definitively in the form of suburban separation. The racial divisions 
between blacks and whites as part of the racial associations of a unitary whiteness 
became the major political project (and the major material project) of the USA in the 
twentieth century. To draw this out, the thesis worked through a range of superb 
historical works that looked at class politics, nativism, immigration, ethnic divisions 
and whiteness. The way in which class divisions – and the related questions of 
nationality and religion – came to be dealt with through whiteness was uniquely 
American. Here, I would argue, is in many ways the reason for US exceptionalism – 
the peculiar way in which questions of class and nation were negotiated such that 
class in particular did not form the basis for a clear political divide in the USA even in 
the era of mass industrial production.62 The divisions of class, nation, culture and 
                                            
62
 Foner, writing on the question of the lack of socialism in the USA, critiques what is perhaps the 
main explanation in the racial and ethnic divisions in the USA as being too general. He sets the task 
of “investigating the specific circumstances under which racial and ethnic divisions inhibit class 
solidarity”. Here we have attempted an outline of a historically specific treatment of how key elements 
of this worked in the political sphere, in particular making the case that malleable ethnic divisions 
among whites are subsumed in a white racial identity. Eric Foner, “Why is there no Socialism in the 
United States?”, History Workshop, (Oxford: Ruskin College, 1984): 67. 
338 
religion were ultimately dealt with using race and post-war US economic growth 
combined with the continental size of the country which allowed spaces and 
resources for the incorporation of white ethnics into an undifferentiated whiteness 
and the literal distancing of whites from the black population. Here we could bring out 
the historically specific nature of race as it came together in the late nineteenth to 
mid twentieth century consolidated in the material form it took through the creation of 
whites only suburbs which was at the same time the consolidation of new political 
structures purposefully set against the old urban cores. 
At this point we can note that our historical-political explanation of race fulfilled the 
five criteria that we set out in the introduction. First, the strength of feeling over an 
extended period of time can be explained by the pressures on white ethnics to fit into 
the racial order by distancing themselves from blacks and by the sizeable material 
benefits to be gained from inclusion in the white suburban spaces. Second, the 
national racial separation of whites from blacks explains how race became important 
nationally and not just in the South. Third, the 1924 immigration law that linked 
whiteness to national belonging explained how whiteness became connected with 
being American. Fourth, our historical account showed how race acted through racial 
separation as a means to consolidate a common whiteness in suburban expansion 
where mortgages were backed by federal guarantee. Fifth, the thesis could account 
for the lessening of race with the culmination of the racial project of a combined 
whiteness from the 1970s.  
How racial factors and racial thinking changed during the C20th? 
With race in its twentieth century form – understood as the project of bringing whites 
together to overcome political divisions – the thesis was able to explain why the 
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momentum behind the project flags. What becomes apparent is that the impetus 
behind race figuring as the creation of a combined, unitary whiteness runs its course. 
White ethnic immigrants eventually become as politically and socially white as those 
Northern European Protestant whites that previously made up the base of the 
nativist movement. Arriving at Ellis Island rather than at Plymouth Rock largely 
stopped being a functional difference or having political consequences. This 
combined whiteness was described by Jacobson as a “consanguine” whiteness – in 
other words whites become a unitary race, a family as if by blood, with previous 
group racial differentiations among whites forgotten.63 Increasingly the motivations 
that were behind this outlook were weakened as the concerns upon which it was 
built no longer applied. The insecurities of a place in the racial order and the desire 
to mark a distance from blacks were increasingly less important. New generations 
brought up in the suburbs no longer felt the pressures that their parents and 
grandparents had felt as they left urban spaces marked out by racial conflict.  
We connected the importance race has had in the modern period in the USA with a 
particular political project, that of the transformation of the various white groupings to 
being undifferentiated white Americans. With the completion of this project and the 
removal of the concerns of being white, Chapter 7 made the case that by the 1970s 
race in this sense had begun to lose its intensity. Without organisational forms to 
carry forward a collective memory of the initial concerns around race, generational 
change has meant that increasingly the insecurities of a position in the racial and 
ethnic order that so animated racial politics had greatly diminished. This point was 
demonstrated in the removal of the absolute barrier to blacks relocating to suburban 
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areas which previously were no-go zones that started in the 1970s and the 
subsequent reduction in what demographers call the “dissimilarity index”. Despite the 
divisions between blacks and whites, many blacks were now able to move into 
formerly all-white locales, economics permitting.  
We made the case, however, that this lessening of the importance of race was 
disguised and subsequently rendered less important, identifying two key factors. The 
first was the way in which the major parties continued to deprioritise black concerns 
in an attempt to maintain what they saw as racially influenced white support. The 
problems blacks had, which were often expressed as distinct because of the social, 
economic, and spatial distance from the middle-class white experience, had difficulty 
even being acknowledged by the major parties. What Frymer calls the “capturing” of 
the black vote meant that black electoral influence could often be ignored along with 
black concerns – as black voters had nowhere else to go. Additionally there was the 
sense that the acknowledgement of the needs of blacks would bring with it problems 
for white support. Perhaps the extent to which that this is true is questionable, but a 
cautious political assessment from party leaders would have it that there is no 
reason to put white support at risk. Without significant attempts at political solidarity 
the pressure to alter this orientation has been lacking. In effect this orientation 
propped up and extended the politics of race.  
The second factor that acted to disguise these changes was the way in which a 
politics of exclusion based around suburban interests tended to act as a replacement 
for the politics of race. Despite a falling away of the importance of racial distancing 
as a concern for many whites, nonetheless there remained a local politics, the 
orientation of which was to create a distance from others and their problems which 
was especially connected with suburban locales. Subsequently there is politics of 
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space that, even without specifically racial concerns, works against the interests of 
the poor and of the blacks overrepresented in their ranks.  
This second factor, we suggest, of a polity organised around the needs of small 
enclaves of relatively narrow self-interest, is in part an unintended consequence of 
US racial politics and the particular form that this politics took through spatial 
separation. Without necessarily primarily having a racial component in this later 
period, there is nonetheless a divided politics at work. Nor, perhaps, could or should 
this politics be described as a coherent class politics given its local character. Indeed 
the relative insularity of the concerns of suburban enclaves perhaps points towards 
difficulties in the formation or articulation of class interests. The enormous number of 
small well-organised, self-governing locales based around a striving to control local 
taxation and ensure it goes only to their own requirements tends to work against 
both state and federal policies and attempts to muster resources to resolve wider 
problems. We identified in Chapter 7, that, in this context, the complex politics of a 
differentiated suburbia unevenly affected by economic problems can be seen as a 
better explanation of political problems and orientations than the much more 
generalised politics of race of the post war period.  
It should be noted that our analysis runs counter to and brings into question the 
dominant narrative of a racial backlash by whites starting in the late 1960s. The 
default view has it that the gains made by the Civil Rights movement are met with 
white resentment and that subsequently Republicans made electoral gains through 
splitting off members of what had been the New Deal coalition using often coded 
racial appeals both in the South and then more widely – described by the idea of the 
“Southernisation” of US politics. However, as we argued in Chapter 7, racial division 
was not a product of Republican politicking or new to the period. Rather the division 
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between blacks and whites was already established and this had happened in great 
part through the New Deal. The difficulties that the liberal programme had in inspiring 
supporters or solving contemporary problems – which Nixon tried to deal with at an 
early stage through the idea of the “silent majority” – was what was at issue rather 
than the racial views of whites.  
Why race was understood through identity and disconnected from 
equality 
From a historical perspective, and as discussed in Chapter 6, race as used in the 
2008 election was understood through matters of identity and as disconnected from 
equality: during the election, matters of representation, recognition and symbolism 
predominated. Matters of equality, integration and discrimination, that have 
previously been considered key when it came to race, were seldom raised. This 
focus on identity was not new. However, the way that discussion of race in 2008 was 
dominated by matters of the representation and symbolism that might come with a 
black president was striking and notable. Especially given the opportunities 
presented by what were considered historic changes, the fixation on matters of 
recognition suggests that there was a limited political imagination at play during the 
election and that campaigning across racial lines for solidarity based on common 
interests was not considered feasible or perhaps not even considered.  
Chapter 8 attempted to establish how and why politics connected with identity had 
become so powerful. The Civil Rights movement came to a stuttering halt faced with 
determined opposition against the racial divisions in the North in the late 1960s. 
Programmes such the Johnson’s War on Poverty, likewise, faced seemingly 
insurmountable problems. The subsequent political approach was not aimed at 
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overcoming racial division or attempting to integrate blacks into the US mainstream. 
Rather, the focus shifted to acknowledging racial divisions as a means to managing 
them. Affirmative action started with Nixon in an attempt to diffuse problems through 
working with existing racial identities. The consequence was that civil rights 
questions and activism have tended to be swallowed up in a defence of the idea that 
the state must manipulate outcomes based on race on the basis of redressing past 
injustices. This colour conscious approach undercut previous orientations towards 
equality with energies directed towards gaining federal support and funds rather than 
attempting to raise support from fellow citizens. 
The thesis discussed how identity politics became the predominant way in which 
race was seen and dealt with. This was done not just with affirmative action but, for 
example, with therapeutic approaches that attempted to regulate the relationships 
and even the language of interactions between those of different races. It explored 
how, for example, with Bill Clinton the politics of identity became a powerful way of 
gathering black support and of diffusing racial conflict. Increasingly over time the 
goal of equality was abandoned. The thesis looked at the latest approach, racial 
realism, which further distanced racially conscious forms of management from any 
link with equality. 
In a supplement to the politics of identity we discussed how the conceptions of white 
identity, of whiteness, have been used to dismiss the idea of equality. In Chapter 9, 
we discussed how with the idea of whiteness being taken up as an explanation in 
itself for the maintenance of racial domination, that formal equality has been 
discounted dismissed as disguising the effects of white privilege. However, that 
despite the concerns of whiteness studies authors that whiteness is still a powerful 
force that oppresses, rather today whiteness is under attack as backward, racist etc. 
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Here whiteness studies style approaches end up being on one side of the culture 
wars.  
The role of race in the 2008 election 
The role of race in the 2008 election can be understood as an attempt to distance 
the polity from the racial organisation that was so powerful for most of the twentieth 
century. Race was important for bringing together white Americans of different 
classes in the shared success of the American Century. The sense of racial 
togetherness lessened the importance of class antagonism and, initially, the 
antagonisms of religion and national background. However by the 1970s these 
previous antagonisms, between whites at least, had greatly diminished. The conflict 
of identity between white ethnic background and white American no longer existed, 
the drive and/or pressure to fit into white America was no longer at issue. With the 
passing of the drive to fit into a white society, which was at the same time a 
distancing from blacks, and which at the same time was the mechanism to bring the 
different white ethnic groups together, racism became an anachronism and 
increasingly morally abhorrent. The racism of US society was clearly unproductive, 
alienated foreigners and immigrants, caused conflict, and was increasingly alien to 
new generations. The thesis charted the rise of race in this twentieth century form 
and then its dissolution. We attempted to show the backlash against Cold War 
whiteness and the hostility to the racism with which it was connected. 
In the wake of the completed project of white American unity, racism became a 
problem. From the Democrat’s side they seemed constantly under criticism for 
policies whenever it seemed they might help blacks. It seemed race was a tool used 
by Republicans that linked social reform to support for the poor, made undeserving 
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by racial background. Even with polls showing support for Obama, the Democrats 
held their breath hoping that election returns did not show the “Bradley Effect” i.e. 
whites had hidden their prejudices against Obama in opinion polling and would vote 
McCain in the privacy of the polling booth.64 Because the understanding was that the 
Republicans had relied on coded racial appeals to white bases of support in recent 
years the relief was that, in the words of Democrat supporters’ chants, “race doesn’t 
matter!”. This thesis has made the case, however, that such fears were overblown. 
The understanding that racism lurked in the background, in the consciousness of 
many whites, did not describe reality. This thesis made the case that the strength of 
identification with race in its twentieth century form has long been in decline. The 
Republicans needed to accommodate an electorate that was increasingly non-white 
and so being linked to racial views was a constant but growing problem. Further, 
race was connected with populist outpourings which have been constantly disruptive. 
Both parties were invested in the polity moving away from race in its twentieth 
century form and thus defusing its potential effects. 
Consequently the primary way in which race figured immediately in the election was 
as an attempt to avoid making race into a political issue. Republicans saw no 
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mileage in playing to racial sentiments and were concerned they might appear racist. 
Democrats did not want to alienate whites by any hint that resources might be 
directed towards the urban poor. This was combined with a general sensitivity to 
discussing race that has been a feature of politics in recent years. Pronouncements 
by both Republicans and Democrats are scanned for any hint of prejudice or 
controversy on the issue. Consequently both parties saw little gain to be had and so 
had little to say on race. Further, Obama distanced himself from the idea that race 
was or should be a factor in policy.  
To remove race from politics might be considered difficult, however, given the 
massive disparities in resources and life changes that remain for blacks and whites. 
One way to removing the source of the difficulty could be done by bringing some 
measure of development to the black urban ghettos, but this was not seen as 
plausible. Rather race could be removed as a political problem by allowing it to 
continue at the level of identity, to recognise and allow for cultural expressions but to 
remove the link between race and equality. It was this link with equality that had 
energised those either wanting to overcome race and those wanting to see blacks 
oppressed.  
The thesis charted how this worked from Nixon on: how this shift from matters of 
equality to the recognition of identity is how race had long been managed in the 
USA. As we attempted to show when discussing identity politics it allowed for race to 
be recognised in law and racial group membership allowed to be used as a passport 
to resources, employment etc. by some middle class blacks. Thus matters of equality 
became secondary as racial difference was acknowledged and accepted. 
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The post-racial strategy of the election was to further remove race from politics. It did 
that partly, as we discussed, through deconstructing race. As we discussed in 
Chapter 1 and 2, race through the mechanism of “hope” was used in making race 
part of the many narratives of lives that might be expressed in the many American 
Dreams. Here as race became part of everyday lives it was also removed from 
politics. This was also a distancing from whiteness and the national link between 
being American and whiteness.  
The other way that the polity was distanced from race was through the election itself. 
The mass campaigning by whites to elect Obama signalled both their own personal 
dislike of race and also the way in which the polity as a whole wanted to move 
beyond race. However, perhaps the greatest way that the USA signalled being post-
racial was in the form of Obama’s election. Thus representation and identity played 
their role again to manage race. As we discussed in Chapter 1, Obama was in many 
ways the endpoint of the campaigning. 
Race in its twentieth century guise did not directly impact the Obama election. There 
was no sense of an attempt at a revival of the idea of a “white” America. Rather what 
was at issue was whether whites could pass the test of having transcended their 
racist past by voting for Obama. In that regard race as it figured in 2008, as a cultural 
test of whites might be understood as part of the culture wars. Our analysis, 
however, points to the decline of race in the form it took for most of the twentieth 
century. The hostility towards blacks as part of marking out a position within the 
consolidation of white mainstream America was largely marginal as of the 2008 
election. Undoubtedly there were some politicians attempting to whip up animosity 
towards Obama, but these amounted to sideshows. In one way the parties had long 
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artificially kept race going by, as we discussed in Chapter 7, deciding to marginalise 
the interests of blacks. 
Indeed as part of the culture wars, expressed through the efforts of those associated 
with whiteness studies, and as we discussed in Chapter 9, attacks on white culture 
have continued. Indeed given the difficulties of changing one’s culture these often 
amount to continued attacks on whites. Partly it seems that to maintain many 
racialised cultures means opposition to white culture seen as causing oppression.  
We have discussed the way that in 2008 it becomes clear that race has been 
divorced from questions of equality. The absence of any significant politics of 
equality, the lack of any movement that have attempted solidarity across the race 
line means that the enormous racial divisions have not been brought into question. 
To overcome such divisions requires political will and support to garner resources. It 
is not just that the racial divide has not been attacked but also that the idea of 
equality and attempts to bridge the divide based on attacking inequality have been 
dismissed. Rather than raise the problem of the racial divide, through the fixing of 
racial identities in identity politics, of which whiteness should be counted an aspect, 
there is a shoring up of the racial divisions.  
Public proclamations of the idea of that the USA was post-racial have not continued 
through Obama’s time in office. They have been replaced by descriptions of the 
tensions that came with racial shootings Black Lives Matter protests.65 Indeed public 
opinion has come to see worsening race relations. Drawing too much attention to 
being post-racial raises a number of uncomfortable questions about the divisions 
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between blacks and whites. However, the idea that came with the USA being post-
racial still remains. Race is not the issue it was, dividing the US polity.  
Whereas blackness still exists and provides a cultural touchstone with which people 
identify themselves, whiteness, in its older “mainstream” normal sense, does not. 
The United States is not so much post-racial but is seeing the break-up of the white 
identity established in the interwar years. Obama’s election took place in a context 
when whiteness – another form of American-ness – is no longer regnant, no longer 
encapsulates values that others look up to. In the 1960s most Americans saw 
themselves as success stories – ordinary people from diverse backgrounds who 
superseded their class/ethnic backgrounds to become successful, patriotic, law-
abiding, independent, morally-improving, entrepreneurial embodiments of the 
American Dream. Blacks served as the repository of all was negative and un-
American – inner-city, violent, hopelessly poor, suffering family breakdown, welfare-
dependent, criminal etc.  
But in the late 1960s and 1970s this white mainstream was impugned as 
institutionally racist, as irrationally anti-communist, war-mongering and culturally 
vapid. Expressed in affirmative action, the moral improvement expected in Myrdal 
appeared to have stopped, Americans were seen as hopelessly racist, their values 
corrupt. Cast adrift by political leaders some whites have attempted to cast 
themselves as victims of this change – encouraged by the template set out by 
Nixon’s silent majority. African Americans continue to exist in a negative relationship 
to white Americans overall, embodying the worst of America. Although what 
previously have been seen as negative cultural traits – shallow materialism and 
violence of the inner cities – have, in a twist, become partly celebrated quite widely 
today.  
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Obama as President: The limits of representation 
With Obama in power it could be argued that there has been sensitivity towards 
matters of race that would not otherwise have been the case. The treatment of racial 
incidents was attempted through mediation and linked to identity. Obama’s 
connection was that blacks might be discriminated against because they looked “like 
me”. Here, Obama attempted to setup an encounter group for the nation. Obama 
might be described as the Therapist in Chief. While there has been further reaction 
to police violence because of its sometimes overt racial nature, this response is 
limited to the issue of police violence and seems unable to connect with whites or 
else look at broader issues. While it seems possible for the style of US policing to be 
modified, it seems unclear that this approach would appear that there is little in the 
way of a political approach to tackle other divisions. Matters of economics, housing, 
employment, education, health and black disadvantage have not been able to 
feature in the politics on offer today. The politics of representation can say that 
blacks should be treated as human beings, but the ability to move beyond that and 
look at equality more broadly is not present. 
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